Subject: Question regarding perfect forward secrecy in http 2.0

From: Carsten Krüger <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2013 18:30:41 +0200

Hello,

first of all sorry for not knowing what happend before in discussion
of http 2.0.

Is it still possible to change the http 2.0 draft in a way that
all traffic is encrypted?
I'd like to suggest perfect forward secrecy encryption even if proper
authentication is not possible or wished.

http2:// is ALWAYS pfs encrytped
https2:// is ALWAYS pfs encrytped and server authenticated

pfs encryption should be not an option but the default for everyone
that uses http2.

At present time (PRISM, tempora etc.) it should be the goal to prevent
passive sniffing of traffic.

greetings
Carsten

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From: David Morris <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2013 15:56:42 -0700 (PDT)

No No No ... unless there is a viable spec for intermediaries which
can be known to the user and provide services.

It isn't our role as the IETF to take what I believe is a political
position by insisting all traffic be encrypted. Nor is it our role
to insist on the additional deployement expense related to providing
full encryption as the cost of entry.

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From: Amos Jeffries <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2013 11:42:38 +1200

> full encryption as the cost of entry.

Carsten,
   The WG charter had a key requirement to make HTTP/2 operate over the 
same infrastructure used for HTTP/1. That necessarily means HTTP/2 needs 
to be an open protocol which can be delivered over both secured (TLS) 
and non-secured (TCP) mediums.
  * TLS provides the requirements for perfect forward secrecy *if* used 
that way.
  * The application-layer transactions and payloads being delivered are 
free to contain any additional security required beyond what TLS offers 
(ie DRM-like encryption features on the payload).

The existing HTTP/1 infrastructure already provides perfect forward 
secrecy in the same ways. The problem is just that almost nobody is 
using it, and those who are often choose partial secrecy over perfect.

Amos

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From: Carsten Krüger <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 19:56:17 +0200

Hello Amos,

> same infrastructure used for HTTP/1.

That's ok

But what prevents an upgrade of the connection to an encrypted one?
It must not necessarily be TLS.

> using it, and those who are often choose partial secrecy over perfect.

That's the problem, and that's why I vote for PFS without
authentication as an default in http 2.

greetings
Carsten