Subject: #539: mention TLS vs plain text passwords or dict attacks?

From: Julian Reschke <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 10:27:38 +0100

Hi there,

in the IESG feedback, we were asked by Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell 
to mention TLS in part 7:

Sean Turner:

> 1) So I guess the reason we're not saying TLS is an MTI with basic/digest is that that's getting done in an httpauth draft? It really wouldn't hurt to duplicate that while we're getting the other one done (I know you *don't* want a reference to that draft).

Stephen Farrell:

> Please check the secdir review. (​​http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03491.html) I agree with the comment that this really should have some mention of using TLS to protect basic/digest, even if that ought also be elsewhere.

However, P7 currently does not attempt to discuss security 
considerations that would be specific to particular authentication schemes.

Basic and Digest are defined in RFC 2617, and already have these 
warnings in their Security Considerations. The same will be true for the 
replacement specs the HTTPAUTH WG is working on.

Thus I'd like to close this as WONTFIX -- feedback appreciated!

Best regards, Julian

---

From: Amos Jeffries <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 22:55:12 +1300

On 2/01/2014 10:27 p.m., Julian Reschke wrote:
>> 1) So I guess the reason we're not saying TLS is an MTI with
>> basic/digest is that that's getting done in an httpauth draft? It
>> really wouldn't hurt to duplicate that while we're getting the other
>> one done (I know you *don't* want a reference to that draft).
> 
> Stephen Farrell:
> 
>> Please check the secdir review. (​​
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03491.html) I
>> agree with the comment that this really should have some mention of
>> using TLS to protect basic/digest, even if that ought also be elsewhere.
> 

Peg me as a "dont care".

But, if they are going to make a fuss it would not be far amiss to have
a generic mention that "
Either message-based security (ie Secure-HTTP or similar) or underlying
transport security (ie IPSEC, TLS or other future techniques) have
implications on the HTTP messages and any data contained.
"
or something to that effect. The important details being that TLS is
just one option, and wrapping only a portion of the message in
encryption is reasonable.

Amos

---

From: Julian Reschke <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 15:04:17 +0100

> Thus I'd like to close this as WONTFIX -- feedback appreciated!

Proposed change 
(<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/attachment/ticket/539/539.diff>): 
add

"Challenges and responses are transmitted in header field values, and 
thus can easily leak information when not using a secured connection. 
Depending on the type of the authentication scheme, it therefore can be 
necessary to use a TLS-secured connection ("Transport Layer Security", 
[RFC5246])."

Amos, if you want to tune this to clarify that there are other ways to 
secure the bits, please go ahead and make a proposal...

Best regards, Julian

---

From: Julian Reschke <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 15:27:32 +0100

> secure the bits, please go ahead and make a proposal...

...and applied with 
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/changeset/2571>.

Best regards, Julian