Subject: Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04: (with COMMENT)

From: Spencer Dawkins <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2018 14:43:54 +0000

Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I don't object to publishing this document, but I do have an honest question.
Is OCSP sufficiently robust and stable that you're expecting OCSP checks to
work as a security mitigation?

I remember some concerns about that in the SIP community, probably three years
ago, and thought I should ask before the document is approved.

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From: Mark Nottingham <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:53:40 +1100

Hi Spencer,

> On 9 Jan 2018, at 1:43 am, Spencer Dawkins <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 

On the Web I think it's reasonable, when using OCSP stapling. Note that it's given as an example here; it's up to an implementation to decide what's appropriate.

Thanks,

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/

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From: Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 19:21:22 -0800

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 6:53 PM, Mark Nottingham <[email-masked]> wrote:

> On the Web I think it's reasonable, when using OCSP stapling. Note that
> it's given as an example here; it's up to an implementation to decide
> what's appropriate.
>

Well, it's potentially reasonable with MUST STAPLE, though the exposure
window is pretty long

-Ekr