Subject: RE: [Ieprep] Public Safety?

From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 14:25:06 -0800

At 11:42 AM 3/29/2002, Gunn, Janet NE wrote:
>we don't want to get in the habit of thinking "X worked well for 9/11, 
>therfore it will always work well."
>
>Someone pointed out that the hospital system in NYC worked well, but that 
>was more because of the nature of the incident: so many were beyond the 
>need for hospital services.  But that does not, per se, mean the the 
>hospital system does not need to be improved.

agreed. On the other hand, I'm not into solving problems that aren't there. 
I'd like to focus first on problems that are demonstrable, and then ask 
ourselves what else we need to think about.

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From: Henning Schulzrinne <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 20:03:17 -0500

> ourselves what else we need to think about.

Having a real problem also helps with evaluating the cost-benefit
trade-off. Any priority scheme imposes costs, in terms of implementation
and testing complexity, need for strong authentication and possibility
for denial-of-service attacks both during emergencies and during regular
use. The risk is probably higher if the capability is rarely, if ever,
exercised.  Thus, this becomes a risk assessment exercise. Also, one has
to ask oneself whether spending the same amount of money on adding
resources instead of selectively dropping messages isn't a better use of
resources. [Insert repeat of QoS-vs-overprovisioning discussion here,
iteration 2457.]