Subject: RE: [Ieprep] draft-ietf-ieprep-requirements-00.txt

From: "Gunn, Janet NE" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 16:10:44 -0400

I am NOT advocating any particular solution.  I just don't want to see it
dismissed as a "non-problem".

Yes, complex QoS systems would also be vulnerable to targeted attacks.

I am not sure which (monopolizing core capacity, or disrupting QoS systems)
is a more inviting target- I guess it depends on the attacker's motives. 

And personally I think that (for IP telephony, at least) variants on the
"call setup" process would be more useful than complex QoS systems.  For
instance I recently read an article (it is sitting on my dining room table
at home, so I don't have the reference handy) about schemes for finding
alternate paths when RSVP can't find the needed capacity on the primary
route.  (I'll post the reference tonight.)  I am not necessarily advocating
that either.  I just don't think that "congestion in the core" should be
completely ignored.

Janet

-----Original Message-----
From: Randy Bush [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 3:51 PM
To: Gunn, Janet NE
Cc: 'Beard, Cory'; ieprep
Subject: RE: [Ieprep] draft-ietf-ieprep-requirements-00.txt

> No matter what the ratio of core capacity to edge capacity, I suspect that
> SOMEONE could come up with a "virus" (using that term in its most general
> sense) which could use up enough of the core capacity to cause congestion.

and similarly, someone could come up with an attack on the complex qos
systems you seem to be advocating to overcome this.

randy

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