Subject: [Ieprep] IEPREP requirements for accounting

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 09:25:26 EDT

To all,

The point of a number of my comments the past several weeks is to add a 
requirement to IEPREP as follows. I don't know whether this should go under 
"Security", since by itself it does not provide "security" in the normal 
sense. While this draft concentrates on "ETS", that is, authorized emergency 
calls, this requirement also applies (maybe even stronger) to public dialed 
emergency calls like 911 or 112 and it applies to what I have been proposing 
called "Assured Service".

-----------------------------------------
REQ x: Accountability: The security of ETS depends on being able to 
determine, after the fact, who used the service. This is important in order 
to detect use by unauthorized persons (through theft of passwords, etc.) as 
well as improper use by authorized persons. The system or network must 
provide a capability for maintaining a record of each use, and attempted use, 
of the service, to include whatever identifying information is available.
-----------------------------------------

And before comments related to packet transfer start, the above is not 
intended in any way to imply that any network element should record transfers 
of packets or streams of packets that are marked for "preferential 
treatment". It applies to call setup, i.e., INVITEs. Therefore, it applies 
directly to SIP, which is the subject of this draft.

Mike Pierce
Artel

---

From: Henning Schulzrinne <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 10:08:15 -0400

In my view, this is a strictly operational requirement. It is clearly 
trivially possible to record SIP requests, including any priority 
indications or authentication exchanges. If it is more than just keeping 
a log file, SIP itself is not a candidate for conveying such accounting 
records to third parties. The format and detail of such logs or 
accounting records are also beyond the scope of this WG.

Thus, I fail to see how this requirement will in any way influence the 
design choices made in SIP/SIPPING. The requirement is obviously 
harmless (and a good idea for an operator), but, taking Scott's advice, 
I would rather concentrate on things that bear on the design process.

[email-masked] wrote:
> requirement to IEPREP as follows. I don't know whether this should go 
> under "Security", since by itself it does not provide "security" in the 
> normal sense. While this draft concentrates on "ETS", that is, 
> authorized emergency calls, this requirement also applies (maybe even 
> stronger) to public dialed emergency calls like 911 or 112 and it 
> applies to what I have been proposing called "Assured Service".
> 
> determine, after the fact, who used the service. This is important in 
> order to detect use by unauthorized persons (through theft of passwords, 
> etc.) as well as improper use by authorized persons. The system or 
> network must provide a capability for maintaining a record of each use, 
> and attempted use, of the service, to include whatever identifying 
> information is available.
> intended in any way to imply that any network element should record 
> transfers of packets or streams of packets that are marked for 
> "preferential treatment". It applies to call setup, i.e., INVITEs. 
> Therefore, it applies directly to SIP, which is the subject of this draft.
> 
> Mike Pierce
> Artel
> 

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---

From: RJ Atkinson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 10:42:11 -0400

On Tuesday, Oct 15, 2002, at 09:25 America/Montreal, [email-masked] 
wrote:
>  While this draft concentrates on "ETS", that is, authorized emergency 
> calls, this requirement also applies (maybe even stronger) to public 
> dialed emergency calls like 911 or 112 and it applies to what I have 
> been proposing called "Assured Service".

Support for POTS-like 911 and 112 services are out of scope for this 
Working Group,
but should be in scope for SIPPING.   So I'd suggest that you take your 
comments
of that flavour directly over there, rather than raising them here.

> determine, after the fact, who used the service.

I do not believe the above sentence is factually true.

If one really think it is true, maybe a starting point would be for one
to provide a more detailed definition of "security".  Words that might 
be
more clear (not sure which one's meaning might be) include for example:
	authentication
	confidentiality
	integrity

> This is important in order to detect use by unauthorized persons 
> (through theft of passwords, etc.) as well as improper use by 
> authorized persons. The system or network must provide a capability 
> for maintaining a record of each use, and attempted use, of the 
> service, to include whatever identifying information is available.

I do not believe this is a legitimate requirement to place on service 
providers.

As long as the service provider has enough capacity to handle both 
legitimate
and non-legitimate calls, there is no functional need for the service 
provider
to detect or account for the non-legitimate uses/users.  This is a 
business tradeoff
between call capacity costs and accounting/detection costs.  Different 
service
providers might legitimately make different decisions for that tradeoff 
based on
differing cost structures.

Ran
[email-masked]