Subject: RE: [Ieprep] RE: network congestion, VoIP, NCS contracting approa ch, etc.

From: "Nguyen, An" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 14:13:29 -0500

Rex,

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Rex Buddenberg [mailto:[email-masked]]
>Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 1:19 PM
>To: Nguyen, An
>Cc: 'RJ Atkinson'; ieprep
>Subject: Re: [Ieprep] RE: network congestion, VoIP, NCS contracting
>approach, etc.

> 
> 
>I believe you have your priorities in the wrong order.  

>First, is it ok to translate 'reliability' into availability (up time /
>total time) and survivability?  

>The engineering solution to the availability problems involve multiple
>threading (elimination of single points of failure).  In most cases,
>this tends to result in overprovision which overtake the QoS issues.  

Actually, since reliability/availability/survivability and priority are
related to QoS in Y.1541, they will be addressed somewhat concurrently in
the T1 organization. At least that is the plan agreed to at the last
meeting.

Regards,

An

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From: Rex Buddenberg <[email-masked]>
Date: 13 Nov 2002 13:25:40 -0800

> the T1 organization. At least that is the plan agreed to at the last

Order of business is important; if you discuss concurrently, you're
likely to get into the paralysis by analysis loop you see going on here.

Availability and survivability properly belong in one bin.  And, IMHO,
it should be the first bin.  The tools to counter Ao vulnerabilities and
those to counter survivability vulnerabilities are pretty much the
same.  The only real difference is with survivability, some Bad Guy is
killing your equipment and with Ao, you're equipment is killing itself
(maintenance-induced failures are a lesser included offense here).
  
QoS control, on the other hand, requires a different toolset.  From your
para above, it's not clear whether priority is the problem or the
solution.  If you're predetermined that it's the problem, then implement
diff-serv and caveat emptor -- you've got some folks out here warning
you that the cure may be worse than the disease.  
	What I'm suggesting is that if you appropriately solve your Ao and
survivability problems, this one may or may not exist.  

(Precise language warning: if you read, say, the Defense Science Board
literature, they lump All Of The Above into a bin called 'Security'.)