Subject: RE: [Ieprep] Re: more process discussion

From: "Folts, Harold" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 12:41:56 -0500

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bill Woodcock [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 1:18 PM
> To: Folts, Harold
> Cc: 'King, Kimberly S.'; 'ieprep'
> Subject: RE: [Ieprep] Re: more process discussion
> 
> 
>       On Tue, 12 Nov 2002, Folts, Harold wrote:
>     > The Internet technology offers an excellent protential 
> to support
>     > emergency communications in times of disaster.
> 
> Uh, this isn't "potential," this is actual fact.  The 
> question at hand is
> whether there's a problem that needs to be fixed.  Is there a problem
> which needs to be fixed?  If so, can you articulate it, 
> quantify it, and
> describe the process you went through to discover and identify it?
> 
>                                 -Bill

The ieprep working group is "preparedness" not "repair"

Hal 
_______________________________________________
Ieprep mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ieprep

---

From: Bill Woodcock <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 10:01:00 -0800 (PST)

> The ieprep working group is "preparedness" not "repair"

So we're preparing a solution for a problem which we acknowledge doesn't
exist?

Can we delay smacking the Internet upside the head with the solution until
the problem actually manifests itself, perhaps?

                                -Bill

---

From: RJ Atkinson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 13:07:36 -0500

On Wednesday, Nov 13, 2002, at 12:41 America/Montreal, Folts, Harold 
> The ieprep working group is "preparedness" not "repair"

Hal,

	On 9/11/01 the Internet created an existence proof that it is
already fully prepared.  The Internet has demonstrated this also in
other countries (e.g. Japan during/after earthquakes, California
during/after earthquakes).

	Sounds to me and others like we are already prepared.

	Can we please shut down the WG and go home now ?

Quite Seriously Yours,

Ran
[email-masked]

---

From: Rex Buddenberg <[email-masked]>
Date: 13 Nov 2002 11:11:18 -0800

On Wed, 2002-11-13 at 10:07, RJ Atkinson wrote:
  The Internet has demonstrated this also in
> during/after earthquakes).
Aha, my packrat tendencies are occasionally useful.  Attached below is
an after-action on the Kobe earthquake -- 1995.  

The Kobe earthquake has several lessons worth reviewing; here are a few
points that I've picked up:
	- note that this mentality is pre-internet but you should note the
'networked bulletin boards' notions that appear
	- Kobe, like Loma Prieta and Northridge, happened at an hour when
family reunification problems are at their nadir.  None of these three
happened while school was in session.  Picture the 'I'm alive' issue if
the quake had occurred at 1000 local.
	- note that the voice vs other data feel is a bit different.
	- there's a whole lot of what the software geeks call open source
running around here -- the reporters don't have much nice to say about
the higher-than-local government.

To: Rex Buddenberg <[email-masked]>
From: [email-masked]
Date:         26 May 95 10:03:28 EST
Subject:      Re: Kobe earthquake article

KOBE'S LESSON:
DIAL 711 FOR "OPEN" EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

Eli M. Noam and Harumasa Sato

_______________________________
Tranquility and routine were abruptly shattered on January 17 in
the Japanese port city of Kobe, when an earthquake struck at
dawn, killing more than five thousand people and leaving many
more homeless.  The dazed survivors, together with their families
and public safety agencies, immediately faced an information
problem.  What was going on?  How could help be organized?  What
was the fate of their loved ones?  A few months later, we are
able to assess how helpful modern communications and information
technology was in producing answers to these questions.  The
experience of Kobe, as well as those of the less severe quakes of
Los Angeles and San Francisco, are important for a world that is
always at the edge of natural or manmade disaster.
     The basic lesson from Kobe is that the usual approach of
disaster communications, traditionally based on military-style
public safety agencies that are operating in a top-down manner
and share information with "civilians" only on a "need-to-know"
basis, should be replaced. Instead, we should set up an open-
access emergency system -- open to inputs from a wide variety of
public and private participants and with open to access to that
information. Not only would such a system be more efficient as a
tool of information and organization, but it would also be more
resilient to the shocks of disaster.
     There are always two ways to protect vital information. One
is to design and build elaborate and hardened technical systems.
This is expensive and will always miss unforeseen mishaps. The
other approach is to decentralize the information system so that
even if many of its parts are damaged the whole will continues to
function.
     A historic analogy: in the early days of the American
republic, important public documents were protected in archives
and other storage facilities.  Thomas Jefferson, here also ahead
of his time, argued instead for protection by decentralization:
     "Our experience has proved to us that a single copy, or
     a few, deposited in MS in the public offices cannot be
     relied on for any great length of time.  The ravages of
     fire and of ferocious enemies have had but too much
     part in producing the very loss we now deplore. . .
     This leads us then to the only means of preserving. . .
     that is, a multiplication of printed copies."

Today, electronic information and communications technology makes
it possible to organize emergency communications in a similarly
decentralized fashion.  To explore this approach, let us look at
the experience of Kobe, both the positive and the negative.
     1.  Phone networks are not so much destroyed as congested
into uselessness. In Kobe, most lines and switches kept on going.
Service was temporarily interrupted to about 20% of subscribers
in the damaged areas, mostly due to power outages (285,000
subscriber lines), destruction of buildings (100,000 lines), and
cut transmission links mostly above-ground (about 100,000 lines).
For long-distance service, the trunks of NTT, Japan's
traditionally dominant domestic carrier, were fairly resilient.
Among competing carriers, DDI's microwave transmission proved
robust, while the fiber links of Teleway Japan (using its highway
rights-of-way) were temporarily cut when the roads were
destroyed.
     One of the first things that needed fixing were ATM cash
machines and financial networks. It turned out that survivors
needed money to buy food; credit cards needed verification; and
interbank transfers were urgently needed. Almost 500 ATM host
computers and terminals, as well as the system management itself,
were damaged, and their restorations proved difficult.
     The main problem, however, was congestion rather than
destruction.  Because everyone was trying to call at the same
time, nobody got through. Networks are designed to handle about
ten percent of their subscribers at one time. In Kobe, traffic
volume on the first day was 50 times the usual peak---way above
capacity.  Next day, network demand was still 20 times normal
peak. This is not a short-term problem for disaster areas.
Experience shows that after a crisis the volume of calls stays
heavy for a long time.
     In Kobe, as before in California, most incoming long-
distance calls were blocked in favor of outgoing calls.
Emergency service (911, known in Japan as 119 and 110) received
priority, but it congested almost immediately and became more of
a source of frustration than help.
     Mobile communications proved helpful in bypassing destroyed
landlines. But they, too, were vulnerable and congested. Traffic
volume was seven times normal. In heavily damaged areas, one
third of NTT's transmission towers were damaged or stopped
working for lack of electricity.  Emergency batteries proved
inadequate.  Adjacent towers often maintained coverage, but at
the expense of capacity.
      Disaster mitigation meets the prepared. Long in advance of
disasters, the public should be educated on using telephones only
minimally in such situations, and encouraged to pick a "message
meeting point." Congestion control should receive priority.
Collaborative multi-aid agreements among otherwise competing
carriers, such as already exist in New York, should be reached
and tested in advance. Inbound 800 numbers could let some long-
distance calls though even while most are blocked.  But no
network can be designed economically to withstand the gravest and
rarest of disasters and congestions. One must be realistic about
the limitations of advanced planning.
     2.  Television provided the big picture, often from the
over-dramatized perspective of hovering helicopters, but not the
little-picture details which people on the scene really need.  TV
networks  released only verified official information on the
number of the dead and the magnitude of the earthquake, and
because these figures were underestimates, public recognition of
the catastrophe was long delayed.  A Kobe congressman called
several members of the Japanese Diet in Tokyo, pleading for a
declaration of national emergency and the dispatch of troops, but
was disbelieved for hours, because early TV reports were much
less disturbing.
     Radio proved again very useful in emergencies. (The humble
battery becomes critical in emergencies. If seems impossible to
have too many.) In California, the much-maligned talk radio shows
provided a tension-reducing two-way link and countered false
rumors. In Japan, too, the number of calls to radio stations was
large--20,000 calls to FM Kobe, and 30,000 to NHK in four days.
     3.  The major lesson from Kobe is that computer networks and
bulletin boards are more effective than voice phone networks and
broadcasting, once the immediate calamity is over.
     In Kobe, the "Nifty" computer network quickly became a major
meeting point. Nifty (as well as its rival PC-Van) established a
special earthquake bulletin board on the earthquake. During its
first week, 5,000 messages were posted, and accessed 650,000 by
140,000 subscribers.  Usage of the board was free, and Nifty
matched charitable donations.
     The first messages posted were about disaster and
transportation conditions. Soon, inquiries appeared by friends
and families outside of Kobe. Initially only few messages were
sent by survivors since many of them  had lost computers, phones,
and power. But some Nifty members soon reached an access point in
an adjacent prefecture.
     One of the most interesting things to happen in Kobe was the
emergence of "information volunteers."  These were mostly
outsiders who came into Kobe carrying their portable computers.
They visited shelters, collected messages about survivors (some
taken from handwritten notes attached to ruins), and sent out the
specifics about needs.  They created a meeting point between
needs and help and coordinated supplies among shelters. They
obtained regional data about food, water, and hot bath
opportunities, and put it on a regional map.  Later, they offered
information about jobs, schooling, and housing.
     Many of the volunteers organized themselves over the
network. For instance, a Nifty forum for railway enthusiasts
delivered a message  "Let's meet at the Osaka station at 8
O'Clock this weekend and then go to Kobe to help.  Each member
should bring food and other supplies for survivors." A forum for
motorcycle owners organized its members to move into the damaged
neighborhoods to help as well as to obtain information which was
put on the network.
One software company designed an information system to track and
register survivors. This system was first ignored by official
agencies but received 3-4,000 inquiries within one day.
     It is often feared that "unofficial" information is
inaccurate and not updated. However, once the Nifty bulletin
board information grew in volume, it tended to be self-verifying.
While some messages may have been inaccurate, their sum-total
offered a better picture than the official information collected
in the traditional way. Information was periodically reviewed by
a Nifty monitoring committee, the messages seems to have been
generally informative, responsible, and often quite interesting.
Feedback among network members, as well as messages of thanks by
those benefitted, further encouraged reliability.
     4. Government authorities are just as much in the dark in a
catastrophe as individuals are.  During the Los Angeles quake,
President Clinton's early information sources were his brother
and the TV news.  In Japan, at its noontime meeting, the
government still believed the number of dead to be only about
200.  To get a first-hand report, the military sent a helicopter
to videotape the damage, but it lacked telecommunications
facilities to send the recording to Tokyo. Most information
travelled up the hierarchical chains-of-command of rival
ministries and were slowly coordinated to assemble a full
official picture. Public notification was correspondingly late
and incomplete.
     Emergency communications often failed. At the Ashiya fire
department, only two telephones out of six functioned, so that
most incoming calls got a busy signal. Fire fighters could not
reach their own department, doctors, or hospitals.
     The usual response to problems of this sort is the call for
a technological fix, such as the design of a still better
communications system. Kobe illustrates the ultimate futility of
this approach. Kobe's Prefecture had installed, at considerable
expense ($80 million), a satellite communication system to
connect it to local and national government, offices and public
safety agencies.  But in the crunch the costly system was
useless. It quickly stopped working when the backup batteries ran
out, and the back-up generators overheated due to the failure of
water cooling. And the public safety organizations did not know
how to take care of the system. For example, they had no training
in how to adjust the angle of the satellite dishes once they had
been upset by the quake.  Only two calls were logged in on the
entire system on the morning of the calamity.
     5. None of this should be surprising. Governments usually
get an incomplete and often slow picture from their field agents.
Emergency systems can never be built to be fool- and disaster
proof. If anything, modern communications become more vulnerable
as their electronics are hard to fix in the field, and as they
become more dependent on outside power supply.  It is time to
learn from these experiences and revise the basic philosophy of
emergency communication. Emergencies are no time to maintain the
attitude of military-style emergency operations that keep
information close to the official vest.
     Instead of high-tech constructions, another approach is
needed -- a decentralized and open system of interconnected
computer servers, where individuals and emergency workers can
deposit and collect information about the state of their
neighborhood, family, business, and whereabouts. It would be used
by public safety agencies and insurance companies an a planning
tool, and could send messages and instructions to targeted
individuals, or areas.
     Such a "711" emergency information system (the number is
available) would permit access to an "emergency dial tone,"
enabling the access of interlincked emergency computer bulletin
boards on a priority basis, with automatic cutoff after a few
minutes. Because of its decentralization, including sites remote
from the disaster area, and "inter-net working" among multiple
carriers, the system would be less vulnerable to shock. There
could be a
schematic display of a city, block by block.  Individuals,
rescuers, non-profit organizations, and information volunteers
would log in information, whether by phone-lines, or over the
air. Much of the information would also be available to distant
parties.  The system would give news organizations detailed
information, link world-wide donors with actual needs, provide
"how-to" information, and reach specialized data bases, for
example about toxic substances.  Certain communications could
have to remain confidential or private and  require special
levels of access authorization, but that could be easily
accomplished.
     Of course, most people today do not have access to
computers, especially in an emergency. But once the immediate
calamity is over and problems of coordination displace those of
physical survival, they could call in by regular or mobile phones
to talk to volunteers supported by automatic equipment.
     In Kobe, the beginnings of such an information system are
being introduced by equipping shelters and other public places
with access to computer networks.  (Schools, in general, make
excellent emergency nodes for people services and communications-
-one reason to give them effective network links.) The Kobe city
government is now providing  public information on housing,
transportation, and schooling on the network.  Kobe residents
communicate with the world. A high school class in New York
collected donations and sent them to Kobe, after seeing pictures
of the damage on the internet.
     Who could set up such systems?  Commercial and non-profit
software developers would provide the shell that would be put by
computer networks on the net; telecommunication carriers would
offer access points and links; information volunteers would
update the system once a disaster strikes; municipalities,
community groups, and volunteer rescue organizations would
provide the basic municipal grid information which is the main
expense. Unlike the 911 service (which would continue), a 711
system requires no costly operators on duty because it would not
be a dispatch service but simply an information meeting place
into which emergency agencies can plug in.
     What is important is that, unlike the 911 system, the 711
system would not be a one-way, top-down, communications system
but a genuine interactive and horizontal communications medium
connecting citizens, their friends and relatives, and rescue
efforts.  The technology is available and affordable;  the user
base is strong and growing. And the time is here and now.

Columbia Institute for Tele-Information
Columbia Business School
809 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027

[T] 212 854 4222
[F] 212 932 7816