Subject: Re: [Ieprep] Re: PSTN collapse

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 11:06:55 EST

In a message dated 12/10/2002 9:42:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> Nor was 9/11 an isolated case.  A long list of natural disasters (e.g.
> Kobe, Loma Prieta, Hurricane Andrew, Northridge, various twisters) are
> good examples where the telephone system did suffer significant congestion
> (resulting in inability to place calls) but the Internet did NOT suffer
> significant congestion (resulting in people using the Internet successfully
> to communicate even though their phone service was unavailable due to 
> switch congestion).
> 

[MAP] I fail to see how these events (excpet 9/11) are accurate indications 
of how VoIP might function in a major event today. They all (except 9/11) 
occurred before there was any VoIP (of any significant amount). How will an 
emergency worker get access after the next big event?

Incidentally, I was in San Francisco during the really big one in 1989 and 
made about 10 phone calls out of the area right after with no problem. People 
may not have been able to call into the area, but that is one of the 
congestion management procedures used in the PSTN. The only problems I heard 
of in that case, as well as after Andrew, were the usual ones of not being 
able to get fuel to some Central Office generators. (How many Internet 
routers have generators anyway?)

Mike Pierce
Artel

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From: RJ Atkinson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:59:31 -0500

On Tuesday, Dec 10, 2002, at 11:06 America/Montreal, [email-masked] 
wrote:
> [MAP] I fail to see how these events (excpet 9/11) are accurate 
> indications of how VoIP might function in a major event today. They 
> all (except 9/11) occurred before there was any VoIP (of any 
> significant amount). How will an emergency worker get access after the 
> next big event?

	It is not at all clear to me that VoIP is necessary or sufficient.  A 
lot of us,
particularly those who think about the world beyond the US (e.g. Japan, 
where
VoIP is NOT part of their IEprep model), think that it would be pretty 
darned clever
to use also other non-voice applications (e.g. email, web, Jabber, 
other) for
communications during an emergency.  Voice might be part of the mix, 
but certainly
is not the only application that is useful and relevant to IEprep.  So 
the incidents
prior to 9/11/01 are in fact relevant (at least as examples of 
non-voice applications
working fine -- and maybe also as voice applications working fine [1]).

> The only problems I heard of in that case, as well as after Andrew, 
> were the usual ones of not being able to get fuel to some Central 
> Office generators. (How many Internet routers have generators anyway?)

At least Bill Woodcock has indicated that he was unable to get dial 
tone from
within SFBA to SFBA during such a natural disaster.  So the mileage 
varies.

Most ISP core routers are located in the same quality of facilities 
that long-haul
voice carriers use for long-haul voice switches.  For example, @Home's 
core routers
were all located inside the same AT&T Long Lines facilities that had 
their long-haul
voice systems.  @Home's NOC was on its own Siemens generator and there 
were also
cold-spares, hot-spares, offsite backups of data, backup NOC site, etc. 
  NDAs preclude
my listing which specific big backbone ISPs that I know do all this, 
but I can say
that a significant number of them do such as normal commercial 
practice. Some
access ISPs (e.g. Cox Cable) use that quality of facilities even for 
their
head-end equipment.

So most core routers in most large backbone networks have generators, 
have in-depth
backups, spares, and all that other good stuff.

Ran
[email-masked]

[1]  Voice over IP applications (written by others, I don't have the 
right clues
for such applications) have been in my paws since the early 90s and 
WERE used
during Loma Prieta and several other natural disasters.

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From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 11:44:59 -0800

At 11:06 AM 12/10/2002 -0500, [email-masked] wrote:
>(How many Internet routers have generators anyway?)

most of the ones in ISP POPs do. They get pretty serious about that. They 
like revenue. 
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From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 12:05:56 -0800

>> most of the ones in ISP POPs do. They get pretty serious about that. They 

I would guess that most ISPs of any size have redundance power
(from redundant grids, with redundant entrance), as well as other
backup power (e.g. diesel generator); heck, UO even has that
much. In addition, frequently the entire HVAC systems are
redundant, so the change of this kind of failure is pretty
minimized (again, at least for the carriers that I know about).

Dave

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From: Rex Buddenberg <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 14:31:41 -0800

>minimized (again, at least for the carriers that I know about).

You've got the Achilles Heel of network high availability engineering.

We can design a very resilient network structure -- lots of alternate 
routes and lots of redundant routers.  But if the volts go away, none 
of it works.  Today, our power grid is quite centralized (much like 
the PSTN).
      We all know about putting UPSs under routers and switches ... 
but they're endurance tends to be very limited.  Backup generators 
help, but they're expensive enough that you're unlikely to have one 
for each router.  (I've had students track the fuel cell developments 
to see if there's offset there -- so far, mostly promises).
      When USS Cole was bombed in Yemen two years ago, it was without 
power for 8 days -- the bomb destroyed the engine room that contained 
the generators.  So if it had a network in it to hold up the damage 
control system, the network would have failed.   Not because the 
network equipment was broken, but because it didn't have power.  (In 
reality, most of the damage control network is still sneakernet).
      I think if you look at the contributions that Kimberly is 
digging up, they're pretty much all saying they need high 
availability and my Navy-specific example is pretty close to the same 
kinds of issues they have -- they need comms and indirectly, they 
need the volts to hold the comms up.

-- 
b

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From: Bill Woodcock <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2002 04:23:01 -0800 (PST)

> most of the ones in ISP POPs do. They get pretty serious about that. They

Any customer of any size has a battery string and generators.  As a
Californian, I can't imagine trying to keep an Internet connection up
under this administration without one.

                                -Bill