Subject: Re: Possible extra "oral tradition" for draft-ietf-nomcom-rfc2727bis-01.txt

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 16:49:12 -0400

--On Friday, 12 July, 2002 05:39 -0400 Fred Baker
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>...
> Similarly, in looking at the IETF Chair (which the nomcom
> appoints) or the IAB Chair (which the nomcom does not appoint,
> but the question of who will likely be chosen to do the job
> does come up in discussion), we are talking about the CEO or
> CTO of the organization in some sense. What are the
> qualifications of a CxO? I suspect that they can be difficult
> to enumerate precisely, but come down to the factors one
> considers in answering the questions
>...

Fred,

I had hoped to sit this particular conversation out, given
concerns that someone might worry about my motivations.  But I
think you raise, in passing, an important point, so I will risk
it with the understanding (in the event that it was not clear
from my remarks in Minneapolis) that nothing could ever induce me
to take the IAB Chair position again...

The notion of the nomcom trying, as part of its decision-making
process, to second-guess various decisions over which it, in
theory, has no control is troubling and, IMO, a threat to the
system.  The IESG appoints a liaison to the IAB, various ADs de
facto appoint liaisons and representatives to other organizations
that fall within the scope of their areas (the IAB must approve
these, but, absent an obvious problem, the approval is pro
forma).  The IESG determines what areas exist and how many ADs
are allocated to each one.  The IAB appoints its own chair, an
IESG liaison, liaisons to other organizations (which, under
evolving scenarios, includes ISOC Board seats and ICANN
representatives).  The IAB Chair appoints the IAB Executive
Director.  The IAB and IESG Chairs, jointly, have effective
management responsibility for the IETF Secretariat, and the IETF
Chair has ultimate sole responsibility for where meetings are
held.

I think that the Nomcom should look as broadly as possible at the
qualifications and likely responsibility of the people it is to
select.  But this predictive collateral stuff can, I think, get
us into too much trouble by providing essentially bogus reasons
for making (or not making) a selection.  Think about where it
leads:  

	"She would be a really good AD, but the IESG might make
	her liaison to the IAB, and we don't want her there".  
	
	"He would be a good IAB member, but he is a bit too
	interested in ICANN and we don't want any chance that the
	IAB would put him on the PSO-PC".

	"If placed on the IAB, she might end up Chair, and that
	might give her too much influence, so let's keep her out".

	"I really think we need to have a separate IPv6 area, and
	he is opposed to that, so let's keep him off the IESG
	even though he would be a good AD."

	"She wouldn't otherwise be a very good IETF Chair, but my
	first priority is to get an IETF meeting held in Pago
	Pago, and she has promised that would be a priority, so
	I'm going to push for her."

I suggest that these are gray areas (I assume that the last one
would clearly be rejected by the rest of the Nomcom as bogus, at
least if the reasoning could be identified, but the others may be
a bit more subtle).  Assuming the Nomcom is being responsible,
they appear to also put too much pressure on, and decision-making
power in the hands of, the respective liaisons: making such
decisions rationally requires predicting how the IESG or IAB will
behave internally, and the liaisons are the only
presumably-reliable sources of information on that topic.  

To make this more complicated, we have no guidelines on how the
liaisons are expected to behave vis-a-vis the bodies that
appointed them: in my tenure on the two bodies, I saw liaisons
who would actively consult those bodies (or the non-candidate
subset of them) when a question came up in the Nomcom about their
operations and saw others who interpreted the confidentiality
rules as preventing them from doing so (sometimes, I assume,
reinforced by personal preferences or style).

The Nomcom needs to trust the people it nominates to do those
jobs competently and responsibly -- as the IETF Chair, as ADs, as
IAB members.  If it does not, it has no business nominating them
for anything.  But, for these secondary decisions that are
ultimately the result of how the IESG or IAB decide to organize
themselves -- responsibilities the current procedures fairly
clearly give to the IESG and IAB -- the Nomcom should, IMO, avoid
guessing and, ideally, be barred from it.   If that isn't what
the community wants, then we need to change the organization
structure, not encourage the Nomcom to tamper.   For example:

	* There are arguments for the IESG deciding about area
	organization and allocation of ADs to areas (e.g., only
	the IESG can really figure out what it needs).  There are
	some arguments the other way (e.g., the community may
	have a better idea).  At present, the IESG decides.  We
	could examine the balance, decide it gives the IESG too
	much power, and change it.  But, if we don't, the Nomcom
	should avoid trying to figure out how, by manipulating
	appointments, it can change the IESG and Area structure
	(and a Nomcom member with that agenda should be, IMO,
	replaced).
	
	* There are arguments for the IAB picking its own Chair
	(e.g., the IAB needs to function as a group to a greater
	extent than the IESG and having it select its own Chair
	is its best protection against a poor choice).  And there
	are arguments against it (e.g., including  the perception
	that the Chair has too much external or individual
	influence).   Again, at present, the rules are such that
	the IAB makes that appointment from within its own
	membership.  If that is the right rule, the Nomcom
	should, IMO, stay out of it.  If it is the wrong one,
	then we should fix it, either to make the IAB Chair a
	Nomcom appointment like the IETF Chair or, in principle,
	to remove the restriction that the IAB Chair must come
	from the sitting IAB membership.  But the predictive
	second-guessing strikes me as unwise and, ultimately, as
	an attempt by Nomcom members to circumvent fairly clear
	procedures about scope of Nomcom responsibilities.

	* There are arguments for the IAB selecting liaisons and
	for extending that responsibility into the PSO-PC, the
	ISOC BoT, potentially the ICANN Board.  There are
	arguments that some of these have impact too sweeping and
	that they should be entrusted only to the Nomcom or to
	some process yet to be defined.  But, again, if the
	community doesn't want the IAB making these appointments
	(or even deciding whether they should be made), it needs
	to engage on the issues and decide who or what should
	(rather than ending up in the rather inconclusive
	discussions on the Poisson list about one of these topics
	a year or two ago).  But the Nomcom is just not selected
	to make those decisions for the community by attempting
	to manipulate the composition of the IAB --these are not
	decisions that should be made in secret, nor by a body
	that doesn't ever have to explain the reasons for the
	decisions it is making.

Just my thoughts, but ones based on a certain amount of
experience.

       john

---

From: Thomas Narten <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2002 20:06:04 -0400

Hi John.

Let me focus on just one aspect of your note, that of the IAB chair
and what role the nomcom can/should play.

IMO, the current system is sub-optimal. The IAB chair has a very
visible role outside of the IAB, thus the choice effects
many. Consequently, I don't think this should be exclusively an
IAB-internal issue. This is much less true for some of the other cases
you site, though similiar issues may apply there too, to some extent.

For all the specialized appointments (IAB chair, liason to so and so,
etc.) some feedback is generaly appropriate to the body that selects
candidates for the position. In the case of the IAB chair, the nomcom
(in practice) would appear to be the only place such input is being
fed. (Well, in any case, the nomcom does get such input.)

When the nomcom does get feedback about the chair, some of it relates
to the individual's actions as an individual IAB member, some to
actions as an IAB chair. If the nomcom ignores that latter feedback,
where should folks be sending such feedback instead?

My understanding is that the IAB does not solicit any feedback on
possible chair candidates prior to making its selection. Given the
external role of the IAB chair, it's quite possible (likely?) that
this approach leads to the IAB not always having all relevant input at
hand for making the best decision. To further compound matters, the
IAB choses its chair at the start of the new term, when some of the
just-selected members may have relatively little information to go on.

Personally, on balance, I think the IAB (rather than the nomcom)
should stick with appointing its chair (there are lots of pros/cons
here, but I won't provide them in this note). But some improvements in
the process would also be useful.

One possibility would be to have the nomcom provide more specific
details of the feedback it obtained to the IAB. Note that at present,
confidentially issues make it problematic for the nomcom to provide
the IAB (as a whole) specific information it received about (say) the
chair. I think changes to the nomcom document would be needed if we go
this route.

Another approach would be to have the selecting body (i.e, the IAB)
more actively solicit feedback from relevant parties, leaving the
nomcom out of the equation.

Thomas

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2002 21:08:44 -0400

Thomas,

A useful perspective, thanks.

Please note that I am in complete agreement that we are in a
sub-optimal situation now, in that I believe that the community
should either explicitly give the nomcom responsibility for
considering the IAB Chair situation, or the nomcom should get out
of that business.   I don't intend to express a strong opinion as
to which choice should be made.  Nor, if nomcom involvement is
chosen, do I want to take a position on whether that should be
having the Nomcom make the selection or by engaging in more
dialog on the subject with the IAB, perhaps as you suggest.

But I believe that this is one of several areas in which the
community should give the nomcom specific guidance or
instructions, rather than having each nomcom develop its own
rules about how much it is appropriate for it to try to
reorganize and reshape the IETF.

As you probably know, but the rest of the WG may not, I generally
favor permitting (or requiring) the Nomcom to share credible
(negative and positive) feedback with all selected candidates and
the body to which each is appointed.  That is rather different
from disclosing comments, especially unedited ones, about people
being considered for positions.  Once the nomcom has made a
decision, it ought to be able to disclose, in a non-comparative
way, the data about the particular candidate that figured into
that decision.  I believe both the IAB and the IESG would find it
helpful to know about types of unrest or strong support that the
nomcom identified and considered important, especially in the "we
are appointing you in spite of... and wish you would work on
that" situations that sometimes arise.  And I would discount any
concerns about the selected IAB or IESG member having his or her
feelings hurt: these are high-visibility positions, the IETF
isn't shy, and strong opinions about personality and performance
will come out soon enough anyway.

I haven't figured out whether I think it would be reasonable for
the nomcom to share (non-comparative) pros and cons about a
candidate with the confirming bodies during the confirmation
process, but some of the same arguments for doing so might apply.

One other pair of observations:

* In practice, the IAB Chair serves pretty much at the pleasure
of the IAB.  I can't imagine anyone in that role (past, present,
or, I would hope, future) who would not instantly step down if he
or she lost the confidence of even a significant fraction of the
other IAB members.  That reality, which could certainly be
written into a future revision of RFC 2850 if that made people
more comfortable, provides considerable protection against a bad
decision made (or acceded to) by newly-appointed members or
someone running wild.  It probably even provides better
protection than the recall procedures, since it does not involve
nearly as much fuss to initiate and use.

* That said, I don't think having the term of an IAB Chair start
at the same time as new members are seated is ideal.  General
stability, getting new members up to speed, etc., would probably
be enhanced by offsetting the Chair's term by three to six months
from the first IETF meeting of the year.  But I don't have even a
vague idea as to how to make that work without rather significant
side-effects such as effectively imposing a one-year term limit
on the IAB Chair or removing the person who was in the chair from
the regular nomcom review process.

     john

---

From: Matt Holdrege <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2002 18:35:22 -0700

Oral tradition somehow implies someone giving advice to others. Advice is 
always good. But the nomcom can choose to listen or ignore such advice. 
This debate seems to reflect the opinion of others that the nomcom *needs* 
their advice. Everyone wants to push the nomcom to their favorite 
direction. Nothing we do in this effort will change that. In the end the 
nomcom will choose who they see fit no matter what official or unofficial 
direction they get.

So I don't see any point in changing things. The abuses of the system, if 
there are any, are human nature and we can't change that. The nomcom will 
talk to whomever they wish to talk to. You can't change that. If we choose 
to officially publish everything, how does that help?

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2002 13:41:13 -0400

Matt,

Assume this view --that the nomcom will ultimately ignore any
advice or instructions and do what it pleases, presumably based
on its internal biases and dynamics-- is correct and generally
held.  (I'm not that cynical and pessimistic, but I've never been
on the inside.)   I think it then argues for one of three
conclusions:

	* What the community really intends with the nomcom
	process is that we randomly select a bunch of people who,
	using their own judgement and experience (which may be
	quite limited, given the membership requirements), and
	potentially ignoring all input, who are then going to
	determine the future of the IETF.  In that model, nothing
	else counts: not procedures, not information from the
	IESG and IAB as to what capabilities are needed, not real
	experience (beyond nomcom member prejudices) about what
	things work and what don't.  I can't assume that is what
	the community wants.  It would border on insanity to
	stake the IETF's future on the roll of somewhat-loaded
	dice.
	
	* More options for the confirming bodies to dig into the
	nomcom's process, decisions, and reasoning, including, as
	needed, understanding what input was received and how it
	was evaluated.  That probably needs to come with either
	provisions for leaving positions unfilled if we get to
	the first IETF of the year without agreement between a
	confirming body and the nomcom, or provisions for
	oversight during the nomcom process and, potentially, for
	firing a nomcom and starting over. This essentially
	implies that the confidentiality envelope has to be
	expanded to include the confirming bodies (or selected
	subsets of, or proxies for, them).  I don't find that
	approach particularly attractive either -- it could lead
	us into some very bad places.
	
	* The nomcom idea is so defective that we need to discard
	it and find some other approach.   And that isn't
	attractive either, at least absent someone coming up with
	a better idea.  I think that, when this process was put
	in place, we concluded that all of the other
	possibilities were significantly worse.

If the behavior you imply is a real risk -- if former nomcom
members (ex-officio or voting) can tell us that the "we are going
to ignore everything and do what we want" behavior has actually
occurred -- then I suggest that a better alternative would be to
establish a procedure for getting someone who is taking that
approach off of the nomcom and banned from future nomcoms for a
long time the moment some process determines that he or she holds
this type of position.

The nomcom makes decisions on behalf of the community, after
obtaining, and paying very serious intention to, input from the
community.  If a nomcom loses sight of that, we are, I think, in
very serious trouble indeed.

       john

--On Saturday, 13 July, 2002 18:35 -0700 Matt Holdrege
<[email-masked]> wrote:

> Oral tradition somehow implies someone giving advice to others.
> Advice is always good. But the nomcom can choose to listen or
> ignore such advice. This debate seems to reflect the opinion of
> others that the nomcom *needs* their advice. Everyone wants to
> push the nomcom to their favorite direction. Nothing we do in
> this effort will change that. In the end the nomcom will choose
> who they see fit no matter what official or unofficial
> direction they get.
> 
> So I don't see any point in changing things. The abuses of the
> system, if there are any, are human nature and we can't change
> that. The nomcom will talk to whomever they wish to talk to.
> You can't change that. If we choose to officially publish
> everything, how does that help?
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> To subscribe or unsubscribe from this elist use the subscription
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>

---

From: Matt Holdrege <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2002 15:38:06 -0700

There is procedure and all nomcom members are watched by each other, the 
chair and the liaisons. So while nomcom members have free will in their 
deliberations, they do not have freedom to act outside of procedures.

It is essential to protect the freedom of the nomcom when it comes to 
making choices. We don't "ignore everything and do what we want". Rather we 
listen to everything and *then* vote as we please. The  process ensures 
that we are presented with as many data points as we can get. After that, 
it's all in the hands of individual consciences.

Given the above (if you will), what needs to change? Democracies do not 
ensure that you will get what you want. So, unless you want to eliminate 
democracy or move to an unworkable form of democracy (we create membership 
and we all vote), I don't see what we can change?

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 11:31:25 +0200

John C Klensin wrote:
...
> from the first IETF meeting of the year.  

Absolutely. In fact, I took over as IAB Chair from Christian Huitema
during the Second IETF in 1995 and that was much better than doing it
at the "normal" time. There's nothing in the current rules to prevent
this, in fact, if 
  a) the previous Chair is a continuing IAB member
  b) the IAB agrees to re-appoint him/her
  c) he/she then resigns as Chair during the Second IETF

> But I don't have even a

It would be very hard to mandate; we have running code proof that it can
be done if the departing Chair, the incoming Chair, and the IAB agree.

  Brian