Subject: RE: The End-to-end Argument

From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2005 15:54:22 -0700

> Saltzer, Reed and Clark's paper "End-to-end Arguments in 
> System Design" points out the exceptions: 
<http://mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf>
(starting at the heading "Performance aspects").

And if Tom bothers to actually read the only two paragraphs in the paper
on security he will discover that it makes exactly the same point that I
made. End to end encryption is only one approach and it does not address
all security requirments, it is complimentary to other security
approaches.

There does not appear to be an true cannonical exposition of end-to-end
security.

The real end-to-end argument is an argument about the optimal placement
of complexity. If you look at the arguments in the paper and accept that
maybe the Internet has changed significantly in the past quarter century
you will find that the same arguments and premises now lead to very
different conclusions in some (but not all) cases.

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