Subject: Phishing

From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 09:50:29 -0700

> No need to overcompensate, though. For instance, look at Galileo's  
> experiments: they barely support his theories, because is tools were  
> so crude. But Popper et al. covered this ground extensively.

Actually the person who more or less originated argument that I made was
Karl Popper. Volume one of The Open Society and its Enemies is all about
Plato and how the idea of Platonic ideals leads to the idea of absolute
truth which Popper argues is a threat to open society.

> > The Internet does not provide the necessary type of 
> security for the 
> > majority of its billion+ users.
> 
> Hm, then why do they use it?

Because they trust us and rely on us to secure it.

If we do not provide the security they want they will go elsewhere.

> > Helping to stop Internet crime is the IETF's responsibility. If the
> > IETF
> > wants to remain an important player in Internet security 
> standards it
> > has to address these issues.
> 
> Please don't reuse the word "security" for all three of these 
> issues.  

They are all security issues. For the sake of argument though lets call
them 'splunge issues'.

We still have to solve all the splunge issues.

> As for misspelled "fishing": I haven't seen this myself, so I can't  
> be sure what the deal is, but it sure looks like people are way too  
> gullible and not using the mechanisms that are available today. Why  
> doesn't any business sign its messages with S/MIME, for instance? 

Because S/MIME only works if you can rely on your recipient supporting
S/MIME.

If you try to sign email to consumers with S/MIME at least 1% of
recipients receive an unacceptable user experience likely to result in a
support call cost.

That is why there is so much interest in DKIM.

The question now is whether DKIM is going to be a hermetically sealled
technology that cannot be extended or whether it will be possible to
combine the DKIM message format with existing PKI infrastructure as an
option for those who have that infrastructure.

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