Subject: Genart LC review: draft-ietf-insipid-logme-reqs-11

From: Stewart Bryant <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 15:03:08 +0000

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by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
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Document: draft-ietf-insipid-logme-reqs-11
Reviewer: Stewart Bryant
Review Date: 2017-01-03
IETF LC End Date: 2017-01-13
IESG Telechat date: unknown

Summary: Ready with minor issue

This is a well written document that describes a useful feature in
its intended purpose. However I could not help but think that it has
an inevitable alternate use in the observation of users. There is
guidance on how to prevent this, but that seems easily ignored. Thus
the guidance from Security Area review will be of particular importance.

Major issues:

None.

Minor issues:

6.1.  Trust Domain

    Since a "log me" marker may cause a SIP entity to log the SIP header
    and body of a request or response, the "log me" marker SHOULD be
    removed at a trust domain boundary.

SB> I am not convinced that SHOULD is strong enough given that the traffic
SB> is leaving the trust domain.

Nits/editorial comments:

3.1.  Network Boundary

    Figure 2 shows a network boundary between GW-A1
    in operator A's network and the SBC in operator B's network.  A

SB> SBC needs expanding on first use.

===================

    [RFC5853] gives examples of manipulating signaling to prevent the
    sending network passing on sensitive information, for example
    topology hiding, or the receiving network protecting itself from
    signaling that is not under its control, for example protocol repair.

SB> The last sentence does not scan well.

===================

    o  REQ9: The "log me" marker mechanism SHOULD allow a SIP
       intermediary to request logging SIP requests and responses on
       behalf of the originating endpoint.  The typical use case for this
       requirement is for compatibility with UAs that have not

SB> UA needs expanding on first use.