Subject: Re: globally unique site local addresses

From: Andrew White <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 02 Dec 2002 10:21:27 +1100

Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> 
> Hi Andrew,
> 
> 4 or 6 subnet bits are not sufficient for most uses.  It is expected
> that these addresses will be used for internal numbering within an
> enterprise, so we should, at minimum, leave room for a 16-bit subnet
> ID.  This would allow the same subnet numbers to be used for global
> and local subnets.

The key point of my proposal must be unclear.  I'm not proposing leaving 4
or 6 bits to number the site.  Instead, I'm proposing that each router
number the subnets it is attached to - ie subnet identifiers are
automatically generated from a 50+ bit space.

A draft has been written and is working its way through a review process. 
Hopefully that will make things clearer.

-- 
Andrew White                [email-masked]
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From: Kurt Erik Lindqvist <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 11:24:45 +0100

> 1) the default ACLs and route filters for the rather large ISP I used 
> to
> work for. Unfortunately I don't get a chance to work in the core of 
> that
> network, so I'm making a judgement on what was supposed to be the
> practice rather than reality.

If you are filtering you will not see it...:)

> 2) I logged into router-server.cerf.net, couldn't find any network 10/8
> in the bgp and route tables, looked at their incoming BGP route 
> filters,
> they weren't filtering for it, so their upstream ASs looked to be
> filtering it.

My experience is that it is pretty short lived once leaked as it get 
detected.

> With the RFC1918 leaks you see, do they disappear pretty quickly after
> they appear, indicating somebody took action to stop the leak ? It 
> would
> also be interesting to see if the origin AS of these RFC1918 leaks is
> one of the private ones.

Yes. Look at the historic CIDR and "Philip Smith reports". They give a 
pretty good indication of what is floating around (looking at that 
normally tells you that RFC1918 space is not the worst problem...:) )

- kurtis -