Subject: Re: IPP> Re: ADM - Draft minutes [client security issues]

From: [email-masked] (Ira Mcdonald x10962)
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 13:31:06 PST

Hi Keith,

I agree that the IETF (and particularly you and Harald) should
develop new protocol standards with provision for strong security.
I just think that the interoperability question is clouding an
entirely separate issue, to whit, should customers be forced to
pay for security, if they don't want it.

Across the public Internet, it is highly desirable (at least)
for printing protocols to use strong security (and data
confidentiality).

Within corporate intranets, the marketplace hasn't shown much
interest in paying for strong security.  No printer vendor
can ignore that reality.  Shoving the interoperability problem
onto the client end (who, per last weeks IETF discussion now
have to always support TLS, in order to be IPP clients) is just
pushing the problem around.

Why not address the real interoperability between mutually
secure clients and servers and SEPARATELY between mutually
insecure (or weakly secure with HTTP/1.1 native facilities)
clients and servers.  Why should it matter that every IPP
client implements strong security?

But I agree that you should push for a solid security story
in IPP.  Sorry I was obscure in my previous note.

Cheers,
- Ira McDonald (outside consultant at Xerox)

---

From: Keith Moore <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 19:22:32 -0500

> pay for security, if they don't want it.

If the marginal cost for scalable security in clients is really 
that high, there will be a sizable market for cheaper clients that 
do only digest authentication.   If by these clients turn out to be 
the rule rather than the exception, we can change the standard when 
it is revised.  IETF has a strong tradition of deprecating, eliminating, 
or making optional unused or under-used features as specifications 
progress along the standards-track.

> interest in paying for strong security.  

Yes, but there's a significant difference in the cost of using a 
technology which is (a) nonstandard, (b) in limited use, and 
(c) encumbered by patents, than the cost of using a standard 
technology which will be widely deployed and is not so encumbered.

> Shoving the interoperability problem

Yes, but "just" pushing the problem around would appear to make
the overall solution cheaper.  You seem to be arguing that we
don't really need interoperable security.  Most of the knowledgable
users of the Internet, I suspect, would strongly disagree.

> client implements strong security?

So that all clients and servers can interoperate.

Keith