Subject: Re: Ipr-wg digest, Vol 1 #59 - 8 msgs

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 18:28:06 +0100

a response to:

2. Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR inamodified
       RFC 2026 (Brian E Carpenter)

" I agree with the remarks made by Brian Carpenter. The function of the WGs
is to choose the best technology for standardization and once these
committees turn into forums for evaluating IPR issues there is a risk that
they lose sight of this task.

1.  On the substantial issue of how to resolve IPR with the standards, IETF
works today on a RAND model rather than a RF model.  If a decision is to be
made to move to a RF model then I also agree with Brian Carpenter that a
lot of companies would probably stop with its contributions to the WGs.
This is obviously a significant change and one that would presumably
require a
consequent amendment of the IETF statutes.  This is not something to be
done in an ID.

2.  Concerning IPR disclosures, regardless of the language saying that
patent
searches are not required, the effect of specific disclosure (and the
proposed
"reasonably known" language) is to increase the pressure on individual
representatives to verify that the patent portfolio of his employer does
not
contain any relevant patents - with the consequent risk of losing valuable
IPR if this isn't done.  That being said, we recognize that IETF
contributors
wish to have such disclosures. If so, the key conditions that give rise to
an obligation to disclose should be as clear as possible and should not
promote unfair elimination of IPR value.  This is not the case today.
Rules which could tend to promote the elimination of IPR value would
certainly discourage contribution.

3.  The ID refer to disclosures being made for IPR which "cover or may
cover" the technology.  In my view, it should be made clear that this
should refer to IPR which is essential and unavoidable in order to
implement the standard.  Otherwise, the criteria for disclosure of IPR
become impossible to follow and large patent holders will be tempted to
simply disclose the entire patent portfolio each time to avoid the risk of
inadvertently losing IPR relating to non-mandatory useful features for
which they should be legitimately entitled to protection.

4.  The moments at which IPR should be declared should be made clearer.
Generally speaking, multiplying the instances at which specific disclosures
are required to be made puts a heavy burden on IPR holders to verify their
patent portfolio each time and probably does not provide any real
advantages
to non IPR-holders.

There are a number of other points in the ID that I could address, but we
would respectfully point out that most companies (including some that are
contributing to this email thread) have legitimately acquired valuable IPR
and patents that they will wish to use at some stage in the future against
competitors that infringe such IPR.  Without clear and reasonable rules
regarding declaration, such IPR is put at risk."

Albin Schätzle                            Tel.: + 49 (0) 711 821 44525
IPD Standardization Manager                               Fax.: +49 (0) 711
821 44587
Intellectual Property Department                GSM: +49 (0) 170 2219 786
Alcatel                                   e-mail:
[email-masked]
D-70619 Stuttgart, Lorenzstrasse 10

                      ipr-wg-request@i                                                                                            
                      etf.org                  To:      [email-masked]                                                           
                      Sent by:                 cc:                                                                                
                      ipr-wg-admin@iet         Subject: Ipr-wg digest, Vol 1 #59 - 8 msgs                                         
                      f.org                                                                                                       

                      11/13/2002 05:32                                                                                            
                      PM                                                                                                          
                      Please respond                                                                                              
                      to ipr-wg                                                                                                   

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR in
       amodified  RFC 2026 (Paul Gleichauf)
   2. Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR inamodified
       RFC 2026 (Brian E Carpenter)
   3. # Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
inamodified RFC 2026 (Bruce Perens)
   4. RE: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR inamodified
RFC 2026 (Reb Thomas)
   5. Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
       inamodified   RFC 2026 (Paul Gleichauf)

--__--__--

Message: 1
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:19:47 -0800
To: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
From: Paul Gleichauf <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR in
  amodified  RFC 2026
Cc: [email-masked]

Brian,

At 09:46 AM 11/12/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>This would be an effective way of making it even less likely than today
>that any document is ever classified as Standard.

I have been told that most of the Internet runs on Proposed, not Full
Standard protocols, but the core of the argument is that openness is more
difficult the more restricted the licensing model.

>Paul, you haven't identified a problem that calls for such a contentious
>solution, as opposed to the non-contentious clarifications in the
>current draft.

If you found the restrictions on Full Standard the (most) contentious part
of my statements, then perhaps the very slow rate promotion to the ultimate

category is the proof, but I don't think it is central to the argument of
providing a process for simplifying the navigation of WG around IPR.

The simplest statement is that a RAND statement is insufficiently useful,
and the language I have read around RFC 2026 and its modification so far
does not help guide how to make it more so.

The broadest-based participation under the IETF umbrella benefits the
Internet community, but that requires the ability to recognize and adjust
for IPR claims.

Since RFC 2026 was first crafted IPR disclosure has become more coupled
with the crafting of standards.

When work on a standard is initiated, it is important to know who has IPR
at stake and to encourage them to disclose its impact.

At the early stages of working group development relevant IPR may be
pending, or it may not be clear what claims are relevant until the standard

advances.

Licensing POLICY is more important than claims coverage to early working
group progress.

A very few types of IPR license policy should cover the vast majority of
cases. A suggested initial set are 1) RF, 2) RF with defensive rights, 3)
RAND [with an obligation to be more specific before advancement to
Proposed], 4) No license [WG needs to reevaluate based upon specific claims

or charter], 5) Other [WG needs to escalate discussions with IPR owner and
IESG subcommittee to determine how to proceed or reach agreement on
placement in earlier categories.]

Licensing TERMS are more important by the time implementations are ready,
and given most WG timescales, pending IPR grants have usually been resolved

by the time a standard reaches proposed status.

A systematic coupled process to reach IPR convergence as part of the
evolution of the standard's technology would simplify the operation of WG's

and would also guide IPR owners on what they need to do and when they need
to do it.

There are some other reasons, but those are the ones I think most relevant.

Paul

>    Brian
>
>Paul Gleichauf wrote:
> >
> > A message from Steve Bellovin dated October 22, 2002 to the ietf-ipr-wg
> > mailing list contained a statement:
> > "The Rights and Scenarios documents are not very contentious.  I
> > think that we can wrap up the open issues with them in Atlanta,
> > subject to post-meeting ratification on the mailing list."
> >
> > I have been following the activities of this WG since before Yokahama
in
> > the hope that the vague treatment of IPR in 2026 would be clarified to
the
> > point that every conscientious contributor and interested party to a
> > standard would know what to do with IPR and when to do it. This message
is
> > intended to identify what I think is thus far missing from Intellectual
> > Property Rights in IETF Technology
<draft-bradner-ipr-technology-01.txt>. I
> > can post a couple of follow-on messages to offer more detailed
constructive
> > solutions for debate before the Altanta meeting. It would be
unfortunate if
> > the attitude upon arriving in Atlanta was that these issues are no
longer
> > contentious, and that a problem of limited scope has been solved.
> >
> > There are three readily apparent interested parties at work in the IETF
> > standards process: the IETF itself, the working group participants, and
> > intellectual property rights holders. A coherent policy for IPR should
take
> > account of the diversity of these interests. It should be designed to
> > encourage and enable all parties to easily know and do the right thing.
It
> > should not turn working groups into lawyers debating IPR claims and
their
> > legitimacy. There are two steps that could make this possible.
> >
> > The first is a clear statement of principles, a philosophy, of what
> > constitutes best behavior, or failing that at least acceptable
behavior;
> > through the social mechanisms of approbation, disapproval, and shunning
> > that anchor the IETF.
> >
> > The second is a well-defined iterative process for soliciting and
> > disclosing IPR that is tightly coupled with the evolution of a standard
> > through the working group mechanisms already defined in 2026. These
> > disclosures should start with submission of a form to the IETF WG which
> > includes a selection from a small set of precise policy statements for
> > licensing that are more specific and useful to the working group than
RAND,
> > but not more onerous for IPR owners than appropriate given that a
proposal
> > does not yet a draft or full standard make. The disclosures should
converge
> > to a statement of licensing terms by the time two independent
> > implementations have been created to advance to draft standard. By the
time
> > the draft is elevated to full standard licensing should be RF with some
> > qualifications to provide defensive protection to IPR holders for their
> > donation to the community. The disclosures should be regularly
solicited
> > and refined by working group chairs, and archived into a searchable
public
> > database that also functions as a form of social memory of
contributions
> > and impediments to the standards process.
> >
> > So, is this in scope, or not?
> >
> > Paul Gleichauf
> > [email-masked]

--__--__--

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 12:05:53 +0100
From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Organization: IBM
To: Paul Gleichauf <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
inamodified
 RFC 2026

Paul,

Let me be very explicit, since you are challenging a very long
held consensus in the IETF.

1) If the IETF gets into the business of dealing with details
of license regimes, the task of the WG chairs, ADs, etc. will become
dominated by dealing with these issues instead of what they are
supposed to be doing, i.e. facilitating the best possible technology
design. It would not, as you assert, simplify the WG's operation;
it would substantially complicate it.

1a) Since the IETF is not incorporated, we would need legal advice,
but I suspect these people would also become personally liable for
any misjudgements, errors, and omissions. Personally, I wouldn't
want to be a WG chair or AD in those circumstances.

2) If the IETF attempted to move from a RAND to an RF requirement
(as opposed to an RF preference), then companies unwilling to accept
this would simply withdraw from the IETF, wait until the standard was
published, and then start collecting royalties. This isn't theory;
it's already happening elsewhere.

   Brian

Paul Gleichauf wrote:
>
> Brian,
>
> At 09:46 AM 11/12/2002 +0100, you wrote:
> >This would be an effective way of making it even less likely than today
> >that any document is ever classified as Standard.
>
> I have been told that most of the Internet runs on Proposed, not Full
> Standard protocols, but the core of the argument is that openness is more
> difficult the more restricted the licensing model.
>
> >Paul, you haven't identified a problem that calls for such a contentious
> >solution, as opposed to the non-contentious clarifications in the
> >current draft.
>
> If you found the restrictions on Full Standard the (most) contentious
part
> of my statements, then perhaps the very slow rate promotion to the
ultimate
> category is the proof, but I don't think it is central to the argument of
> providing a process for simplifying the navigation of WG around IPR.
>
> The simplest statement is that a RAND statement is insufficiently useful,
> and the language I have read around RFC 2026 and its modification so far
> does not help guide how to make it more so.
>
> The broadest-based participation under the IETF umbrella benefits the
> Internet community, but that requires the ability to recognize and adjust
> for IPR claims.
>
> Since RFC 2026 was first crafted IPR disclosure has become more coupled
> with the crafting of standards.
>
> When work on a standard is initiated, it is important to know who has IPR
> at stake and to encourage them to disclose its impact.
>
> At the early stages of working group development relevant IPR may be
> pending, or it may not be clear what claims are relevant until the
standard
> advances.
>
> Licensing POLICY is more important than claims coverage to early working
> group progress.
>
> A very few types of IPR license policy should cover the vast majority of
> cases. A suggested initial set are 1) RF, 2) RF with defensive rights, 3)
> RAND [with an obligation to be more specific before advancement to
> Proposed], 4) No license [WG needs to reevaluate based upon specific
claims
> or charter], 5) Other [WG needs to escalate discussions with IPR owner
and
> IESG subcommittee to determine how to proceed or reach agreement on
> placement in earlier categories.]
>
> Licensing TERMS are more important by the time implementations are ready,
> and given most WG timescales, pending IPR grants have usually been
resolved
> by the time a standard reaches proposed status.
>
> A systematic coupled process to reach IPR convergence as part of the
> evolution of the standard's technology would simplify the operation of
WG's
> and would also guide IPR owners on what they need to do and when they
need
> to do it.
>
> There are some other reasons, but those are the ones I think most
relevant.
>
> Paul
>
> >    Brian
> >
> >Paul Gleichauf wrote:
> > >
> > > A message from Steve Bellovin dated October 22, 2002 to the
ietf-ipr-wg
> > > mailing list contained a statement:
> > > "The Rights and Scenarios documents are not very contentious.  I
> > > think that we can wrap up the open issues with them in Atlanta,
> > > subject to post-meeting ratification on the mailing list."
> > >
> > > I have been following the activities of this WG since before Yokahama
in
> > > the hope that the vague treatment of IPR in 2026 would be clarified
to the
> > > point that every conscientious contributor and interested party to a
> > > standard would know what to do with IPR and when to do it. This
message is
> > > intended to identify what I think is thus far missing from
Intellectual
> > > Property Rights in IETF Technology
<draft-bradner-ipr-technology-01.txt>. I
> > > can post a couple of follow-on messages to offer more detailed
constructive
> > > solutions for debate before the Altanta meeting. It would be
unfortunate if
> > > the attitude upon arriving in Atlanta was that these issues are no
longer
> > > contentious, and that a problem of limited scope has been solved.
> > >
> > > There are three readily apparent interested parties at work in the
IETF
> > > standards process: the IETF itself, the working group participants,
and
> > > intellectual property rights holders. A coherent policy for IPR
should take
> > > account of the diversity of these interests. It should be designed to
> > > encourage and enable all parties to easily know and do the right
thing. It
> > > should not turn working groups into lawyers debating IPR claims and
their
> > > legitimacy. There are two steps that could make this possible.
> > >
> > > The first is a clear statement of principles, a philosophy, of what
> > > constitutes best behavior, or failing that at least acceptable
behavior;
> > > through the social mechanisms of approbation, disapproval, and
shunning
> > > that anchor the IETF.
> > >
> > > The second is a well-defined iterative process for soliciting and
> > > disclosing IPR that is tightly coupled with the evolution of a
standard
> > > through the working group mechanisms already defined in 2026. These
> > > disclosures should start with submission of a form to the IETF WG
which
> > > includes a selection from a small set of precise policy statements
for
> > > licensing that are more specific and useful to the working group than
RAND,
> > > but not more onerous for IPR owners than appropriate given that a
proposal
> > > does not yet a draft or full standard make. The disclosures should
converge
> > > to a statement of licensing terms by the time two independent
> > > implementations have been created to advance to draft standard. By
the time
> > > the draft is elevated to full standard licensing should be RF with
some
> > > qualifications to provide defensive protection to IPR holders for
their
> > > donation to the community. The disclosures should be regularly
solicited
> > > and refined by working group chairs, and archived into a searchable
public
> > > database that also functions as a form of social memory of
contributions
> > > and impediments to the standards process.
> > >
> > > So, is this in scope, or not?
> > >
> > > Paul Gleichauf
> > > [email-masked]

--__--__--

Message: 3
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: # Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
inamodified RFC 2026
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 06:59:25 -0800 (PST)
From: [email-masked] (Bruce Perens)

Brian,

> 1) If the IETF gets into the business of dealing with details
> of license regimes, the task of the WG chairs, ADs, etc. will become
> dominated by dealing with these issues instead of what they are
> supposed to be doing, i.e. facilitating the best possible technology
> design. It would not, as you assert, simplify the WG's operation;
> it would substantially complicate it.

This is not the case for the draft royalty-free-only policy for W3C. That
policy will be presented for last call in a few days, and will be available
for you to read by the time of your WG face-to-face.

In the W3C policy, simple required terms for licenses, but not
the licenses themselves, are specified. The required terms are
royalty-free-only, without discrimination, with a scope-of-use limitation
to only the practice necessary to implement the standard. This leaves the
patent holders lots of room to license their patents for other applications
than implementation of the standard. We would, of course, always prefer
entirely unencumbered standards, but the scope of use limitation is the
best compromise we could come up with for the overall policy.

There is no RAND in the last-call W3C policy, none of the more-than-RAND
admitted by the current IETF drafts, and no different intellectual property
terms for "extensions".

The WG chairs need to make sure that disclosures are followed and that
the licenses submitted with the disclosures are compliant with one set of
required terms that allow all implementors. This is a managable process
and one the IETF would do well to emulate.

> 1a) Since the IETF is not incorporated, we would need legal advice,
> but I suspect these people would also become personally liable for
> any misjudgements, errors, and omissions. Personally, I wouldn't
> want to be a WG chair or AD in those circumstances.

I would not want to carry out any technical pursuit whatsoever without
liability protection. To do so in the face of litigious holders of
software patents and their victims is foolhardy. And the legal risks
increase substantially if your standard is not purportedly RF.

Consider that many WG participants are shielded from the direct impact of
a lawsuit by the large companies they work for. But IETF policy should
not discourage the same degree of participation by employees of small
companies and independent developers. Thus, they must be protected.

Incorporation of IETF or other measures for protection of WG menbers is
probably outside of this WG charter, but should be addressed.

> 2) If the IETF attempted to move from a RAND to an RF requirement
> (as opposed to an RF preference), then companies unwilling to accept
> this would simply withdraw from the IETF, wait until the standard was
> published, and then start collecting royalties. This isn't theory;
> it's already happening elsewhere.

W3C will soon declare its policy to be very much more "open" than IETF's
current or draft policy. Sure, a few companies rattled their swords,
threatening to walk out. But the reality is that it would be a foolish
move - they would only lose their influence. The vast majority of the
membership will stay put along with the three sponsoring organizations,
and the influence of W3C will _increase_, because its standards will
unambiguously admit all implementors without exception.

The purpose of a standard is to codify a way of doing things that
_all_ implementors can follow. Anything less is not really a standard.
RAND-licensed patents effectively prohibit Open Source implementations
of standards incorporating them, since the Open Source developers do not
themselves collect royalties, and can not afford to pass any on to patent
holders. Thus, RAND _is_ discriminatory. But patents are a reality, and
thus you _will_ have to make technical compromises in order to create
a standard that all can implement. I wish it were otherwise.

It's time for IETF to follow W3C's example and make positive steps toward
a process that admits all implementors without exception.

             Thanks

             Bruce Perens

--__--__--

Message: 4
From: "Reb Thomas" <[email-masked]>
To: "Brian E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>,
   "Paul Gleichauf" <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
inamodified   RFC 2026
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 10:09:59 -0500

For what it is worth, I favor Paul's approach.  I don't think that the IETF
can duck the issue of license details, but I also think that 3-4 choices of
standard license approaches would minimize any WG chair or other party's
time spent dealing with these matters.  In some situations the IETF may
need
legal advice but hasn't that been the case in the past as well?  If not
(the
IETF would have to count itself lucky to have never needed legal advice)
then I cannot see where these ideas are so radical as to start forcing the
IETF to change its methods of operations.  I especially wish to address
your
point 2).  As things stand, companies have this opportunity today, but the
natural desire to want their ideas, technology, etc to be the "standard"
approach is such a strong motivator that they naturally want to participate
and possibly shape the WG's chosen directions.  The fact that they might
have to have their management and legal look at the licensing issues in
that
process of working with the standards formation WG is a net positive in my
estimation.

Regards,

Calhoun "Reb" Thomas, III
Thomas Law Firm
1201 Main Street, Suite 1980
Columbia, SC 29201
803-748-1303 (office)
803-261-1721 (mobile)
803-787-9959 (fax)
[email-masked]

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of
Brian E Carpenter
Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 6:06 AM
To: Paul Gleichauf
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
inamodified RFC 2026

Paul,

Let me be very explicit, since you are challenging a very long
held consensus in the IETF.

1) If the IETF gets into the business of dealing with details
of license regimes, the task of the WG chairs, ADs, etc. will become
dominated by dealing with these issues instead of what they are
supposed to be doing, i.e. facilitating the best possible technology
design. It would not, as you assert, simplify the WG's operation;
it would substantially complicate it.

1a) Since the IETF is not incorporated, we would need legal advice,
but I suspect these people would also become personally liable for
any misjudgements, errors, and omissions. Personally, I wouldn't
want to be a WG chair or AD in those circumstances.

2) If the IETF attempted to move from a RAND to an RF requirement
(as opposed to an RF preference), then companies unwilling to accept
this would simply withdraw from the IETF, wait until the standard was
published, and then start collecting royalties. This isn't theory;
it's already happening elsewhere.

   Brian

Paul Gleichauf wrote:
>
> Brian,
>
> At 09:46 AM 11/12/2002 +0100, you wrote:
> >This would be an effective way of making it even less likely than today
> >that any document is ever classified as Standard.
>
> I have been told that most of the Internet runs on Proposed, not Full
> Standard protocols, but the core of the argument is that openness is more
> difficult the more restricted the licensing model.
>
> >Paul, you haven't identified a problem that calls for such a contentious
> >solution, as opposed to the non-contentious clarifications in the
> >current draft.
>
> If you found the restrictions on Full Standard the (most) contentious
part
> of my statements, then perhaps the very slow rate promotion to the
ultimate
> category is the proof, but I don't think it is central to the argument of
> providing a process for simplifying the navigation of WG around IPR.
>
> The simplest statement is that a RAND statement is insufficiently useful,
> and the language I have read around RFC 2026 and its modification so far
> does not help guide how to make it more so.
>
> The broadest-based participation under the IETF umbrella benefits the
> Internet community, but that requires the ability to recognize and adjust
> for IPR claims.
>
> Since RFC 2026 was first crafted IPR disclosure has become more coupled
> with the crafting of standards.
>
> When work on a standard is initiated, it is important to know who has IPR
> at stake and to encourage them to disclose its impact.
>
> At the early stages of working group development relevant IPR may be
> pending, or it may not be clear what claims are relevant until the
standard
> advances.
>
> Licensing POLICY is more important than claims coverage to early working
> group progress.
>
> A very few types of IPR license policy should cover the vast majority of
> cases. A suggested initial set are 1) RF, 2) RF with defensive rights, 3)
> RAND [with an obligation to be more specific before advancement to
> Proposed], 4) No license [WG needs to reevaluate based upon specific
claims
> or charter], 5) Other [WG needs to escalate discussions with IPR owner
and
> IESG subcommittee to determine how to proceed or reach agreement on
> placement in earlier categories.]
>
> Licensing TERMS are more important by the time implementations are ready,
> and given most WG timescales, pending IPR grants have usually been
resolved
> by the time a standard reaches proposed status.
>
> A systematic coupled process to reach IPR convergence as part of the
> evolution of the standard's technology would simplify the operation of
WG's
> and would also guide IPR owners on what they need to do and when they
need
> to do it.
>
> There are some other reasons, but those are the ones I think most
relevant.
>
> Paul
>
> >    Brian
> >
> >Paul Gleichauf wrote:
> > >
> > > A message from Steve Bellovin dated October 22, 2002 to the
ietf-ipr-wg
> > > mailing list contained a statement:
> > > "The Rights and Scenarios documents are not very contentious.  I
> > > think that we can wrap up the open issues with them in Atlanta,
> > > subject to post-meeting ratification on the mailing list."
> > >
> > > I have been following the activities of this WG since before Yokahama
in
> > > the hope that the vague treatment of IPR in 2026 would be clarified
to
the
> > > point that every conscientious contributor and interested party to a
> > > standard would know what to do with IPR and when to do it. This
message is
> > > intended to identify what I think is thus far missing from
Intellectual
> > > Property Rights in IETF Technology
<draft-bradner-ipr-technology-01.txt>. I
> > > can post a couple of follow-on messages to offer more detailed
constructive
> > > solutions for debate before the Altanta meeting. It would be
unfortunate if
> > > the attitude upon arriving in Atlanta was that these issues are no
longer
> > > contentious, and that a problem of limited scope has been solved.
> > >
> > > There are three readily apparent interested parties at work in the
IETF
> > > standards process: the IETF itself, the working group participants,
and
> > > intellectual property rights holders. A coherent policy for IPR
should
take
> > > account of the diversity of these interests. It should be designed to
> > > encourage and enable all parties to easily know and do the right
thing. It
> > > should not turn working groups into lawyers debating IPR claims and
their
> > > legitimacy. There are two steps that could make this possible.
> > >
> > > The first is a clear statement of principles, a philosophy, of what
> > > constitutes best behavior, or failing that at least acceptable
behavior;
> > > through the social mechanisms of approbation, disapproval, and
shunning
> > > that anchor the IETF.
> > >
> > > The second is a well-defined iterative process for soliciting and
> > > disclosing IPR that is tightly coupled with the evolution of a
standard
> > > through the working group mechanisms already defined in 2026. These
> > > disclosures should start with submission of a form to the IETF WG
which
> > > includes a selection from a small set of precise policy statements
for
> > > licensing that are more specific and useful to the working group than
RAND,
> > > but not more onerous for IPR owners than appropriate given that a
proposal
> > > does not yet a draft or full standard make. The disclosures should
converge
> > > to a statement of licensing terms by the time two independent
> > > implementations have been created to advance to draft standard. By
the
time
> > > the draft is elevated to full standard licensing should be RF with
some
> > > qualifications to provide defensive protection to IPR holders for
their
> > > donation to the community. The disclosures should be regularly
solicited
> > > and refined by working group chairs, and archived into a searchable
public
> > > database that also functions as a form of social memory of
contributions
> > > and impediments to the standards process.
> > >
> > > So, is this in scope, or not?
> > >
> > > Paul Gleichauf
> > > [email-masked]
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--__--__--

Message: 5
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 08:31:45 -0800
To: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
From: Paul Gleichauf <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Alternate view of the philospophy and process for IPR
  inamodified   RFC 2026
Cc: Paul Gleichauf <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]

Brian,

At 12:05 PM 11/13/2002 +0100, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>Paul,
>
>Let me be very explicit, since you are challenging a very long
>held consensus in the IETF.

Fair enough. I am asking for a reevaluation of the consensus at an
opportune time, but this is not a personal crusade.

>1) If the IETF gets into the business of dealing with details
>of license regimes, the task of the WG chairs, ADs, etc. will become
>dominated by dealing with these issues instead of what they are
>supposed to be doing, i.e. facilitating the best possible technology
>design. It would not, as you assert, simplify the WG's operation;
>it would substantially complicate it.

I am trying to argue for general enough framework that for the vast
majority of cases no such  involvement will be necessary. I would welcome
broad input from WG chairs, past and present, for alternative mechanisms.

>1a) Since the IETF is not incorporated, we would need legal advice,
>but I suspect these people would also become personally liable for
>any misjudgements, errors, and omissions. Personally, I wouldn't
>want to be a WG chair or AD in those circumstances.

I don't see why beyond the initial language describing the categories, a
one time effort by an IETF engaged attorney which was originally applied to

RFC 2026 and is again being applied against Scott Bradner's modifications.
Any other legal counsel would be engaged by the IPR contributors to fit
their contributions into one of the categories. The only exception is the
Other case. If it turns out that Other is not the exception, then we would
have badly crafted the preferred categories.

>2) If the IETF attempted to move from a RAND to an RF requirement
>(as opposed to an RF preference), then companies unwilling to accept
>this would simply withdraw from the IETF, wait until the standard was
>published, and then start collecting royalties. This isn't theory;
>it's already happening elsewhere.

The options I listed are in order of preference. RF with defensive rights
is the one I personally would rank first, but I was not sure whether that
would be the consensus. I take it you think that RAND (number 3 in the hit
parade) is phrased in such a way that it makes its use impossible for
companies? Then the language for that option needs to be changed, since my
intention is to make sure that everyone can shelter under the 2026
umbrella, not to drive contributors away. There is nonetheless a bias
toward forms of RF for use in open standards. I also have read with some
care what is happening elsewhere (in particular the W3C concerns me), and
do not want this discussion to head down some of those blind alleys.

Paul

>    Brian
>
>Paul Gleichauf wrote:
> >
> > Brian,
> >
> > At 09:46 AM 11/12/2002 +0100, you wrote:
> > >This would be an effective way of making it even less likely than
today
> > >that any document is ever classified as Standard.
> >
> > I have been told that most of the Internet runs on Proposed, not Full
> > Standard protocols, but the core of the argument is that openness is
more
> > difficult the more restricted the licensing model.
> >
> > >Paul, you haven't identified a problem that calls for such a
contentious
> > >solution, as opposed to the non-contentious clarifications in the
> > >current draft.
> >
> > If you found the restrictions on Full Standard the (most) contentious
part
> > of my statements, then perhaps the very slow rate promotion to the
ultimate
> > category is the proof, but I don't think it is central to the argument
of
> > providing a process for simplifying the navigation of WG around IPR.
> >
> > The simplest statement is that a RAND statement is insufficiently
useful,
> > and the language I have read around RFC 2026 and its modification so
far
> > does not help guide how to make it more so.
> >
> > The broadest-based participation under the IETF umbrella benefits the
> > Internet community, but that requires the ability to recognize and
adjust
> > for IPR claims.
> >
> > Since RFC 2026 was first crafted IPR disclosure has become more coupled
> > with the crafting of standards.
> >
> > When work on a standard is initiated, it is important to know who has
IPR
> > at stake and to encourage them to disclose its impact.
> >
> > At the early stages of working group development relevant IPR may be
> > pending, or it may not be clear what claims are relevant until the
standard
> > advances.
> >
> > Licensing POLICY is more important than claims coverage to early
working
> > group progress.
> >
> > A very few types of IPR license policy should cover the vast majority
of
> > cases. A suggested initial set are 1) RF, 2) RF with defensive rights,
3)
> > RAND [with an obligation to be more specific before advancement to
> > Proposed], 4) No license [WG needs to reevaluate based upon specific
claims
> > or charter], 5) Other [WG needs to escalate discussions with IPR owner
and
> > IESG subcommittee to determine how to proceed or reach agreement on
> > placement in earlier categories.]
> >
> > Licensing TERMS are more important by the time implementations are
ready,
> > and given most WG timescales, pending IPR grants have usually been
resolved
> > by the time a standard reaches proposed status.
> >
> > A systematic coupled process to reach IPR convergence as part of the
> > evolution of the standard's technology would simplify the operation of
WG's
> > and would also guide IPR owners on what they need to do and when they
need
> > to do it.
> >
> > There are some other reasons, but those are the ones I think most
relevant.
> >
> > Paul
> >
> > >    Brian
> > >
> > >Paul Gleichauf wrote:
> > > >
> > > > A message from Steve Bellovin dated October 22, 2002 to the
ietf-ipr-wg
> > > > mailing list contained a statement:
> > > > "The Rights and Scenarios documents are not very contentious.  I
> > > > think that we can wrap up the open issues with them in Atlanta,
> > > > subject to post-meeting ratification on the mailing list."
> > > >
> > > > I have been following the activities of this WG since before
> Yokahama in
> > > > the hope that the vague treatment of IPR in 2026 would be clarified

> to the
> > > > point that every conscientious contributor and interested party to
a
> > > > standard would know what to do with IPR and when to do it. This
> message is
> > > > intended to identify what I think is thus far missing from
Intellectual
> > > > Property Rights in IETF Technology
> <draft-bradner-ipr-technology-01.txt>. I
> > > > can post a couple of follow-on messages to offer more detailed
> constructive
> > > > solutions for debate before the Altanta meeting. It would be
> unfortunate if
> > > > the attitude upon arriving in Atlanta was that these issues are no
> longer
> > > > contentious, and that a problem of limited scope has been solved.
> > > >
> > > > There are three readily apparent interested parties at work in the
IETF
> > > > standards process: the IETF itself, the working group participants,
and
> > > > intellectual property rights holders. A coherent policy for IPR
> should take
> > > > account of the diversity of these interests. It should be designed
to
> > > > encourage and enable all parties to easily know and do the right
> thing. It
> > > > should not turn working groups into lawyers debating IPR claims and

> their
> > > > legitimacy. There are two steps that could make this possible.
> > > >
> > > > The first is a clear statement of principles, a philosophy, of what
> > > > constitutes best behavior, or failing that at least acceptable
> behavior;
> > > > through the social mechanisms of approbation, disapproval, and
shunning
> > > > that anchor the IETF.
> > > >
> > > > The second is a well-defined iterative process for soliciting and
> > > > disclosing IPR that is tightly coupled with the evolution of a
standard
> > > > through the working group mechanisms already defined in 2026. These
> > > > disclosures should start with submission of a form to the IETF WG
which
> > > > includes a selection from a small set of precise policy statements
for
> > > > licensing that are more specific and useful to the working group
> than RAND,
> > > > but not more onerous for IPR owners than appropriate given that a
> proposal
> > > > does not yet a draft or full standard make. The disclosures should
> converge
> > > > to a statement of licensing terms by the time two independent
> > > > implementations have been created to advance to draft standard. By
> the time
> > > > the draft is elevated to full standard licensing should be RF with
some
> > > > qualifications to provide defensive protection to IPR holders for
their
> > > > donation to the community. The disclosures should be regularly
> solicited
> > > > and refined by working group chairs, and archived into a searchable

> public
> > > > database that also functions as a form of social memory of
> contributions
> > > > and impediments to the standards process.
> > > >
> > > > So, is this in scope, or not?
> > > >
> > > > Paul Gleichauf
> > > > [email-masked]

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---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2002 17:05:38 +0100

Albin,

> This is not something to be
> done in an ID.

With respect, an Internet Draft, as the preliminary step towards an RFC, 
is the correct (and only) mechanism for IETF process changes. The IETF 
has no statutes, since it is an unincorporated association. However, 
the IDs published so far introduce no changes of principle. If you think 
they need additional clarification, precise proposals for text changes 
would be helpful.

FYI, the currently applicable process document is technically a
Best Current Practices RFC (approved by the IESG, as defined within the
document itself), which was also accepted by the Board of the Internet
Society, under "Resolution 96-11: Adoption of POISED Documents

      RESOLVED, that the Board accept the POISED Documents: The Organisations Involved in the IETF Standards Process, IAB and
IESG Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees, and The Internet Standards
Process -- Revision 3, and accept the responsibilities of ISOC as described in these documents."

Any change will have to go through the same process.

   Brian Carpenter