Subject: Re: SRH provision security

From: "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 14:14:29 +0000

Jean-Michel

Thanks for the kind reminder during the WG meeting today.

As all the security provided by the HMAC relies on a secure (confidential and trusted) way to share the key, you are right to state that this channel (for example SDN) must be secure as it is the foundation of the SRH security in this use case.

The I-D has a section 3.3 which talks about this issue but after re-reading it today, I am going to reword it to make it clear that the key distribution must be secure.

Thanks for your review

-éric

From: ipv6 <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>> on behalf of Jean-Michel Combes <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>
Date: lundi 23 mars 2015 18:14
To: 6man Mailing List <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>
Subject: SRH provision security

Hi,

as promised during the session, here is a clarification about my second comment about the trust relationship between a node, outside the SR domain, requesting a SRH to controller.

Assuming that a PSK has been compromised (HMAC Key ID = HKID1) and the controller is aware (i.e., using another HMAC Key ID = HKID2 for the requested SRH), what will happen if a MitM attack is set up between the controller and the requesting node (the SRH is modified and signed with HKID1, of course)? How the requesting node could be aware of this attack?

Thanks in advance for your reply.

Best regards,

JMC.