Subject: [jose] Fwd: Re: Security research on JWT implementations

From: Prateek Mishra <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 11:46:37 -0700

The JOSE specifications aren't a security protocol - they are just 
building blocks and primitives meant to be used by a security protocol.
XML-DSIG and XML-ENC from the last decade are similar constructions but 
meant for XML (and with some resulting complexities).

These frameworks meant to be used in the context of a protocol - OpenID 
Connect comes to mind - in which trust relationships and processing 
rules describe how JOSE can be used to achieve, for example, message 
authentication.

I take your point that people are using JOSE and signing/encryting bits 
of stuff and pushing it around the internet without the benefit of a 
higher-level protocol. And, yes, they are open to attacks and no doubt 
misusing/misinterpreting the results.

> On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 12:06 PM, Prateek Mishra 
> <[email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
>
>     This sounds like a basic misunderstanding about the role of a
>     "security toolkit" vs. an end-to-end protocol that uses a toolkit
>     (e.g., SAML or openID Connect).
>
>     For example, all of the crypto primitives available in java
>     (jca/jce) could also be "misused" in these ways, so I am not sure
>     this analysis is very helpful.
>
>
> I'm not sure what you mean here. This isn't a case of implementers 
> misusing primitives -- this is a case of attackers forcing misuse of 
> primitives. Maybe you can clarify?
>
> Tim
>
>
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