Subject: Re: authmeth-07 issues

From: "Roger Harrison" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2004 00:31:47 -0700

With the fairly extensive reworking of the effect of Start TLS and TLS
closure on the LDAP association state, I'm wondering how WG members view
the need for these security considerations proposed by Hallvard.  Your
comments are greatly appreciated.
 
Roger

>>> Hallvard B Furuseth <[email-masked]> 10/14/2003 8:11:28
AM >>>
> 10. Security Considerations

I think you should say that if the connection is already bound when
startTLS is performed, servers SHOULD reject operations that follow
StartTLS other than bind, unbind and abandon (with
strongAuthRequired?).

bind before startTLS is an insecure combination, and that an attacker
also may insert a bind before a startTLS when the client expects to do
anonymous operations with TLS.

Or SHOULD the server reject these operations even if the connection is
anonymous? The attacker could have inserted an anonymous bind, though
that doesn't seem like much of a problem.

---

From: John McMeeking <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2004 08:43:24 -0600

I don't think there is any need to add material to the Security
Considerations section if the proposed changes to authmethod are made (your
previous note on StartTLS and StopTLS).

John  McMeeking

"Roger Harrison" <[email-masked]> wrote on 02/16/2004 01:31:47 AM:

> With the fairly extensive reworking of the effect of Start TLS and
> TLS closure on the LDAP association state, I'm wondering how WG
> members view the need for these security considerations proposed by
> Hallvard.  Your comments are greatly appreciated.
>
> Roger
> >>> Hallvard B Furuseth <[email-masked]> 10/14/2003 8:11:28 AM
>>>
> StartTLS other than bind, unbind and abandon (with strongAuthRequired?).
>