Subject: Re: CSV and STARTTLS

From: "Hector Santos" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2004 02:41:55 -0400

----- Original Message -----
From: "Andrew Newton" <[email-masked]>
To: "Hector Santos" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "IETF-MXCOMP" <[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2004 9:56 PM
Subject: Re: CSV and STARTTLS

> On Jun 30, 2004, at 8:24 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
> > The only possible reason I can think of is because it usually means
> > exclusive arrangements which is already done with IP Relays tables or
> > SMTP AUTH accounts.   Any TLS security advantage is not guarantee
between
> > multi-hop routes.
>
> Not that I disagree with this observation, but couldn't it also apply
> to CSV since it is doing the same thing?
>
> Or in other words, if it isn't worth it to authenticate via TLS because
> SMTP is a hop-by-hop protocol, why is CSV authentication more
> compelling?

I am undestanding CVS correctly,  CVS is based (and only cares for) in the
trust and validation of the final MTA/MDA transaction with the presumption
that the original submission was authenticated (required for a route(, and
the routes themselves are trusted.  Its the circle or chain of trust
concept.

Its a valid theoritical concept until we get into hetergenous mixing of
servers which we have already experienced first hand with a real customer
issue.  Right or wrong, the customer had control in replacing long
established legacy SMTP servers but was able to add the  new "LMAP-ready"
AntiSpam SMTP server as a primary host and smart host for the legacy
servers. I don't think CVS will solve this because will assume the legacy
server already did validations.

In short, as I explained to the customer,  installing a new $15K Advanced
Home Security System [MARID Servers] with all the latest gadgets doesn't
quite make sense when you still have the habit of leaving the front door key
[non-MARID servers] under a potted plant on the porch. :-)

-- 
Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc.
http://www.santronics.com