Subject: [MEXT] IPsec vs other

From: Alexandru Petrescu <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 00:22:43 +0100

IPsec is a big thing.  Why not having just its AH as a MUST, before 
proposing big alternatives to big IPsec.

Alex

---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 17:19:08 +0800

AH is OK to disclose the MIP6 header to the router/firewall. But the 
home agent still has to maintain a SA database (maybe a big SAD) for all 
of mobile nodes. I thought it is why Raj/Char would like to give up 
IPsec.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Alexandru Petrescu" <[email-masked]>
To: "mext" <[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2009 7:22 AM
Subject: [MEXT] IPsec vs other

> _______________________________________________
> MEXT mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mext 

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---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 17:42:59 +0800

Agree with Michael comment: HA deletes the BCE as well as the related SA 
from SAD at the same time. Then the coming BU will be dropped simply due 
to no associated SA.

Anyway, the ralated SA will be deleted/updated when its lifetime is 
expired. So the question here is: after deleting the SA, does MIP6 need 
to send a notice to IKE that a SA is deleted?

---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 18:03:41 +0800

Hi, Raj and Charles

Will the considering alternate security architecture still need to 
encrypt the messages between MN and HA as current MIP6 does?

IMHO, it is not necessary to encrypt the packets between MN and HA since 
we do not encrypte the packets between HA and CN. It is hard to say that 
the meesages between HA and MN are more sensitive than HA and CN.

Regards
Qiu Ying

---

From: [email-masked] (Arnaud Ebalard)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 11:07:21 +0100

Hi,

"QIU Ying" <[email-masked]> writes:

> Agree with Michael comment:

Sorry but which comment are you refering to?

> HA deletes the BCE as well as the related
> SA from SAD at the same time. Then the coming BU will be dropped
> simply due to no associated SA.
>
> expired. So the question here is: after deleting the SA, does MIP6
> need to send a notice to IKE that a SA is deleted?

Cheers,

a+

---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 18:15:01 +0800

It's regarding Char's talk on rfc3775bis Issues, the first issue: BU 
de-registration race condition.
Michael's comment is to delete the SA when deleted the BC entry.

---

From: Alexandru Petrescu <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 11:23:07 +0100

QIU Ying a écrit :
> home agent still has to maintain a SA database (maybe a big SAD) for 
> all of mobile nodes. I thought it is why Raj/Char would like to give 
> up IPsec.

Hmm... any other non-IPsec method on HA would have to maintain a
database with keys for MNs, which would become large if many MNs.

Alex

> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Alexandru Petrescu" 
> <[email-masked]> To: "mext" <[email-masked]> Sent: 
> Wednesday, March 25, 2009 7:22 AM Subject: [MEXT] IPsec vs other
> 
> 
>> Alex _______________________________________________ MEXT mailing 
>> list [email-masked] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mext
> 
> Institute for Infocomm Research disclaimer:  "This email is 
> confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended 
> recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately. Please do not 
> copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to any other
>  person. Thank you."
>

---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 18:41:17 +0800

Hi, Alex

The ID based solution should be a candidate.

Although HA as a key generator still has to keep a big database, the 
maintenance is offline. So the online overhead could be reduced.

Regards
Qiu Ying

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Alexandru Petrescu" <[email-masked]>
To: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Alexandru Petrescu" <[email-masked]>; "mext" 
<[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2009 6:23 PM
Subject: Re: [MEXT] IPsec vs other

---

From: Alexandru Petrescu <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 11:53:21 +0100

> The ID based solution should be a candidate.

I think I've heard about ID-based solution (as opposed to IPsec IP
address based authentication) during the MEXT meeting, but not sure what
is it - is there a draft name for ID-based solution?

Or is it just an idea about authenticating based on a NAI, like
[email-masked]?

>  maintenance is offline. So the online overhead could be reduced.

Not sure I udnerstand this but I may have completely missed some discussion.

Alex

> Regards Qiu Ying
> <[email-masked]> To: "QIU Ying"
> <[email-masked]> Cc: "Alexandru Petrescu"
> <[email-masked]>; "mext" <[email-masked]> Sent:
> Wednesday, March 25, 2009 6:23 PM Subject: Re: [MEXT] IPsec vs other
> 
> 
>> QIU Ying a écrit :
>>> AH is OK to disclose the MIP6 header to the router/firewall. But
>>> the home agent still has to maintain a SA database (maybe a big
>>> SAD) for all of mobile nodes. I thought it is why Raj/Char would
>>> like to give up IPsec.
>> 
>>>> IPsec is a big thing.  Why not having just its AH as a MUST,
>>>> before proposing big alternatives to big IPsec.
>>>> 
>>>> Alex _______________________________________________ MEXT
>>>> mailing list [email-masked]
>>> recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately. Please do
>>> not copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to
>>> any other person. Thank you."
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>

---

From: "QIU Ying" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 19:08:28 +0800

> is it - is there a draft name for ID-based solution?

I have a rough idea @ 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-qiu-mext-mn-ha-secure-01.txt

Regards
Qiu ying

---

From: Francis Dupont <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 18:12:19 +0100

In your previous mail you wrote:

=> it doesn't: only authentication and integrity are required.

=> it is common to put the MN is a potentially hostile environment so
it can be critical to protect the HA - MN path. HA - CN is in general
in the core and routing optimization is not mandatory, i.e., you can
keep the MN - HA - CN routing if the direct MN - CN path can be
considered as dangerous.

BTW there are still very good reasons to stay with the current security
architecture: it is yet proven to be enough secure and IMHO to provide
alternatives is just the best way to introduce confusion (to stay polite).

[email-masked]

PS: unfortunately I couldn't attend the MEXT session yesterday...

---

From: Julien Laganier <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2009 00:35:37 +0100

Qiu,

Quoting 3775:

    The return routability procedure, described in Section 5.2.5, assumes
    that the confidentiality of the Home Test Init and Home Test messages
    is protected as they are tunneled between the home agent and the
    mobile node.

--julien

QIU Ying wrote:
> Institute for Infocomm Research disclaimer:  "This email is confidential 
> and may be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please 
> delete it and notify us immediately. Please do not copy or use it for 
> any purpose, or disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you."

---

From: Ryuji Wakikawa <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 17:21:33 -0700

Hi

RFC4225 mentioned the reason to protect RR packets between MN-HA.

"At first, it may sound unnecessary to protect the packet between the  
home agent and the mobile node, since it travelled unprotected between  
the correspondent node and the mobile node. If all links in the  
Internet were equally insecure, the additional protection would be  
unnecessary. However, in most practical settings the network is likely  
to be more secure near the home agent than near the mobile node. For  
example, if the home agent hosts a virtual home link and the mobile  
nodes are never actually at home, an eavesdropper should be close to  
the correspondent node or on the path between the correspondent node  
and the home agent, since it could not eavesdrop at the home agent. If  
the correspondent node is a major server, all the links on the path  
between it and the home agent are likely to be    fairly secure. On  
the other hand, the Mobile Node is probably using wireless access  
technology, making it sometimes trivial to eavesdrop on its access  
link. Thus, it is fairly easy to eavesdrop on packets that arrive at  
the mobile node. Consequently, protecting the HA-MN path is likely to  
provide real security benefits even when the CN-HA path remains  
unprotected."

ryuji

On 2009/03/25, at 16:35, Julien Laganier wrote:

>> IMHO, it is not necessary to encrypt the packets between MN and HA  
>> since we do not encrypte the packets between HA and CN. It is hard  
>> to say that the meesages between HA and MN are more sensitive than  
>> HA and CN.
>> Regards
>> Qiu Ying
>> not copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to any  
>> other person. Thank you."

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2009 02:05:57 +0100

The need to encrypt the signaling messages (or payload in certain instances) between the MN and HA is essential.
I do not believe we can expect secure links between the MN and HA. The quotes by Julien and Ryuji should convince you as well.

-Raj

________________________________________
From: [email-masked] [[email-masked]] On Behalf Of ext Ryuji Wakikawa [[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2009 7:21 PM
To: Julien Laganier
Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]; mext
Subject: Re: [MEXT] MIP6 Security architecture

Hi

ryuji