Subject: [NEXTEL-1] Submitted Testimony Before 9/11 Commission Of Alan Reiss Former Director, World Trade Department, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 18:00:50 -0400

Submitted Testimony Before 9/11 Commission Of Alan Reiss Former
Director, World Trade Department, Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey

1

TESTIMONY OF ALAN REISS

BEFORE THE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

May 18, 2004

Thank you Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton and distinguished
members of the Commission for the opportunity to testify before you
today. My name is Alan Reiss and I am currently the Deputy Director of
Aviation at The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Prior to
assuming my current position, I was the Director of the agency’s World
Trade Department, which operated the World Trade Center. Mr.  Chairman,
I know that you are familiar with the Port Authority, but for the
benefit of the other members of the Commission, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey operates many of the busiest and most important
transportation links in the New York-New Jersey region. Most important
to the Commission’s work, the Port Authority built and operated the
World Trade Center and continues to own the 16-acre World Trade Center
site in Lower Manhattan.
September 11th was without a doubt the wo rst day in the long history of
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey and one of the worst in the
history of the United States. This was a profound personal loss for us
at the Port Authority. The World Trade Center was our headquarters and
84 members of the Port Authority family died that day;

16 of them civilian building management staff who reported to me and
responded to their emergency posts that day. We grieve their loss, and
our hearts continue to go out to their families, and to the families of
all the victims who died that day. We also grieve with the families of
the firefighters, police officers, rescue workers, and military
personnel who made the ultimate sacrifice to keep our country safe.

As each of you know, the attacks of September 11 were not the first time
that the World Trade Center was targeted and attacked by terrorists. On
February 26, 1993, terrorists detonated a bomb in the subgrade parking
levels of the Trade Center, killing six people, including four Port
Authority employees, one of whom was pregnant, and injuring thousands.
Port Authority landmark facilities, such as the Lincoln and Holland
Tunnels and the George Washington Bridge have been identified as
specific targets, along with other New York City landmarks, by terrorist
organizations.  While our agency’s primary mission is to promote
commerce and economic development in our region, the everyday realities
within which we operate dictate that safety and security is our number
one priority. Given our agency’s experiences and our priorities in the
areas of safety and security, I am pleased to have the opportunity to
provide you with information about the life-safety systems in place at
the World Trade Center on September 11 and how they, along with the
extraordinary and he roic efforts of both uniformed and civilian
personnel contributed to the one of the largest, safest 2 evacuations of
tens of thousands of workers and visitors at the World Trade Center on
that fateful morning.

INCIDENT COMMAND

The Port Authority adopted the Incident Command System in the 1980s as
the way of managing all incidents at its facilities such as the World
Trade Center and the metropolitan area airports. Port Authority or New
Jersey State Police trained all World Trade Department operations staff
and the majority of senior staff, more than 26 people in the World Trade
Department alone, in the use of the Incident Command System so we could
work with uniformed responders as an effective team.  The World Trade
Center had a written emergency procedures manual that dealt with
numerous types of emergencies and it has been made available to this
commission.  This manual was updated and revised every year as a joint
effort between World Trade Center operations staff and the Port
Authority Police. As the world changed over the last decade, so did the
emergency manual and training.

The Port Authority Police held annual tabletop drills involving both
police and the civilian management at the World Trade Center to exercise
these plans and its decisionmaking.  PAPD specialists developed these
exercises. Training was not restricted to just Port Authority employees.
For example, New York City fire companies downtown were given regular
familiarization tours of the World Trade Center and simplified subgrade
floor plans.

The Port Authority Police and World Trade Department staff enjoyed a
close working relationship with the New York City Fire Department. Port
Authority Police radios were given to Engine 10/Ladder 10 and Battalion
1 in the 1980s to improve communications between the Fire Department and
Port Authority Police located at the World Trade Center. Additional
police radios were made available to responding units to ensure
effective communications between the command post and the incident.
After the 1993 attack, we installed a repeater on the Fire Department
Citywide radio frequency to aid in communications. Port Authority Police
and the Fire Department even drilled together at the World Trade Center,
including a simulated five-alarm, full floor fire on the 92nd floor of 2
WTC on June 6, 1999. This drill on an early Sunday morning used smoke
machines, mannequins and lighting to create a realistic environment for
those involved.  In addition, the Fire Department high-rise unit would
perform annual inspections that typically took more than a week.

Incident Command training and drills were also done on a multi-agency
basis.  Just weeks before 9/11, all PA executive staff, including
myself, participated in the “Gateway 2000” tabletop exercises at the
Port Authority Technical Center in Jersey City and Newark Liberty
International Airport with dozens of local, state and federal agencies
on a simulated Weapons of Mass Destruction attack at Port Newark. This
exercise tested the participants’ ability to work under a unified
command structure as the situation evolved.
3

FIRE SAFETY PLANS AND STAFFING

Six weeks prior to the September 11 attacks, the World Trade Center was
net leased to a private developer, Silverstein Properties, which began
managing the facility with its own executives. I, and a select group of
Port Authority employees assisted Silverstein staff during a three-
month transition period. Nevertheless, it is vital for the Commission to
understand the nature of Port Authority policies and procedures that
were implemented and utilized that day and why so many PA staff, even
those not on the Silverstein transition team, immediately responded to
their former battle stations, as they had been trained to do over the
years.

The Port Authority developed and filed with the Bureau of Fire
Prevention, a Fire Safety Plan for the WTC buildings in accordance with
the bureau’s guidelines. Port Authority operations supervisors were
certified by FDNY as fire safety directors. They were on duty around the
clock at the World Trade Center, as were additional contract
FDNY-certified and dedicated deputy fire safety directors who staffed
the fire command stations in the tower lobbies 24 hours a day and seven
days a week. The sole job of each deputy fire safety director was to
staff the fire command station. A separate elevator starter was on duty
watching the vertical transportation system, unlike in many buildings
where the starter also assumes the fire safety director functions. We
felt it was extremely important to have this dedicated fire safety
staff. Each of these individuals passed an onsite examination given by
the New York City Fire Department before being qualified to work at the
World Trade Center.

Prior to the net leasing of the World Trade Center to Silverstein
Properties, the Port Authority’s life safety supervisor was the
complex’s top fire safety director. He updated the Emergency Procedure
Manual annually, oversaw the fire drills and training, and conducted the
familiarization tours and exercises with FDNY. He held a Bachelor of
Science in Fire Safety and an MBA, as well as numerous professional
certifications. The floor wardens and their fire safety team members
received specific training on their responsibilities, including a
videotape to ensure consistency in training, red hats, flashlights, and
whistles, all above and beyond what local law required.  The Port
Authority had standing plans for the full-scale evacuation of the World
Trade Center during non-fire events, which the New York City Department
of Buildings’ World Trade Center Building Code Task Force now recommends
for all high-rise buildings. These were used successfully on a number of
occasions. For example, the WTC complex experienced a total loss of
power due to the Con Edison South Street Seaport Substation fire on
August 13, 1990, at 1:15 p.m., and staff successfully evacuated the
entire complex of approximately 70,000 people that day in safe manner,
including more than 600 people stuck on 40 elevators.

WORLD TRADE CENTER SECURITY/LIFE SAFETY SYSTEM UPGRADES

The 1993 terrorist bombing was a wakeup call to the nation. The Port
Authority, at the direction of its Board of Commissioners and the
Governors of New York and New 4 Jersey, hired premier experts to help it
evaluate and upgrade its life safety and security systems. The 1993
terrorist attack disclosed various issues, such as loss of the fire
alarm public address system due to damage from the explosion; failure of
emergency generator cooling systems; subsequent loss of all lighting in
stairwells when Con Edison power was turned off to allow fire to be
fought; confusion in transfer floor exit passageways; and difficulties
with the FDNY radio communications within the complex.  To address these
issues, the Port Authority’s Board of Commissioners authorized more than
$130 million in various upgrades to the complex. These investments
included the installation of a 2 million watt, tertiary backup power
system fed from the New Jersey Public Service Electric & Gas grid
utilizing feeders from the PATH rapid transit system.  This would take
over after loss of both normal multiple Con Edison feeds and emergency
generator power. We added battery packs to every other fluorescent light
fixture in the exit stairs, as well as to the elevator cab lighting and
alarm bells, and within the fire alarm system cabinets. We added
photoluminescent paint to stairwells and handrails to guide evacuees,
and added glow- in-the-dark floor signs and trailblazing signs at
horizontal crossovers. The Port Autho rity purchased evacuation chair
stretchers for any mobilityrestricted person working at the World Trade
Center because in 1993 fellow employees carried some people down more
than 60 stories.

After 1993, the Port Authority consulted with security experts and spent
more than $50 million on perimeter and building-access security upgrades
at the World Trade Center. The parking lots and truck docks were
protected with Delta barriers that could stop a moving truck and prevent
its entrance until it was cleared. This type of protection was unheard
of at commercial office buildings in 1993. Truck drivers and their IDs
were photographed while guards conducted visual inspections of trucks
entering the truck dock while PAPD and explosives-detection dogs
provided random inspections of the trucks.  The perimeter of the World
Trade Center complex was ringed with 10,000-pound planters to prevent a
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device from getting close to the
buildings. The World Trade Center, which had been an open public
complex, including its buildings, was converted into a closed building
complex where all tenants were issued ID cards and all visitors had to
be verified at a visitor desk, where they were photographed and given
temporary IDs.

Cameras monitored the perimeter for stopped vehicles and more than 200
cameras were installed throughout the complex. A new Security Command
Center was built on the 22nd floor of 1 WTC, backed up by a new
Operations Control Center on the subgrade B1 level at 2 World Trade
Center.  The new Operations Control Center was approximately five times
larger than the one damaged by the 1993 bombing, and located as far from
the truck docks as possible.  It was located under 2 WTC because our
security experts told us the highest threat was an improvised explosive
device. The Port Authority also invested more than $70 million
installing new decentralized fire alarm systems with redundant
communication circuits and control panels, a main one in the lobby of
each building and a second in another location.
5
A quick recap of life safety and security-related improvements installed
in the last decade at the World Trade Center shows that the Port
Authority invested over a quarter of a billion dollars since 1993.

Concourse Improvements $34 million
Tower Sprinklers (started pre 1993) 68 million
5,000 LED Exit signs with batteries 1.1 million
2,500 battery packs for stairway light fixtures 1 million
Tertiary backup power from PSE&G 2 million
New Police Command Center 7 million
New Class E Fire Alarm systems 70 million
Perimeter Security 3.8 million
Parking Security 4.3 million
Lock and Key system 1.6 million
Permanent Security System 44.5 million
Parking Access Control System 3.9 million
New Operations Control Center (B1) 11.5 million

RADIO COMMUNICATION

Following a multi-agency critique at One Police Plaza of the response to
the 1993 terrorist attack, it was evident that FDNY radios did not work
satisfactorily, either below grade within the World Trade Center complex
or high up in the towers. I worked with the New York City Fire
Department on its needs, secured Port Authority funds and installed a
repeater system on FDNY’s VHF Citywide channel.  This system was tested
by FDNY and found to provide excellent communication throughout the
complex. It was normally left off and activated by the fire chief when
required. At the request of FDNY, we also added a UHF repeater for the
fire department when it decided to go to new digital radios. In light of
transmissions recorded on Dictaphone tapes recovered from the site, it
appears that the repeater system functioned as intended for those who
utilized it on September 11th. When requested by Commissioner Scoppetta,
we provided detailed information to FDNY on the World Trade Center
repeater system, since it may serve as a model for future systems
required in highrise buildings in New York City. This is one of the
recommendations of both the Building Code Task Force and the McKenzie
Commission.

FIRE DRILLS

Evacuation protocols did not change after 1993, but training and
equipment certainly did. The fire drills subsequent to 1993, and even in
2001, still followed New York City Fire Department guidelines to always
evacuate downward since toxic hot gases and smoke rise. In fact, part of
the fire drill announcement was: "... had this been an actual emergency,
you would have been directed to evacuate to at least three floors below
your floor...” My opinion is that tenants took the fire drills much more
seriously after 1993. Prior to then, not everyone would halt meetings or
leave trading desks to attend 6 drills despite their floor warden’s
urging. Our video specifically addressed this issue, instructed wardens
not to argue, and to report the fact that the persons refused to
participate or evacuate. Managers received a looseleaf tenant manual
prior to moving in; one section dealt with fire safety and the tenant’s
responsibility under the NYC Building Code’s local law 5 to have a fire
safe ty team. Fire drills were conducted for full floor tenants right
after they moved in with their full staff, and were conducted
semiannually for typical office floors, and more frequently for staff of
the observation deck, Windows on the World, and the Children's Discovery
Center Day Care. Tenant fire drills were typically conducted in the
spring and fall and scheduled to maximize tenant participation.
Approximately two weeks before the drills began, a written notification
was handdelivered to all tenant fire safety team members explaining the
process, date, time, etc.  These were required to be signed for, so that
there was a record of their receipt. On the date of the drill, a
representative from the WTC fire safety unit would be positioned on each
of the participating floors to observe. They also used the opportunity
to test the pull stations. After the drill was conducted, all tenant
fire safety team members would gather for a meeting/critique.

ROOFTOP EMERGENCY EVACUATION

As previously stated, standard evacuation procedure was to always
evacuate downward. Tenants were never advised to evacuate upward. In
answer to your question, two of the three staircases went up to the
110th floor to serve as the exit stairs from the center corridor on this
floor. Tenants however would not have been able to reach the 110th floor
center core hallway where the doors to the roof stairs were located
since the fire stairwell doors on this floor were non-reentry doors back
onto the floor. The 110th floor like many other floors was a non-reentry
floor, marked in accordance with the NYC Building Code requirements. It
required either a World Trade Center ID to activate the release on the
door lock or a key. These access cards were issued to regularly
stationed broadcaster staff and also worked on the lobby turnstiles or
freight elevator to the 110th floor, which was also access-controlled.
Building contractor staff such as electricians or window washers also
had stairway door keys. These 110th floor stairway doors were labeled
inside the stairway as “NO Re-entry,” with the closest re-entry floor
indicated on a sign. Even if an individual made it to the 110th floor
center corridor, access to the roof was restricted in accordance with
Federal Communications Commission regulations, since it housed critical
communications equipment, including broadcast facilities for all the
major TV stations, paging transmitters, FDNY transmitters and numerous
other mobile transmitters. Anyone working on the roof had to take a
radio frequency hazard awareness class and be certified to access the
roof. Physical access to the roof was through a set of two doors,
essentially a mantrap. A small group of individuals had access card
privileges, which would open the first door to the roof; and they then
would present their ID card and themselves via CCTV and the second door
was electronically unlocked open by the Operations Control Center. Most
land mobile radio technicians, not on the authorized list, had to
present their IDs at the Operations Control Center and then be escorted
to the roof.

7

Although a few rooftop evacuations did occur in the aftermath of the
1993 bombing, it is my understanding that they were considered and
dismissed during a subsequent review by New York City Police and Fire
departments for the potential use of helicopters for high-rise
evacuations. No such protocol was in place on September 11th.  In
addition, there were no regular helicopter landings on the roofs of
either tower, although there was a small helipad on the roof of Tower
Two, which also had the outdoor observation deck platform and some
broadcasting antennas. Tower One had the main TV mast and antennas and
equipment.

BUILDING CODES

As a bistate agency, under the law, the Port Authority is not subject to
municipal code requirements. However, the Port Authority’s longstanding
policy was and is to meet or exceed all municipal building and fire
codes in all of the agency’s facilities and to allow inspectors to enter
our facilities unannounced.

The 1968 NYC Building Code was used as the basis of design of the WTC
towers. As a part of the federal building and fire safety investigation
of the World Trade Center, the study of the original design documents by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has confirmed
this. The December 2, 2003 NIST status report to its advisory committee
states, “PONYA adopted 1968 NYC Building Code for final design of WTC 1
and WTC2, and WTC 7.” PONYA stands for Port of New York Authority, the
agency’s name until 1972.

The World Trade Center towers also complied with all subsequent code
changes by New York City that were retroactively applicable to existing
high-rise buildings, e.g., sprinklerization as an alternative to
compartmentation of floor areas, class E fire alarm system, etc.

The World Trade Center towers conformed to the code as evidenced in the
World Trade Center Building Performance Study by Federal Emergency
Management Agency, which states: “The study did not reveal any specific
structural features that would be regarded as substandard, and, in fact,
many structural and fire protection features of the design and
construction were found to be superior to the minimum code
requirements.” Where literal conformance was not feasible, accepted
engineering practices and engineered solutions to meet the intent of the
code were implemented. In the mid-1990s, due to increased pedestrian
traffic on its concourse, which was also the access to the PATH system
and various subway lines, and due to increased pedestrian traffic to the
World Financial Center, the Port Authority performed a Concourse Life
Safety study.  The results were reviewed with the NYC Department of
Buildings, after which we converted rentable retail space into new exit
corridors to ensure that the concourse could be evacuated quickly. We
also completely sprinklered and installed a class E voice communications
fire alarm system throughout the concourse. These life safety
improvements cost more than $34 million, not counting the loss of retail
space.
8

The Port Authority has put this policy in writing. In 1993, the Port
Authority signed Memoranda of Understanding with the New York Fire
Department and the city’s Department of Buildings that commits the Port
Authority to comply with the city’s building and fire codes. This
approach has been endorsed by the New York City Department of Buildings’
World Trade Center Building

Code Task Force, which wrote in a February 2003 report:

While not necessarily required to comply with NYC Building Code,
buildings within New York City geographical boundaries such as
diplomatic missions, federal government buildings and those of other
quasi- governmental authorities should ensure that their facilities meet
NYC Code requirements. This can be accomplished through a memorandum of
understanding and other types of inter-governmental collaboration.

Both of the Port Authority’s Memoranda of Understanding with New York
City continue in effect, and apply to all new construction at the World
Trade Center site and all other Port Authority projects in the city. In
addition, the Port Authority’s net lease with Silverstein Properties for
the World Trade Center explicitly requires that it meet municipal codes.
The requirements of the net lease continue in effect as well.
Silverstein Properties and the Port Authority are demonstrating their
continuing commitment to safety and security in the rebuilding of 7
World Trade Center, across the street from the 16-acre World Trade
Center site. In collaboration with the New York City Department of
Buildings and the FDNY, this building will include enhancements that
exceed building and fire code requirements, as well as state-of-the-art
safety and security technologies. The standards applied to 7 World Trade
Center will be applied to all new construction at the World Center site
and are expected to serve as a model for construction of safe and secure
buildings across the nation.  The Port Authority has agreed to the
establishment of a “peer review” process, in which experts would
independently review building plans for the World Trade Center site.
Also, the Port Authority is encouraging New York City to conduct
unannounced building and fire inspections at 7 World Trade Center and
throughout the 16-acre World Trade Center site, during construction and
the operation of the buildings.

NET LEASE TRANSITION

With the net leasing of the World Trade Center to Silverstein Properties
in July 2001, the Port Authority’s role in managing all aspects of the
complex changed substantially. We assembled a transition team of World
Trade Center management and operations staff to advise and assist
Silverstein Properties personnel in assuming their roles and
responsibilities at the complex. Silverstein Properties hired or
reassigned staff, including a fire safety director, a maintenance
manager, an operations manager, and a director of security. The
transition team worked closely with these individuals and others to
educate them about the details of the various systems and procedures in
place at the World Trade Center.

9

Mr. Chairman, on the morning of 9/11, I was on the World Trade Center
Concourse when the first plane hit. I responded immediately to the World
Trade Center Police Desk, which was in the immediate vicinity on the
plaza level and was told that the police had a report that a missile had
been fired at the World Trade Center from the Woolworth building. A PA
detective and I immediately left the police desk and headed out to the
plaza through Five WTC to see what had really happened. We observed the
north face of the north tower with a large gash across it and multiple
floors fully engulfed in flames. We realized that this was not a
missile, based on what our minds could conceive of the damage, and then
we noticed part of a large plane’s wheel assembly on the plaza.

We dragged the assembly back to the police desk and informed the desk
officer that a large commercial plane had hit the tower. I then assisted
the desk officer in answering calls, checking with the fire command
stations and OCC and keeping the desk officer informed as to the
situation. We were stunned when 2 WTC was also hit by a plane. The
police officers and I rushed to the rear emergency exit and looked up at
the tower and realized we were at war. I remained at the police desk
until Two World Trade Center collapsed without warning, trapping me and
the officers at the police desk. We thought the loss of power
accompanied by this tremendous roar was a secondary attack, a bomb.
After we finally escaped, I made my way to the police command post on
West Street, and it was only as I walked west on Barclay Street, that I
realized through the smoke that Two World Trade Center had collapsed. At
the Port Authority Police’s request, I then returned to the vicinity of
6 World Trade Center to assess the condition of One World Trade Center
with then-Captain Whitaker, commander of the PA Police at the WTC, just
as the tower began to collapse. We were both enveloped by this churning
black debris cloud as we ran north on West Street. It was darker than
any burning building I have ever been in as a volunteer fireman, and it
was next to impossible to breathe due to the debris in the air.

PORT AUTHORITY STAFF and THEIR ACTIONS

Mr. Chairman, the employees of the Port Authority have a long history of
distinguished public service. September 11, 2001, subjected Port
Authority staff to a most difficult test. During a time of compelling
need, these men and women performed extraordinary acts of heroism and
service, and their unerring devotion to the agency highlighted their
shared values of duty, loyalty and commitment to the public. Staff from
all Port Authority units, not just the World Trade Department, rose to
the challenge that day, assisting in the evacuation. Eighty-four members
of our Port Authority family perished that day, both civilian and Port
Authority Police. There were many of acts of valor that day, I am
attaching the write-ups on staff you requested.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Chairman, the world has significantly changed for everyone as a
result of 9/11, and I believe there are still lessons to be learned.
Both the NYC and model codes still don't anticipate full high-rise
building evacuations during a fire event. The recommendations currently
before the NYC Council deal with non-fire events. The current thinking
is still “defend in place and evacuate the fire floor and floors above
in 10 danger.” In my opinion, people today will not obey an order over
the public address system to stay in place. I have had office space in
two different buildings in Manhattan since 9/11 as a tenant. In both
buildings, minor fires not within Port Authority space took place and
there was a mass self-evacuation of the building. I remain in touch with
colleagues who run other skyscrapers, such as the Sears Tower, who have
experienced the same phenomena. In my opinion, this needs to be
recognized by the code officials, and the stairwells widened by at least
an extra foot beyond today’s code requirements.

One of the stairwells in the WTC was wider than what the code required
and this proved very beneficial since it allowed two people to come down
adjacent to each other while emergency workers ascended. The training
and equipment we gave the floor wardens and their teams was beyond what
was required by the codes. The studies being done by the National
Institute of Science & Technology and Columbia University on the human
behavior during evacuation hopefully will lead to better understanding
of the relationship between communication and behavior and hence lead to
requirements for future fire drill standards. This is necessary to avoid
people being trampled to death in the stairways in panic. That it did
not happen is a credit to all those people who evacuated the World Trade
Center on 9/11. Nevertheless, I have heard stories of people hesitating,
waiting for public-address announcements, and heading higher in the
buildings. Tenants should understand that stairs may have horizontal
passageways and smoke doors, and that they should follow the
trailblazing signs.

The importance of power redundancies, not common in other buildings, nor
required by codes, needs to be recognized. They, along with the
photoluminescent stairwell signs and markings, worked well, as did the
battery backed- up stairwell fixtures and exit signs. We have even
installed these features in the buildings where we are a tenant at
present.

Another item that should be looked at is the elevator code requirement
that door restrictors must lock the elevator doors closed when the
elevator is not level with a landing. This is a requirement of the
current codes, and such devices were being installed as elevators were
modernized at the World Trade Center. These devices are meant to improve
safety and prevent accidental falls into the shaft, but they have the
potential consequence of trapping individuals in an elevator when it is
stuck between floors, preventing escapes such as took place in both 1993
and 2001.  Another lesson learned is to have a plan to regroup away from
the incident site where headcounts can be taken. It cannot be across the
street, but I never suspected it would have to be miles away in Jersey
City either.

You also need a company plan on how to handle the notifications to
families of employees. We had a plan for PA staff and counselors to make
notifications to a family for someone seriously injured or killed. This
works appropriately for an industrial accident, and even in the 1993
bombing, but in the 9/11 event we did not know for several days who had
survived, who was killed and who was still missing. We set up a number
at the Newark Legal Center for staff to call. And slowly, by 4 a.m. the
next day, the number of my own staff was down to 16 missing, out of
roughly 150 people. I called 11 the families of each missing person,
hoping they had heard something; this went on through the 13th. By that
time the Port Authority Human Resources Department had assigned
counselors to each family. I had lots of hope that members of my staff
who knew the nooks and crannies of the complex would be found in the
subgrade areas.  Unfortunately they were not. I learned how different
each family's reactions were over the first two months with only one
body recovered. I had a list of all staff and their home and cell phones
on my PC, in my attaché case and, luckily, on my Palm Pilot, using a
program called Documents to Go. It proved to be invaluable.

No building or fire safety code can cover every potential terrorist act,
some of which we can’t even imagine today. I have been told that the
energy from one of the planes hitting the tower was equal to the energy
released by a tactical nuclear weapon.  The forces were just incredible,
slicing through steel columns as if they were butter. The towers
actually experienced three separate events; the initial impact, the
fuel/air explosion and resulting overpressures, and finally a raging
fire. If the WTC complex did not exceed codes in so many ways the 9/11
losses would surely have been much more horrific. Therefore, the Port
Authority fully supports the 21 recommendations from the New York City
Department of Buildings’ WTC Building Code Task Force, 13 of which were
introduced as recent legislation in the NYC Council. Many of these
recommendations come out of the extraordinary improvements that the Port
Authority implemented at the World Trade Center, as the New York City
Buildings Commissioner testified when the legislation was introduced.

CONCLUSION

The Port Authority staff, including myself, has spent a great deal of
time in the last year and a ha lf working with the National Institute of
Science and Technology and this Commission to make sure that what
happened that day never happens again.  Fortifying buildings is a last
resort. We must do everything that we can to prevent other Americans
from suffering the pain and anguish that the 1993 and 9/11 families
suffered.  But we also cannot forget that pain and anguish. I have not,
and we continue to deal with the families of staff lost in both events.
They are in my thoughts and prayers.  Thank you.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/reiss_statement.pdf

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