Subject: [NEXTEL-1] Emergency Preparedness and Response Staff Statement No. 13

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 18:34:39 -0400

Emergency Preparedness and Response Staff Statement No. 13

May 18, 2004

TEXT

Members of the Commission, with your help, your staff is prepared to
report its preliminary findings regarding the emergency response in New
York City on September 11, 2001. These initial findings may help frame
some of the issues for this hearing and the development of your
judgments and recommendations.

This report represents a summary of our work to date. We remain ready to
revise our current understanding in light of new information as our work
continues. We encourage those whose understanding differs from ours to
come forward. Sam Caspersen, George Delgrosso, Jim Miller, Madeleine
Blot, Cate Taylor, Joseph McBride, Emily Walker, and John Farmer
conducted most of the investigative work reflected in this statement.

Much of this work was conducted in conjunction with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is studying the
building performance issues. We are indebted to NIST for its
cooperation. We have also received cooperation from the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and from the City of New York.

We have spoken with hundreds of people about the most painful moments of
their lives. We thank them for their willingness to help us. As we have
relived their stories, and the records left by those who no longer can
help us, we have joined in the mourning for all those who were lost that
day.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the
community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested
not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public
servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, and emergency
medical service professionals.

As we therefore focus on the choices they made on the morning of 9/11,
we will not offer much commentary. We will offer more analysis and
suggest some lessons that emerge for the future in Staff Statement No.
14, which we will present tomorrow. Today we concentrate just on
presenting a reliable summary of what happened, to explain the day in
its complexity without replicating its chaos.

We wish to advise the public that the details we will be presenting may
be painful for you to see and hear. Please consider whether you wish to
continue viewing.

Building Preparedness on 9/11

Emergency Preparedness and Response Staff Statement No. 13 embers of the
Commission, with your help, your staff is prepared to report its
preliminary findings regarding the emergency response in New York City
on September 11, 2001. These initial findings may help frame some of the
issues for this hearing and the development of your judgments and
recommendations.
This report represents a summary of our work to date. We remain ready to
revise our current understanding in light of new information as our work
continues. We encourage those whose understanding differs from ours to
come forward. Sam Caspersen, George Delgrosso, Jim Miller, Madeleine
Blot, Cate Taylor, Joseph McBride, Emily Walker, and John Farmer
conducted most of the investigative work reflected in this statement.

Much of this work was conducted in conjunction with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is studying the
building performance issues. We are indebted to NIST for its
cooperation. We have also received cooperation from the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and from the City of New York.

We have spoken with hundreds of people about the most painful moments of
their lives. We thank them for their willingness to help us. As we have
relived their stories, and the records left by those who no longer can
help us, we have joined in the mourning for all those who were lost that
day.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the
community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested
not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public
servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, and emergency
medical service professionals.

As we therefore focus on the choices they made on the morning of 9/11,
we will not offer much commentary. We will offer more analysis and
suggest some lessons that emerge for the future in Staff Statement No.
14, which we will present tomorrow. Today we concentrate just on
presenting a reliable summary of what happened, to explain the day in
its complexity without replicating its chaos.

We wish to advise the public that the details we will be presenting may
be painful for you to see and hear. Please consider whether you wish to
continue viewing.

Building Preparedness on 9/11

Emergency response is a product of preparedness. We begin with a brief
discussion of measures taken to enhance safety and security at the World
Trade Center after the 1993 bombing.

The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was built for the Port Authority of
NewYork and New Jersey. Construction began in 1967, and tenants began to
occupy its space in 1970. The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and
symbolic place in the culture of New York City and America.

The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel,
spread across 16 acres of land. The buildings were connected by an
underground mall one level below the plaza area. The Twin Towers (``1
WTC'' or the ``North Tower,'' and ``2 WTC'' or the ``South Tower'') were
the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office
space. On any given work day up to 50,000 office workers occupied the
towers, and 40,000 visitors passed through the complex.  Both towers had
110 stories and were about 1,350 feet high. Both were square; each wall
measured 208 feet in length. The outside of each tower was covered by a
frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel columns
were 40 inches apart.  These exterior walls bore the majority of the
weight of the building.

The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which
elevators and stairwells were grouped. Each tower contained three
central stairwells, which ran essentially from top to bottom, and 99
elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the lobby ran to ``sky
lobbies'' on upper floors, where further elevators carried passengers to
the tops of the buildings.  Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor
to the mezzanine level and Stairwell B ran from the 107th floor to level
B6. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, except
for two deviations in Stairwells A and C where the staircase jutted out
toward the perimeter of the building. These deviations were necessary
because of the placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms. These
areas were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and
82nd floors in both towers.  On the upper and lower boundaries of these
deviations were ``transfer'' hallways contained within the stairwell
proper. Each hallway contained ``smoke doors'' to prevent smoke from
rising from lower to upper portions of the building. Smoke doors were
kept closed but not locked. Other than these slight deviations in
Stairwells A and C, the stairs ran straight up and down.  Doors leading
to the roof were kept locked. The Port Authority told us that this was
because of structural and radiation hazards, and for security reasons.
To access the roof in either towers required passing through three
doors: one leading from the stairwell onto the 110th floor, and two
leading from the floor onto the roof itself. There was no rooftop
evacuation plan. The roof was a cluttered surface that would be a
challenging helipad even in good conditions and, in a fire, smoke from
the building would travel upward.

Unlike most of America, both New York City and the World Trade Center
had been the target of terrorist attacks before 9/11. On February 26,
1993, a 1,500-pound bomb stashed in a rental van was detonated on a
parking garage ramp beneath the Twin Towers.  The explosion killed six
people, injured 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the World
Trade Center's and the City's emergency preparedness.

The towers lost power and communications capability. Generators had to
be shut down to assure safety. Elevators stopped. The public address
system and emergency lighting systems failed. The unlit stairwells
filled with smoke and were so dark as to be impassable. Rescue efforts
by the Fire Department of New York were hampered by the inability of its
radios to function in buildings as large as the Twin Towers. The 9-1-1
emergency call system was overwhelmed. The explosion occurred at 12:17
p.m.; the last person was evacuated nearly ten hours later in a
helicopter rescue by the New York Police Department.  To address the
problems encountered during the response to the 1993 bombing, the Port
Authority implemented $100 million in physical, structural, and
technological changes to the WTC. In addition, the Port Authority
enhanced its fire safety plan.  The Port Authority added battery-powered
emergency lighting to the stairwells and backup power to its alarm
system. Other upgrades included glow-in-the-dark signs and markings.
Upgrades to the elevator system included a redesign of each building's
lobby command board to enable it to monitor all of the elevators.

To aid communications the Port Authority installed a ``repeater system''
for use by the Fire Department of New York. The ``repeater'' used an
antenna on the top of 5 WTC to ``repeat'' and greatly amplify the wave
strength of radio communications, so they could be heard more
effectively by firefighters operating many floors apart.

The Port Authority also sought to prepare civilians better for future
emergencies. Deputy fire safety directors conducted biannual fire
drills, with advance notice to tenants. During a fire drill, designated
fire wardens were instructed to lead people in their respective areas to
the center of the floor where they would use an emergency intercom phone
to obtain specific information on how to proceed.

Civilians were taught basic procedures such as to evacuate by the stairs
and to check doors for heat before proceeding. Civilians who evacuated
in both 1993 and 2001 have told us that they were better prepared in
2001.  Civilians were not, however, directed into the stairwells during
these drills. Civilians were not provided with information about the
configuration of the stairwells and the existence of transfer hallways
or smoke doors. Neither full nor partial evacuation drills were held.
Participation in the drills that were held, moreover, varied greatly
from tenant to tenant.  Civilians were never instructed not to evacuate
up. The standard fire drill instructions advised participants that in
the event of an actual emergency, they would be directed to descend to
at least two floors below the fire. Most civilians recall simply being
taught to await instructions which would be provided at the time of an
emergency.

Civilians were not informed that rooftop evacuations were not part of
the Port Authority's evacuation plan. They were not informed that access
to the roof required a key. The Port Authority acknowledges that it had
no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire in the towers.

Preparedness of First Responders on 9/11

On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of
New York (FDNY), the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port
Authority Police Department (PAPD), and the Mayor's Office of Emergency
Management (OEM).  The 40,000-officer New York Police Department
consisted of three primary divisions: operations, intelligence, and
administration.  The Special Operations Division supervised units
critical in responding to a major event. This division included the
aviation unit, which provided helicopters for the purpose of survey
and/or rescue, and the Emergency Service Units (ESU), or rescue teams,
which carried out specialized missions.

The NYPD had standard operating procedures for the dispatch of officers
to an incident. Gradations in response were called ``mobilization''
levels and went from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest). Level 3 and 4
mobilizations could not be ordered by someone below the rank of captain.

The NYPD ran the City's 9-1-1 emergency call center. 9-1-1 operators
were civilians trained in the rudiments of emergency response. Fire
emergencies were transferred to the FDNY dispatch center.

The 11,000-member Fire Department of New York was headed by a Fire
Commissioner, who, unlike the Police Commissioner, lacked operational
authority. Operations were controlled by the Chief of Department.  Basic
operating units included ladder companies, to conduct standard rescue
operations, and engine companies, to put out fires. The Department's
Specialized Operations Command contained specialized units, including
five rescue companies, to perform specialized and highly risky rescue
operations, and one HAZMAT team.

The logistics of fire operations were coordinated by Fire Dispatch
Operations division. 9-1-1 calls concerning fire emergencies were
transferred to this division.

Alarm levels escalated from first (lowest) to fifth (highest) with a
pre-established number of units associated with each. Prior to 9/11, it
was common FDNY practice for units to arrive with extra personnel, and
for off-duty firefighters to respond to major incidents.

The years leading up to 9/11 were successful ones for the FDNY. In 2000,
fewer people died from fires in New York City-107-than in any year since
1946. Firefighter deaths-22 during the 1990s-compared favorably with the
best periods in FDNY history. The FDNY had fought 153,000 fires in 1976;
in 1999, that number had been reduced to 60,000.  In July 2001, Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani signed a directive entitled ``Direction and Control of
Emergencies in the City of New York.'' Its purpose was ``to ensure the
optimum use of agency resources while eliminating potential conflict
among responding agencies which may have areas of overlapping expertise
and responsibility.''

The directive designated, for different types of emergencies, an
appropriate agency as ``Incident Commander.'' The Incident Commander
would be ``responsible for the management of the City's response to the
emergency.'' The role of the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management was
supportive, to ``coordinate the participation of all city agencies in
resolving the event,'' and to ``assist the Incident Commander in his/her
efforts in the development and implementation of the strategy for
resolving the event.'' The Mayor's creation of the Office of Emergency
Management and the issuance of his Incident Command Directive were
attempts to address the long-standing rivalry between the NYPD and the
FDNY. This rivalry has been acknowledged by every witness we have asked
about it. Some characterized the more extreme manifestations of the
rivalry-fistfights at the scenes of emergencies, for instance-as the
actions of ``a few knuckleheads.'' Some described the rivalry as the
result of healthy organizational pride and competition. Others told us
that the problem has escalated over time and has hampered the ability of
the City to respond well in emergency situations.

The NYPD and the FDNY were two of the preeminent emergency response
organizations in the United States. But each considered itself
operationally autonomous. Each was accustomed to responding
independently to emergencies. By September 11 neither had demonstrated
the readiness to respond to an ``Incident Commander'' if that commander
was an official outside of their Department. The Mayor's Office of
Emergency Management had not overcome this problem.

As we turn to the events of September 11, we will try to describe what
happened in the following one hundred minutes:

--The 17 minutes from the crash of hijacked American Airlines Flight 11
into World Trade Center 1 (the North Tower) at 8:46 a.m.  until the
South Tower was hit

--The 56 minutes from the crash of hijacked United Airlines Flight 175
into World Trade Center 2 (the South Tower) at 9:03 a.m.  until the
collapse of the South Tower

--The 27 minutes from the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 a.m. until
the collapse of the North Tower at 10:26 a.m.

From 8:46 until 9:03 a.m.
At 8:46:40 a.m. the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the
upper portion of the North Tower.

Video: AA 11 hits North Tower.

The plane cut through floors 93/94 to 98/99 of the building. All three
of the building's stairwells became impassable from the 92nd floor up.
Hundreds of civilians were killed instantly by the impact. Hundreds more
remained alive but trapped.  A jet fuel fireball erupted upon impact,
and shot down at least one bank of elevators. The fireball exploded onto
numerous lower floors, including the 77th, 50th, 22nd, West Street lobby
level, and the B4 level, four stories below ground. The burning jet fuel
immediately created thick, black smoke which enveloped the upper floors
and roof of the North Tower. The roof of the South Tower was also
engulfed in smoke because of prevailing light winds from the north.
Within minutes, New York City's 9-1-1 system was flooded with eyewitness
accounts of the event. Most callers correctly identified the target of
the attack. Some identified the plane as a commercial airliner.

The first response came from private firms and individuals-the people
and companies in the building. Everything that would happen to them
during the next few minutes would turn on their circumstances and their
preparedness, assisted by building personnel on site.

Because all of the building's stairwells were destroyed in the impact
zone, the hundreds of survivors trapped on or above the 92nd floor
gathered in large and small groups, primarily between the 103rd and
106th floors. A large group was reported on the 92nd floor, technically
below the impact but trapped by debris. Civilians were also reported
trapped below the impact zone, mostly on floors in the eighties, though
also on at least the 47th and 22nd floors, as well as in a number of
elevators.  Because of damage to the building's systems, civilians did
not receive instructions on how to proceed over the public address
system. Many were unable to use the emergency intercom phones as
instructed in fire drills. Many called 9-1-1.  9-1-1 operators and FDNY
dispatchers had no information about either the location or magnitude of
the impact zone and were therefore unable to provide information as
fundamental as whether callers were above or below the fire. 9-1-1
operators were also not given any information about the feasibility of
rooftop rescues. In most instances, 9-1-1 operators and FDNY
dispatchers, to whom the 9-1-1 calls were transferred, therefore relied
on standard operating procedure for high-rise fires. Those procedures
are to advise civilians to stay low, remain where they are, and wait for
emergency personnel to reach them. This advice was given to callers from
the North Tower for locations both above and below the impact.

The protocol of advising against evacuation, of telling people to stay
where they were, was one of the lessons learned from the 1993

bombing. Fire chiefs told us that the evacuation of tens of thousands of
people from skyscrapers can create many new problems,
especially for disabled individuals or those in poor health. Many of the
injuries after the 1993 bombing occurred during the evacuation. Evacuees
also may complicate the movements and work of firefighters and other
emergency workers.Although the default guidance to stay in place may
seem understandable in cases of conventional high rise fires, all the
emergency officials that morning quickly judged that the North Tower
should be evacuated. The acting fire safety director in the North Tower
immediately ordered everyone to evacuate that building, but the public
address system was damaged and no one apparently heard the announcement.

Hence, one of the few ways to communicate to people in the building was
through calls to the 9-1-1 or other emergency operators.

We found no protocol for communicating updated evacuation guidance to
the 9-1-1 operators who were receiving calls for help.
Improvising as they learned information from callers, some operators
advised callers that they could break windows. Some operators were
advising callers to evacuate if they could.

Below the impact zone in the North Tower, those civilians who could
began evacuating down the stairs almost immediately.  Claire McIntyre,
Manager, Administration Services, American Bureau of Shipping: After
going out into the hallway and yelling down that everyone get out, I
went into my office to get my pocketbook and also I grabbed the
flashlight and my whistle. The flashlight was useful for the first
couple of flights going down because it was completely dark, and there
was water flowing down so it was dangerous too, and there was some
debris, even on the landings. The air quality wasn't too bad, there was
some smoke, light, it was never heavy smoke, where you couldn't breathe.
And the lights in the stairwells worked all the way down except for the
first two or three flights.

Civilians who called the Port Authority police desk at 5 WTC were
advised to leave if they could. Most civilians began evacuating without
waiting to obtain instructions over the intercom system. Some had
trouble reaching the exits because of damage caused by the impact. While
evacuating, they were confused by deviations in the increasingly crowded
stairwells, and impeded by doors which were locked or jammed as a result
of the impact. Despite these obstacles, the evacuation was relatively
calm and orderly.  Ms. McIntyre: We never really heard any announcements
or received any information all the way down. It got more and more
congested as we went further down. For some reason we had to go down a
long hallway and then when we got to the end of it, it was a locked
door. So, we couldn't go any further; so we went back and went back up
to 78 because we knew that that was a sky lobby.

Within ten minutes of impact, smoke was beginning to rise to the upper
floors in debilitating volumes and isolated fires were reported,
although there were some pockets of refuge. Faced with insufferable
heat, smoke, and fire, and no prospect for relief, some jumped or fell
from the building.

Many civilians in the South Tower were unaware initially of what
happened in the other tower.  Brian Clark, President, Euro Brokers
Relief Fund: I heard a loud boom. The lights in my office buzzed and I
glanced up at them and then my peripheral vision, behind me, caught
something and I spun in my chair, and just two yards from me outside the
glass, 84 floors in the air, was swirling flames. I assumed that there
had been an explosion upstairs.

Richard Fern, Vice President, Facilities, Euro Broker: When I was
entering the
trading floor, I noticed all of the brokers clamoring on the building
side where
One World Trade Center is. And they were just screaming that a bomb went
off.

Many people decided to leave. Some were advised to do so by fire
wardens. In addition, some entire companies, including Morgan Stanley,
which occupied over 20 floors of the South Tower, were evacuated by
company security officials.  The evacuation standard operating
procedures did not provide a specific protocol for when to evacuate one
tower in the event of a major explosion in the other. At 8:49 a.m. the
deputy fire safety director in the North Tower spoke with his
counterpart in the South Tower. They agreed to wait for the FDNY to
arrive before determining whether to evacuate the South Tower. According
to one fire chief, it was unimaginable, ``beyond our consciousness,''
that another plane might hit the the adjacent tower.  In the meantime,
an announcement came over the public address system in the South Tower
urging people to stay in place.  Mr. Clark: Strobe lights flashed, the
siren gave its little ``whoop whoop.'' And I heard a familiar voice say:
``Your attention please, ladies and gentlemen, Building 2 is secure.
There is no need to evacuate Building 2. If you are in the midst of
evacuation, you may use the re-entry doors and the elevators to return
to your office. Repeat, Building 2 is secure.'' And then the
announcement was repeated.

Indeed, evacuees in the sky lobbies and the main lobby were advised by
building personnel to return to their offices. The Port Authority told
us that the advice may have been prompted by the safety hazard posed by
falling debris and victims outside the building. Similar advice was
given by security officials in the sky lobby of the South Tower. We do
not know the reason for this advice, in part because the on-duty deputy
fire safety director in charge of the South Tower perished in the
tower's collapse.  As a result of the announcement, many civilians in
the South Tower remained on their floors. Others reversed their
evacuation and went back up.

Mr. Fern: After the first announcement, for the Port Authority or the PA
system
not evacuate the floor, I guess I kinda felt comfortable to stay on the
floor.
Mr. Clark: At three minutes after 9:00, at the time of impact, I was
talking to a
gentleman who said he had gone down half a dozen or ten floors and had
come
back up because of that announcement.

Stanley Praimnath, Assistant Vice President, Administration, Mizvho
Corp. Bank: As we were about to exit the building through the turnstile
first, the security guard looks at me and say, ``Where are you going?''
I said, ``Well, I am going home.'' ``Why?'' ``I saw fireballs coming
down.'' ``No, your building is safe and secure. Go back to your
office.'' The Port Authority Police desk in 5 WTC gave conflicting
advice to people in the South Tower about whether to evacuate.  We have
been fortunate, in learning about the FDNY's emergency response, to have
had the cooperation of two of the principal commanders in the North
Tower on 9/11, Joseph Pfeifer and Peter Hayden. The chiefs were filmed
throughout the morning by Jules Naudet, a French filmmaker preparing a
documentary about firefighters. We have reviewed Naudet's unedited
footage and also filmed Chiefs Pfeifer and Hayden as they viewed the
footage, commenting on events as they relived them.  The FDNY response
began immediately after the crash.
Joseph Pfeifer, Deputy Assistant Chief, FDNY: Right from the beginning,
before we even arrived at the Trade Center, what you see is the
beginning of an Incident Command System, where things are placed in
order, and command is taken immediately.  Mr. Pfeifer (on 9/11): ``We
have a number of floors on fire, it looks like the plane was aiming
towards the building. Transmit a Third Alarm. We will have a staging
area. Vesey and West Street-have the Third Alarm assignment go into that
area-Second Alarm assignment report to the building.''

Mr. Pfeifer: So from the bullet point when the plane hit the building,
we started
our Incident Command System.

Chief Pfeifer and four companies arrived at about 8:52 a.m. As they
entered the lobby, they immediately encountered badly burned civilians
who had been caught in the path of the fireball.

The initial FDNY incident commanders were briefed on building systems by
building personnel.  Peter Hayden, Assistant Chief, FDNY: When I entered
the lobby here, Joe had already assumed command and I came in. I was
receiving a briefing from Chief Pfeifer here, and he was giving me a
status of the-what was the building systems. He was informing me that
the elevators were not working at the time and that they had a report
from the Fire Safety Director that the plane had crashed in around the
78th floor and Joe had started units up and had then report to the 78th
floor. Here we're convening with the Fire Safety Director and the Port
Authority personnel. Our main concern at this time was evacuation of the
building. And we wanted to get everyone out of the building.

Units began mobilizing in the increasingly crowded lobby.

Mr. Pfeifer: You have to understand that in the Trade Center that we had
ninety-nine elevators in each of the towers, and those had to be checked
to see if they were operating. Without elevators, it meant that the
firefighters carrying a hundred pounds of equipment would have to climb
some ninety floors just to get to where we could start a rescue
operation for people trapped above the damaged area.

Mr. Hayden: These are units coming in and they're awaiting assignment
and, as I said, we're trying to get elevators working. We
are conferring with the Port Authority personnel there-and this took a
period of time for them to come back to and confirm to us
that we had no elevators operating. Once we realized that we didn't have
elevators operating, we began giving instruction to members to start
ascending the stairs by way of the B Stairwell.

It was challenging for the chiefs to keep track of arriving units. They
were frustrated by the absence of working building systems and
elevators.

Mr. Hayden: My aide had arrived and he was setting up the Command Board.

As you can see him in on the background, he was setting up the Board,
which
accounts for the units as they come in. Once they are given an
assignment they
are entered in on the Command Board. That's the way we keep track of the

individuals.

Mr. Hayden: I am walking down off to the right here-left now- waiving my
radio trying to get the Port Authority personnel and the chief fire to
come with me off a little bit to have a private discussion regarding the
building systems and particularly the elevators.  That was a primary
concern of ours at the time. That we didn't have the elevators available
to us. You can see the damage that the planes caused. You can see the
tiles on the floor there. Right now we are seeing more units come in.
Shortly before 9:00 a.m., FDNY chiefs advised building personnel and a
Port Authority Police Department officer to evacuate the adjacent South
Tower. Impressed by the magnitude of the catastrophe, fire chiefs had
decided to clear the whole WTC complex, including the South Tower.

By 9:00 a.m., many senior FDNY leaders, including seven of the eleven
most highly ranked chiefs in the department, had begun responding from
headquarters in Brooklyn. The Chief of Department and the Chief of
Operations called a 5th alarm, which would bring additional engine and
ladder companies; they also called two more FDNY Rescue teams. The Chief
of Department arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. He established an
overall Incident Command Post on the median of the West Side Highway.
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel were directed to one of four
triage areas around the perimeter of the WTC. In addition, many private
hospital ambulances were rushing to the WTC complex.

In the North Tower lobby, the chiefs quickly made the decision that the
fire in the North Tower could not be fought.
Mr. Hayden: Well, we realized that because of the impact of the plane
that there
was some structural damage to the building, and most likely that the
fire
suppression systems within the building were most likely damaged and
possibly
inoperable. We mad that conclusion. We knew that at the height of the
day there
was as many as fifty thousand people in this building. We had a large
volume of
fire on the upper floors. Each floor was approximately an acre in size.
Several
floors of fire would have been beyond the fire extinguishing capability
of the
forces that we had on hand. So we determined very early on that this was
going
to be strictly a rescue mission. We were going to evacuate the building,
get
everybody out, and then we were going to get out.

The chiefs decided to concentrate on evacuating civilians from the North
Tower, although they held various views about whether anyone at or above
the impact zone could be saved.

As of 9:00 a.m., if only those units dispatched had responded, and if
those dispatched units were not ``riding heavy'' with extra men, 235
firefighters would be at the scene or en route. The vast majority of
these would be expected to enter the North Tower.  Mr. Hayden: This is
rescue one entering the lobby now. And at this time we were starting to
get a number of distress calls coming in, particularly from the 9-1-1
and from Port Authority personnel of people in distress on various
floors. As we got the information coming in, we would give the
assignments out to the companies. If we had a report of people trapped
in elevators we would send a company up to that specific floor. We had
reports at one point in time of people in wheelchairs and we gave out
assignments to go up and get the people out from on whatever particular
floor they were calling from. These were difficult assignments. I had a
strong inner sense throughout this entire operation that we were going
to lose people this day.  Mr. Pfeifer: What we did know was that
thousands of people, tens of thousands of people, were in their greatest
moment of need and the firefighters came in and they received orders
from our Command staff, and they turned around and they picked up their
hose, and they picked up their tools, and they went upstairs. What you
see here is, this footage, is actually my brother going upstairs.  As so
many other firefighters, this was the last time we saw them.

The NYPD response also began seconds after the crash. At 8:47 a.m. the
NYPD ordered a Level 3 Mobilization. An initial mobilization point for
patrol officers was established on the west side of the intersection of
West and Liberty Streets. NYPD rescue teams were directed to mobilize at
the intersection of Church and Vesey Streets. The first of these
officers arrived at Church and Vesey at 8:56 a.m. At 8:50 a.m., the
aviation unit of the NYPD dispatched two helicopters to the WTC to
report on conditions and assess the feasibility of a rooftop landing or
special rescue operations.

Within ten minutes of the crash, NYPD and Port Authority Police
personnel were assisting with the evacuation of civilians.
At 8:58 a.m., a helicopter pilot reported on rooftop conditions.

James Ciccone, Police Officer, NYPD Aviation Unit: On the morning of
September 11th, as I arrived at World Trade Tower 1, I was accessing the
damage on the north side of the building, and the rooftop area for the
possibility of rooftop extraction from one of our heavier lift
helicopter. And at that point, a few passes, and slow passes, we made a
determination that we didn't see anybody up on the roof, but more so we
had problems with the heat and the smoke from the building. The heat
actually made it difficult for us to hold the helicopters because it
would interfere with the rotor system.

At 8:58 a.m., while en route, the Chief of the NYPD raised the
department's mobilization to Level 4-its highest level-which would
result in the dispatch of approximately 30 lieutenants, 100 sergeants,
and 800 police officers, in addition to rescue teams, which were already
at the scene. The Chief of Department arrived at Church and Vesey at
9:00 a.m.

At 9:01 a.m., the NYPD patrol mobilization point at West and Liberty was
moved to West and Vesey, in order to handle the greater number of patrol
officers who would be responding to the Level 4 mobilization. These
officers would be stationed around the perimeter of the complex to
assist with evacuation and crowd control.

Around the city, the NYPD cleared routes along major thoroughfares for
emergency vehicles responding to the WTC. The NYPD and Port Authority
police coordinated the closing of bridges, subways, PATH trains, and
tunnels into Manhattan.  The Port Authority's on-site commanding police
officer was standing in the concourse when a fireball exploded out of
the North Tower lobby, causing him to dive for cover. Within minutes of
impact Port Authority police from bridge, tunnel, and airport commands
began responding to the WTC. Officers from the WTC command began
assisting in evacuating civilians. The Port Authority Police Department
lacked clear standard operating procedures to guide personnel responding
from one command to another during a major incident.

The fire safety director in charge of the complex arrived in the North
Tower lobby at approximately 8:52 a.m. and was informed by the deputy
fire safety director there that evacuation instructions had been
announced over the public address system within one minute of impact. As
mentioned earlier, to our knowledge, because the public address system
had been damaged upon impact, no civilians heard that announcement.

At 9:00 a.m., the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an
evacuation of civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the
danger posed by highly flammable jet fuel from Flight 11. The order was
issued, however, over a radio channel which could be heard only by
officers on the Port Authority WTC command channel. There is no evidence
that this order was communicated to officers in other Port Authority
Police commands or to members of other responding agencies. At 9:00
a.m., the Port Authority Police Superintendent and Chief of Department
arrived together at the WTC complex, and made their way to the North
Tower lobby. Some Port Authority officers immediately began climbing the
stairs and assisting civilians.  David Lim, PAPD: I went up the B
Staircase now, and so I proceeded up one that one. While people were
coming down on that staircase, there were some people that were burnt
and injured-required assistance. So, I could have taken one person and
brought that person down I guess, but I thought the greater good would
be to get to the 44th floor and assist more people. So I assigned the
people that were uninjured to help carry this person down. There is a
triage area downstairs, and that seemed to work out. People were more
than happy to help each other out.

Officials in the Office of Emergency Management's headquarters at 7 WTC
began to activate its emergency operation center immediately after the
North Tower was hit. At approximately 8:50 a.m. a senior representative
from that office arrived in the lobby of the North Tower and began to
act as its field responder.

Summary

In the 17-minute period between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. on September 11,
New York City and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had
mobilized the largest rescue operation in the City's history. Well over
one thousand first responders had been deployed, evacuations had begun,
and the critical decision that the fire could not be fought had been
made.  The decision was made to evacuate the South Tower as well. At
9:02 a.m., a further announcement in the South Tower advised civilians
to begin an orderly evacuation if conditions warranted.
One minute later, a plane hit the South Tower.

From 9:03 until 9:59 a.m.

At 9:03 a.m., the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit 2 WTC (the
South Tower) from the south, crashing through the 78th to 84th floors.

Video: UA 175 hits South Tower.

What had been the largest and most complicated rescue operation in city
history instantly doubled in magnitude.  The plane banked as it hit the
building, leaving portions of the building undamaged on impact floors.
As a consequence-and in contrast to the situation in the North Tower-
one of the stairwells (Stairwell A) initially remained passable from top
to bottom.
Mr. Praimnath: I am looking to the direction of the Statue of Liberty,
and I am
looking at an airplane coming, eye level, eye contact, towards me-giant
grey
airplane. I am still seeing the letter ``U'' on its tail, and the plane
is bearing
down on me. I dropped the phone and I screamed and I dove under my desk.
It
was the most ear-shattering sound ever. The plane just crashed into the
building.
The bottom wing sliced right through the office and it stuck in my
office door
twenty feet from where I am huddled under my desk.

At the lowest point of impact, the 78th floor sky lobby, hundreds had
been waiting to evacuate when the plane hit. Many were killed or injured
severely; others were relatively unaffected. We know of at least one
civilian who seized the initiative and shouted that anyone who could
walk should walk to the stairs, and anyone who could help should help
others in need of assistance. At least two small groups of civilians
descended from that floor.

Others remained alive in the impact zone above the 78th floor, though
conditions on these floors began to deteriorate within ten minutes.

Mr. Praimnath: Upon impact, the ceiling caved in, part of the 82nd floor

collapsed. I am trapped under a steel desk. The only desk that stood
firm,
everything else is broken up. It looked like a demolition crew came and
just
knocked everything. Every wall was broken up. Computers were broken up-
everything.

As in the North Tower, civilians became first responders.

Mr. Clark: We went down the hallway on the 84th floor, and I happened to
turn left to Stairway A. We descended only three floors, to the 81st
floor-the group of seven of us-when we met a very heavy-set woman and
she just emphatically told our group, ``Stop, stop! We have just come
off a floor in flames and we've got to get above the flames and smoke.''
That's about all I heard of her conversation because I heard somebody
inside the 81st floor banging on the wall and screaming, ``Help, help! I
am buried. Is anyone there? Help, I can't breathe!'' And, I noticed that
my workmates, the heavy-set woman and her traveling companion were
starting to go up the stairs. And that day they all perished
unfortunately. But they were dealing with the information they had. None
of us really had known what had happened or what was about to happen.

Mr. Praimnath: I am watching the plane, I am watching the floor, and
somebody heard me scream on the other end. The person had a flashlight.

Mr. Clark: This person was directing me. This person who was trapped,
saying,
``You turn left, right,'' and I kept moving with my flashlight.

Mr. Praimnath: The man says,``Knock on the wall and I will know exactly
where you are.''
Mr. Clark: Somehow I grabbed him under the arms, or around the neck,
pulled
him up and over this, and what, as I say latter, I learned was a wall. I
didn't
know what it was at the time. And we fell in a heap on the floor.
Mr. Praimnath: And Brian put his hand around my neck and said, ``Come
on,
let's go home.''

Some civilians ascended the stairs and others remained on affected
floors to assist colleagues.  Although Stairwell A in the South Tower
remained passable from above the impact zone to the lobby, conditions
were difficult and deteriorating.
Mr. Fern: Upon entering Stairway A, I started to run down the stairs.
The
conditions in the stairs were smoky. There were no lights in the
stairway, there
was a glow strip on the floor in the center of the stairs. There was
also a glow
strip on the handrail.

Mr. Praimnath: Brian knew we had to take the Stairwell A, but there was
so much rubble. I don't remember much. I think we just slid right from
the 81st floor to the 80th floor. Because of all that sheet rock and
ceiling tiles that was one there. We actually tried to walk, and we slid
right down.

Mr. Clark: There was smoke, there was a lot of water flowing under foot.
And in
a couple of places, I'm guessing around the 78th, 77th floor, there was
only one
layer of dry wall left that was cracked, and the flames were licking up
the other
side of the wall.

Many ascended in search of clearer air or to attempt to reach the roof.
Those attempting to reach the roof were thwarted by locked doors. Others
attempting to descend were frustrated by jammed or locked doors in
stairwells or confused by the structure of the stairwell deviations.

Mr. Clark: As we descended the stairways, one strange thing that I
recalled
happening is that the Stairway A at least, and I learned later that
Stairway C is
the same, the stairway just doesn't go back and forth all the way down.
As you
descend a few floors, you come to a situation where you must traverse
down a
hallway. You go down a hallway, you make a turn, the stairway continues,

there's another transfer later. A bit of confusion, especially in the
darkness. And
especially when that was the distress area.

By 9:35 a.m., the West Street lobby level of the South Tower was
becoming overwhelmed by injured who had descended to the lobby but were
having difficulty continuing.

Within 15 minutes after the impact, debilitating smoke had reached at
least one location on the 100th floor, and severe smoke conditions were
reported throughout floors in the nineties and hundreds over the course
of the following half hour. By 9:30 a.m. a number of civilians who had
failed to reach the roof and could not descend because of intensifying
smoke became trapped on the 105th floor. There were reports of
tremendous smoke in most areas of that floor, but at least one area
remained less affected until shortly before the building collapsed.

Still, there were several areas between the impact zone and the
uppermost floors where conditions were better. At least a hundred people
remained alive on the 88th and 89th floors, in some cases calling 9-1-1
for direction. The 9-1-1 system remained plagued by the operators' lack
of awareness of what was occurring and by the sheer volume of emergency
calls.

Mr. Clark: I had a very frustrating experience calling 9-1-1. It was, I
am sure,
over three minutes in duration my conversation with them. Not five
minutes, but
certainly over three minutes where I told them when they answered the
phone,
where I was, that I had passed somebody on the 44th floor, injured-they
need to
get a medic and a stretcher to this floor, and described the situation
in brief, and
the person then asked for my phone number, or something, and they
said-they put me on hold. ``You gotta talk to one of my
supervisors''-and suddenly I was on hold. And so I waited a considerable
amount of time. Somebody else came back on the phone, I repeated the
story. And then it happened again. I was on hold a second time, and
needed to repeat the story for a third time. But I told the third person
that I am only telling you once. I am getting out of the building, here
are the details, write it down, and do what you should do, and put the
phone down. Stanley and I went back to the stairs, we continued all the
way down to the plaza level.  No one in the first responder community
knew that Stairwell A remained potentially passable. No callers were
advised that helicopter rescues were not feasible. Civilians below the
impact were also generally advised to remain where they were by 9-1-1 or
FDNY dispatch operators.

Back in the North Tower, evacuation generally continued. Thousands of
civilians continued to descend in an orderly manner. On the 91st floor,
the highest floor with stairway access, all but one were uninjured and
able to descend.  At 9:11 a.m., Port Authority workers at the 64th floor
of the North Tower were told by the Port Authority Police desk in Jersey
City to stay near the stairwells and wait for assistance. These workers
eventually began to descend anyway, but most of them died in the
collapse of the North Tower.

Those who descended Stairwell B of the North Tower exited between the
elevator banks in the lobby. Those who descended the Stairwells A and C
exited at the raised mezzanine level, where the smoky air was causing
respiratory problems. All civilians were directed into the concourse at
lobby level. Officers from the Port Authority and New York Police
Departments continued to assist with the evacuation of civilians, for
example, guiding them through the concourse in order to shelter the
evacuees from falling debris and victims.

Ms. McIntyre: When we went down into the concourse, it was just people
trying to get out. The security or rescue people just still directing us
to keep moving and go out towards Borders and then go out.

By 9:55 a.m., those few civilians who were still evacuating consisted
primarily of injured, handicapped, elderly, or severely overweight
individuals.

Calls to 9-1-1 reflect that others remained alive above and below the
impact zone, reporting increasingly desperate conditions.  Immediately
after the second plane hit, the FDNY Chief of Department called a second
th alarm. While nine Brooklyn units had been staged on the Brooklyn side
of the Brooklyn Battery tunnel at 8:53 a.m., these units were not
dispatched to the scene at this time. Instead, units from further away
were dispatched.

Just after the South Tower impact, chiefs in the North Tower lobby
huddled to discuss strategy for the operations and communication in the
two towers.

At 9:05 a.m., two FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex's repeater system.
This was the system installed after the 1993 bombing in order to enable
firefighters operating on upper floors to maintain consistent radio
communication with the lobby command. The system had been activated for
use on portable radios at 8:54 a.m., but a second button which would
have enabled the master hand-set was not activated at that time. The
chief testing the master handset at 9:05 a.m. did not realize that the
master handset had not been activated. When he could not communicate, he
concluded that the system was down. The system was working, however, and
was used subsequently by firefighters in the South Tower.

The FDNY Chief of Safety agreed with the consensus that the only choice
was to let the fires ``burn up and out.'' The chiefs in the North Tower
were forced to make decisions based on little or no information.
Mr. Pfeifer: One of the most critical things in a major operation like
this is to
have information. We didn't have a lot of information coming in. We
didn't
receive any reports of what was seen from the helicopters. It was
impossible to
know how much damage was done on the upper floors, whether the
stairwells
were in tact or not. A matter of fact, what you saw on TV, we didn't
have that
information.

Mr. Hayden: People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what
was
happening a hundred floors above us than we did in the lobby. Certainly
without
any information, without critical information coming in, the cumulative
effect of
the information coming in, it's very difficult to make informed critical
decisions
without that information. And it didn't exist that day. Our
communication
systems were down. Our building suppression systems were down, the
elevators.
We had no video capability throughout the entire operation.

Climbing up the stairwells carrying heavy equipment was a laborious task
even for physically fit firefighters. Though the lobby command post did
not know it, one battalion chief in the North Tower found a working
elevator, which he took to the 16th floor before beginning to climb.
Just prior to 10:00 a.m., about an hour after firefighters first began
streaming into the North Tower, at least two companies of firefighters
had climbed to the sky lobby on the 44th floor of the North Tower.
Numerous units were located between the 5th and 37th floors in the North
Tower.

At approximately 9:07 a.m., two chiefs commenced operations in the South
Tower lobby. Almost immediately they were joined by an Office of
Emergency Management field responder. They were not immediately joined
by a sizable number of fire companies, as most, if not all units which
had been in the North Tower lobby remained there. One chief and a ladder
company found a working elevator to the 40th floor. From there they
proceeded to climb Stairwell B. One member of the ladder company stayed
behind to operate the elevator.

Unlike the commanders in the North Tower lobby, these chiefs in the
South Tower kept their radios on the repeater channel. For the first 15
minutes of the operations in the South Tower, communications among them
and the ladder company which ascended with the chief worked well. Upon
learning from a company security official that the impact zone began at
the 78th floor, a ladder company transmitted this information, and the
chief directed an engine company on the 40th floor to attempt to find an
elevator to reach that upper level.

Unfortunately, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the
repeater channel was functioning and being used by units in the South
Tower. Chiefs in the North Tower lobby and outside were unable to reach
the South Tower lobby command post initially.

Communications also began to break down within the South Tower. Those
units responding to the South Tower were advised to use tactical channel
3. From approximately 9:21 a.m. on, the ascending chief was unable to
reach the South Tower lobby command post. The lobby chief ceased to
transmit on repeater channel 7 at that time.

The first FDNY fatality of the day occurred at approximately 9:25 a.m.
when a civilian landed on a fireman on West Street.  By 9:30 a.m., few
of the units dispatched to the South Tower had arrived at their staging
area. Many units were unfamiliar with the complex and could not enter
the South Tower because of the danger of victims and debris falling on
Liberty Street. Some units entered the Marriott Hotel and were given
assignments there; others mistakenly responded to the North Tower. An
additional 2nd alarm was requested at 9:37 a.m. because so few units had
reported. At this time, units which had been staged on the Brooklyn side
of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel were sent, and many of them arrived at
the WTC by 9:55 a.m.  At 9:50 a.m., a ladder company had made its way up
to the 70th floor of the South Tower. There they encountered many
seriously injured people. At 9:53 a.m. a group of civilians were found
trapped in an elevator on the 78th floor sky lobby. By 9:58 a.m., the
ascending chief had reached the 78th floor on Stairwell A, and reported
that it looked open to the 79th floor. He reported numerous civilian
fatalities in the area. A ladder company on the 78th floor was preparing
to use hoses to fight the fire when the South Tower collapsed.
So far we have concentrated on the Fire Department's command set-up in
the North and South Towers. The overall incident command was just
outside the WTC complex. At approximately 9:10 a.m., because of the
danger of falling debris, this command post was moved from the middle of
West Street to its western edge by the parking garage in front of 2
World Financial Center. The overall command post's ability to track all
FDNY units was extremely limited.

At approximately 9:20 a.m., the Mayor and the NYPD Commissioner reached
the FDNY overall command post. The FDNY Chief of Department briefed the
Mayor on operations and stated that this was a rescue mission of
civilians. He stated that he believed they could save everyone below the
impact zones. He also advised that, in his opinion, rooftop rescue
operations would be
impossible. None of the chiefs present believed a total collapse of
either tower was possible. Later, after the Mayor had left, one
senior chief present did articulate his concern that upper floors could
begin to collapse in a few hours, and so he said that firefighters thus
should not ascend above floors in the sixties.

By 9:20 a.m., significantly more firemen than were dispatched were at
the WTC complex or en route. Many off-duty firemen were given permission
by company officers to ``ride heavy.'' Others found alternative
transportation and responded. In one case an entire company of off-duty
firefighters managed to congregate and come to the WTC as a complete
team, in addition to the on-duty team which already had been dispatched
to the scene. Numerous fire marshals also reported to the WTC.  At 9:46
a.m., the Chief of Department called a third 5th alarm. This meant that
over one-third of all of the FDNY units in New York City were at or en
route to the WTC.

The Police Department was also responding massively after the attack on
the South Tower. Almost 2,000 officers had been called to the scene. In
addition, the Chief of the Department called for Operation Omega, to
evacuate and secure sensitive locations around the city. At 9:06 a.m.
the NYPD Chief of Department instructed that no units were to land on
the roof of either tower.  An NYPD rescue team in the North Tower lobby
prepared to climb at approximately 9:15 a.m. They attempted to check in
with the FDNY chiefs present, but were rebuffed. Office of Emergency
Management personnel present did not intercede. The team went to work
anyway, climbing Stairwell B in order to set up a triage center on upper
floors for victims who could not walk. Later, a second rescue team
arrived in the North Tower and did not attempt to check-in with the FDNY
command post.

NYPD rescue teams also entered the South Tower. The Office of Emergency
Management field responder present ensured that they check-in with the
lobby chief. In this case, both agreed that the rescue team would ascend
in support of FDNY personnel. By 9:15 a.m., two more of these teams were
preparing to leave the Church and Vesey mobilization point in order to
enter the towers.  At approximately 9:30 a.m. one of the helicopters
present advised that a rooftop evacuation still would not be possible.
Mr. Ciccone: After the Second Tower was hit, we tried to make our way
towards that area, but the smoke from the first building, Tower 1,
obscured the rooftop of Tower 2. It was the first hour-and-a-half that
was critical for these observations-for rooftop rescue. We flew a
horseshoe pattern-in that horseshoe pattern-for over a pattern of about
an hour-and-a-half before the buildings collapsed. That, the same
observations were made. There was no one on the roof. Our ability to get
in that type position was still factored in by the heat, and made it
difficult to even, to make it plausible, to get on the roof.

At 9:37 a.m., a civilian on the 106th floor of the South Tower reported
to a 9-1-1 operator that a lower floor-``90-something
floor''-was collapsing. This information was conveyed incorrectly by the
9-1-1 operator to an NYPD dispatcher. The NYPD
dispatcher further confused the substance of the 9-1-1 call in conveying
at 9:52
a.m. to NYPD officers that ``the 106th floor is crumbling.''

By 9:58 a.m., there were two NYPD rescue teams in each of the two
towers, another approaching the North Tower, and approximately ten other
NYPD officers climbing in the towers.

David Norman, Police Officer, NYPD ESU: We went up to the 31st floor
where we triaged probably, somewhere around six to a half dozen to a
dozen firefighters for a random number of things, chest pains,
difficulty breathing, things like that. Prior to that, we would notice
that the amount of civilians had dwindled down to almost none. At that
point, while we were continuing, or conducting this triage, the South
Tower collapsed.

In addition, there were numerous NYPD officers on the ground floors
throughout the complex, assisting with evacuation, and
patrolling and securing the WTC perimeter. A greater number of NYPD
officers were staged throughout lower Manhattan, assisting in civilian
evacuation, keeping roads clear, and conducting other operations in
response to the attacks.

Prior to 9:59 a.m., no NYPD helicopter transmission predicted that
either tower would collapse.  Initial responders from outside Port
Authority Police commands proceeded to the police desk in 5 WTC or to
the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Officers were assigned to
assist in stairwell evacuations and to expedite evacuation in the plaza,
concourse, and PATH station. As reports of trapped civilians were
received, Port Authority Police officers also started climbing stairs
for rescue efforts. Others, including the Port Authority Police
Superintendent, began climbing toward the impact zone in the North
Tower. The Port Authority Police Chief and other senior officers began
climbing in the North Tower with the purpose of reaching the Windows of
the World restaurant on the 106th floor, where there were at least 100
people trapped.  The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear
standard operating procedures for coordinating a multi-command response
to the same incident. It also lacked a radio channel that all commands
could access. Many officers remained on their local command channels,
which did not work once they were outside the immediate geographic area
of their respective commands.  Many Port Authority Police officers from
different commands responded on their own initiative. By 9:30 a.m. the
Port Authority's central police desk requested that responding officers
meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of
predetermined leadership roles for an incident of this magnitude, a
number of Port Authority inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped
forward at West and Vesey to formulate an on-site response plan. They
were hampered by not knowing how many officers were responding to the
site and where those officers were operating. Many of the officers who
responded to this command post lacked suitable protective equipment to
enter the complex.

By 9:58 a.m., one Port Authority Police officer had reached the sky
lobby on the 44th floor of the North Tower. Also in the North
Tower, two Port Authority teams had reached floors in the upper and
lower twenties. Numerous officers also were climbing in the
South Tower, including the Port Authority rescue team. Many also were on
the ground floors of the complex assisting with evacuation, manning the
Port Authority Police desk in 5 WTC, or supporting lobby command posts.
Sue Keane, PAPD: When I got up to Stairwell C in the Mezzanine area, I
was the
only Port Authority police officer there at the time. There were two
civilians
there, one Port Authority employee, and there was a Secret Service Agent
there.
Afterwards, some NYPD officers showed up, and at that time everybody
just
basically worked together. There was no standard operating procedure. We
just
did whatever we had to do to guide people out of the stairwell.

Summary

The emergency response effort escalated with the crash of United 175
into the South Tower. With that escalation, communications and
command-and-control became increasingly critical and increasingly
difficult. First responders assisted thousands of civilians in
evacuating the towers, even as incident commanders from responding
agencies lacked knowledge of what other agencies and, in some cases,
their own responders were doing.
Then the South Tower collapsed.

From 9:59 until 10:26 a.m.
At 9:59 a.m., the South Tower collapsed in ten seconds.
Video: South Tower collapses.

We believe that all of the people still inside the tower were killed, as
well as a number of individuals-both first responders and civilians-in
the concourse, the Marriott, and on neighboring streets.

The next emergency issue was to decide what to do in the North Tower,
once the South Tower had collapsed. In the North Tower, 9-1-1 calls
placed from above the impact zone grew increasingly desperate. The only
civilians still evacuating above the 10th floor were those who were
injured or handicapped. First responders were assisting those people in
evacuating.  Every FDNY command post ceased to operate upon the collapse
of the South Tower.  Mr. Pfeifer: We were in the North Tower
communicating with some of our people, and all of a sudden we hear this
load roar. And, we were able to go into a small alcove. Immediately to
our left, just adjacent to the passageway to 6 World Trade Center. And
as you see, everything goes black. And what we thought at this point is
that we were the ones in trouble, that something happened, something
fell off of the building and crashed into the lobby-that we in the
lobby-or maybe the elevators had blown out. But we thought we were the
guys in trouble. And when we couldn't maintain our command post in the
lobby, we made a decision that we needed to regroup and pull people out
of the building.

Mr. Hayden: We were completely unaware that the South Tower had
collapsed. I don't ever think it was in our realm of thought.  We knew
some significant event had occurred, whether it was another plane or a
bomb, or one of the elevators crashing into the lobby. But certainly it
was not in our thought process that the South Tower had collapsed.
Lacking awareness of the South Tower's collapse, the chiefs in the North
Tower nonetheless ordered an evacuation of the building.  Mr. Pfeifer: I
got on the radio and I said, ``Command to all units in Tower 1, evacuate
the building.'' And I heard that message relayed up. And then a little
later I repeated it: ``Evacuate the building.'' At that point, we had
firefighters many floors above, and it takes some time to come down.
What we didn't know at that point was that we were running out of time.
An FDNY marine unit radioed immediately that the South Tower had
collapsed. To our knowledge, this information did not reach the chiefs
at the scene.

Within minutes some firefighters began to hear evacuation orders over
tactical 1, the channel being used in the North Tower. Some FDNY
personnel also gave the evacuation instruction on command channel 2,
which was much less crowded, as only chiefs were using it. Two battalion
chiefs on upper floors heard the instruction on Command 2 and repeated
it to everyone they encountered. At least one of them also repeated the
evacuation order on tactical 1.

Other firefighters did not receive the transmissions. The reasons
varied. Some FDNY radios may not have picked up the transmission in the
difficult high-rise environment. The difficulty of that environment was
compounded by the numerous communications all attempted on tactical 1
after the South Tower collapsed; the channel was overwhelmed, and
evacuation orders may have been lost. Some of the firefighters in the
North Tower were among those who had responded even though they were
off-duty, and they did not have their radios. Finally, some of the
firefighters in the North Tower were supposed to have gone to the South
Tower and were using the tactical channel assigned to that Tower.

Many firefighters who did receive the evacuation order delayed their
evacuation in order to assist victims who could not move on their own.
Many perished.

Many chiefs on the scene were unaware that the South Tower collapsed. To
our knowledge, none of the evacuation orders given to units in the North
Tower followed the specific protocols-which would include stating
``mayday, mayday, mayday''-to be given for the most urgent building
evacuation. To our knowledge none of the evacuation orders mentioned
that the South Tower had collapsed. Firefighters who received these
orders lacked a uniform sense of urgency in their evacuation.
Mr. Hayden: (looking at replay of the day on television) Even with the
order to
evacuate, the firefighters themselves on the upper floors were not aware
that the
building had collapsed. They didn't realize the tremendous amount of
danger
they were in at that time.

Mr. Pfeifer: I didn't know, even at this point, that the entire South
Tower
collapsed. What we were doing here was regrouping, and the firefighters
were
coming down, and they were coming down with people. And they were
helping
more people to get out of the building. Like us, they didn't know the
building fell down.

The Police Department had a better understanding of the situation. The
South Tower's collapse disrupted the NYPD rescue team command post at
Church and Vesey. Nonetheless, the NYPD command structure gave vital
help to its units.  Kenneth Winkler, Detective, NYPD, ESU: There was
this tremendous roar- tremendous. I looked up and the South Tower was
imploding. I got behind a vehicle and it went from white to grey to
black, and then back again. As this was happening, I was calling units
out of the North Tower. The units in the North Tower did not know that
the South Tower had collapsed.

Mr. Norman: We at that point-because we were in an area where there were
no
windows-didn't exactly know what was going on. Our building obviously
violently shook. The noise from the collapse was heard by us, but we
didn't know exactly what we were going through.
Mr. Winkler: The building was shaking, the ceiling tiles were falling,
but we did
not know why-this was the result of the South Tower collapsing.

Mr. Norman: As soon as that subsided somewhat, we were communicated from
Officer Winkler, who was our command post operator, that the South Tower
had completely collapsed and we were being called out of the building.
At first, we kinda didn't understand it, that transmission. We clearly
understood it, but to think that a building of one hundred and some
stories was like, you know, almost, not believable at that moment. So we
asked for him to confirm that and to repeat his message. He then
explained that there was no South Tower, that it was absolutely gone,
and our building was in imminent danger of collapse, and that we should
come out of the building immediately.

Mr. Winkler: They descended down in a controlled manner, still checking
the
floors on the way down. They didn't rush out. As they got down and they
got
across West Street, the North Tower collapsed.

Many NYPD radio frequencies became overwhelmed with transmissions
relating to injured, trapped, or missing officers. By 10:10 a.m., the
NYPD rescue team advised that they were moving their command post north
and began moving vehicles in that direction.  NYPD Aviation radioed in
immediately that the South Tower had collapsed. At 10:08 a.m., an
aviation helicopter pilot advised that he did not believe the North
Tower would last much longer. There was no ready way to relay this
information to the fire chiefs in the North Tower.

Both NYPD rescue teams in the North Tower knew that the South Tower had
collapsed and evacuated the building. One remained in the complex near 5
and 6 WTC in order to keep searching for people who needed help. A
majority of these officers died.  At the time of the South Tower's
collapse, a number of NYPD and Port Authority Police officers, as well
as some FDNY personnel, were operating in different groups in the North
Tower mezzanine, the WTC plaza, and the concourse, as well as on the
neighboring streets. Many of these officers were thrown into the air and
were enveloped in the total darkness of the debris cloud.  Within
minutes of the South Tower collapse, these officers began to regroup in
the darkness and to lead the remaining civilians and injured officers
out of the complex. Many of these officers continued rescue operations
in the immediate vicinity of the North Tower and remained there until
the North Tower collapsed. Many lost their lives.

The collapse of the South Tower also forced the evacuation of the Port
Authority Police command post on West and Vesey,
forcing its officers to move north. There is no evidence that Port
Authority Police officers from outside the WTC command ever
heard an evacuation order on their radios. Some of these officers in the
North Tower determined to evacuate, either on their own,
or in consultation with other first responders they came across. One
Port Authority Police officer from the WTC command reported that he
heard an urgent evacuation instruction on his radio soon after the South
Tower collapsed.
Mr. Lim: I remember stopping on the floors now, from forty-four down, to
check
the floors to see if there was anybody left behind. There were some
people that
were, I guess, elderly, or that required assistance, that were just
starting to come
down now, so I just gathered them. There was no time to wait for anyone.
I felt
that time was of essence. And I collected them, and with my party, we
started
going down.

Other Port Authority police stayed in the WTC complex, assisting with
the evacuation.
Ms. Keane: You can see into the plaza, but it's almost like an alley way
between
Tower One and I believe it was 6 the Immigrations Department, because I
could
see the Immigrations sign still. So I knew at that point where I was and
that we
could actually follow that wall down and go into 5. I had a clear view
to look up
and I would look up to see whether or not things were falling. You
couldn't see
too high up. It wasn't like I could-you could hear things. It was
strange. You
could hear whistling. You could almost tell when things were coming
down. And
if things were kinda quiet then I would holler, ``send two over,'' and
they would
come across. And we probably got another ten or so people out. I
honestly don't
know what the count was.

The North Tower collapsed at 10:26 a.m.

The FDNY Chief of Department and the Port Authority Police Department
Superintendent and many of their senior staff were killed. The Fire
Department of New York suffered the largest loss of life of any
emergency response agency in U.S. history. The Port Authority Police
Department suffered the largest loss of life of any American police
force in history. The New York Police Department suffered the second
largest loss of life of any police force in U.S. history, exceeded only
by the loss of Port Authority police the same day. The nation suffered
the largest loss of civilian life on its soil as a result of a domestic
attack in its history.
Mr. Pfeifer: At this point, we heard a load roar again and someone
yelled that
the building was collapsing. And, we started to run. With bunker gear,
you can't
run too far, especially when a building is a quarter mile high. And what

happened inside the building now happened outside. This beautiful sunny
day
now turned completely black. We were unable to see the hand in front of
our
face. And there was an eerie sound of silence. That day we lost 2,752
people at
the World Trade Center; 343 were firefighters. But we also saved 25,000
people.
And that's what people should remember because firefighters and rescuers
went
in and they knew it was dangerous, but they went in to save people. And
they
saved many.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/18/politics/18TEXT-REPORT.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5062&en=7f14d1746876961c&ex=1085544000

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