Subject: [nfsv4] draft-ietf-nfsv4-channel-bindings-00.txt

From: Nicolas Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 13:30:24 -0700

This I-D was submitted before the cutoff, but the WG chair approval
got lost and the retransmission arrived after the cutoff, so this I-D
will not be published until after the upcomming IETF.

This I-D is the result of splitting out the channel bindings
specifications from the CCM I-D and filling in a lot of the details.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Network Working Group                                   Nicolas Williams
INTERNET-DRAFT                                          Sun Microsystems
                                                            October 2003

             On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels
              <draft-ietf-nfsv4-channel-bindings-00.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   This draft expires on March 1st, 2004.  Please send comments to the
   author.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines and formalizes the concept of channel bindings
   to secure layers and defines the actual contents of channel bindings
   for several secure channels.

   The concept of channel bindings allows applications to prove that the
   end-points of two secure channels are the same by binding
   authentication at one network layer to the session protection
   negotiation at a lower network layer.  The use of channel bindings
   allows applications to delegate session protection to lower layers.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Definitions
   3.  Authentication protocols and channel bindings
   3.1.  The GSS-API and channel bindings
   3.2.  SASL and channel bindings
   3.3.  Kerberos V and channel bindings
   4.  Channel bindings to secure layers
   4.1.  Bindings to SSHv2 channels
   4.2.  Bindings to TLS channels
   4.3.  Bindings to IPsec transport mode IKEv2 IKE_SAs
   4.3.1.  Interfaces for creating IPsec channels
   4.5.  Bindings to other types of channels
   5.  Benefits of channel bindings to secure channels
   6.  Security considerations
   7.  References
   7.1.  Informative references
   7.2.  Normative references
   8.  Acknowledgements
   9.  Author's Address

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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
   
1.  Introduction

   [NOTE:  This I-D text has been split out from the "The Channel
	   Conjunction Mechanism (CCM) for GSS" I-D, which will be
	   updated soon to define only the CCM-BIND and CCM-MIC GSS-API
	   pseudo-mechanisms and describe their use.  CCM-BIND is
	   particularly relevant to the use of channel bindings with
	   GSS-API applications.  See draft-ietf-nfsv4-ccm-01.txt.]

   Over the years several attempts have been made to delegate session
   protection at one network layer to another, for performance and/or
   scalability as well as for design elegance and also to avoid having
   to reinvent the wheel for every new application or security layer.

   The critical security problem to solve in order to achieve such
   delegation of session protection is always the same: how to ensure
   that there is no man-in-the-middle (MITM), from the point of view the
   application, at the lower network layer to which session protection
   is to be delegated.

   Alternative statement of the problem: how does one ensure that the
   end-points of two secure channels at different network layers are the
   same?

   And there may well be a MITM, particularly if the lower network layer
   either provides no authentication or if there is no connection
   between the authentication or principals used at the application and
   those used at the lower network layer.

   Such MITM attacks can be effected by, for example, spoofing IP
   address lookups (which is possible, for example, when using DNS but
   not DNSSEC) in a way that the application may not detect but which
   directs the client application or network stack to connect to a
   different host than had been intended (e.g., to the MITM's host).
   Even if such MITM attacks seem particularly difficult to effect, the
   problem must be solved.

   For example: a user decides to use TELNET, with Kerberos V
   authentication, over TLS to connect to some server but an attacker
   spoofs the name service lookup and causes the TELNET client to be
   redirected to some other host which TLS authenticates correctly and
   where the attacker forwards the connection, with or without TLS, to
   the server that the user had intended.  In this example there is an
   MITM from the point of view of the application (TELNET), even though
   there is no MITM as far as TLS is concerned.  The TELNET client and

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   server cannot assume that there is no MITM and so cannot leverage the
   protection afforded by the TLS channel, unless they prove to each
   other that there is no MITM.

   A solution to this problem is highly desirable, particularly where
   multi-user applications are run over secure network layers (e.g., NFS
   over IPsec).  For such applications the authentication model used at
   the application layer (usually user<->server) is generally very
   different from that used by secure, lower network layers, such as
   IPsec (usually client<->server or single-user<->server), and may even
   use different authentication infrastructures altogether (e.g.,
   Kerberos V for the application layer, x.509 certificates at the lower
   layer).  Such applications cannot generally leverage the security
   provided by the lower network layers, which, if they could, would
   allow them to offload session security to the secure lower layer.
   
   One solution involves ensuring the use of secure name services for
   hostname to network address translation and the use of secure
   networks (e.g., IPsec).  This approach can prevent the MITM attack
   described above, but does not offer applications any guarantees that
   there is no MITM in the lower layer.

   Another solution is to use "channel bindings" (a GSS-API concept
   [RFC2743]) to bind authentication at application layers to secure
   transports at lower layers in the network stack.  This solution is
   only applicable to applications that provide for user authentication.

   "Channel bindings" are data which securely identify a secure channel
   such that, when verified to match on both endpoints of end-to-end
   application connections, leave no doubt that the endpoints of two
   secure channels (the one identified by the bindings and the one used
   to exchange/verify the bindings) are the same.

   Because many applications exist which provide for authentication at
   the application layer, because many such applications use generic
   authentication frameworks, such as the GSS-API and SASL and are
   already deployed along with a common authentication infrastructure
   (e.g., Kerberos V, PKI, etc...), because such applications exist
   which multiplex multiple users onto a single session (and so cannot
   leverage network [e.g., IKE] authentication), the use of channel
   bindings is an elegant solution even where secure name services and
   networks are deployed.

   A formal definition of the channel bindings concept is given below,
   as well as the specific formulation of channel bindings for various
   protocols that provide for session security.

2.  Definitions

   The GSS-API [RFC2743] is a generic interface to GSS-API security
   mechanisms which provides for authentication and session
   cryptographic protection.  One facility provided by the GSS-API is a
   concept of "channel bindings" which consists of some data which must

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   be provided, if at all, by initiators and acceptors and which the
   GSS-API security mechanisms ensure are the same for both, the
   initiator and acceptor of any given GSS-API security context - if
   the channel bindings provided by them do not match then the mechanism
   fails to establish a security context.

   o  Channel bindings

      Some data which identifies a channel.

      Where channel bindings are used they MUST be exchanged with
      authenticated integrity protection.

   o  Channel bindings to secure sessions

      Channel bindings that securely identify a secure channel, such
      that no two channels of the same type can have the same channel
      bindings.

      Applications can exchange authenticated, integrity-protected
      proofs of their possession of the same channel bindings data to
      prove that the endpoints of the channel identified by the channel
      bindings are the same as the application endpoints (and thus,
      there can be no MITM at the lower layer).

      More formally, channel bindings to secure sessions

	 - MUST be cryptographically bound to the key exchange of the
	   secure session

	 - MUST be cryptographically bound to all potentially un-
	   authenticated plaintext used for negotiation of the secure
	   session (e.g., algorithm negotiations)

      and

	 - users of channel bindings MUST exchange authenticated,
	   integrity protected channel bindings data or signatures
	   thereof (such exchanges MAY also be confidentiality
	   protected)

      Additionally, the channel represented by the bindings MUST provide
      a cryptographically secure key exchange and channel setup
      negotiation, and it MUST provide at least cryptographically secure
      data integrity protection services.

      Channel bindings data MAY but SHOULD NOT be constructed in such a
      way that their exchange requires confidentiality protection.

      No channel bindings described herein require confidentiality
      protection.

      The security of channel bindings depends on the security of:

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       - the authentication and integrity protection technology used to
	 protect the channel bindings exchanges at the application
	 layers

       - the security of the channels identified by the channel bindings

       - the security of the channel bindings construction
      
   o  Channel bindings to network addresses

      The GSS-API originally defined only channel bindings to network
      addresses.  Such channel bindings, of course, are generally not
      cryptographically secure - this is so even though IPsec, say, can
      be used to secure communications between to IP nodes, except where
      the initiators and acceptors using channel bindings to network
      addresses are able actually confirm and enforce the use of IPsec
      between them.

      For channel bindings to network addresses to be secure the
      application peers MUST be able to verify and ensure that network
      communications between them are secured and that there is no MITM
      - which generally means that the application peers MUST be able to
      interpret and authorize identities authenticated by the network.

      In practice channel bindings to network addresses have mostly just
      caused trouble with NATs.

3.  Authentication protocols and channel bindings

   Some authentication services provide for channel bindings, such as
   the GSS-API and some GSS-API mechanisms - others do not, such as
   SASL.  Where suitable channel bindings facilities are not provided
   application protocol designers may include a separate, protected
   (where the authentication service provides message protection
   services) exchange of channel bindings material

3.1.  The GSS-API and channel bindings

   The GSS-API provides for the use of channel bindings during
   initialization of GSS-API security contexts, though GSS-API
   mechanisms are not required to support this facility.

   This channel bindings facility is defined in detail in RFC2744.

   Unfortunately, the use of GSS-API channel bindings is generally not
   negotiated by GSS-API mechanisms, therefore GSS-API applications must
   agree a priori on the use of channel bindings or otherwise negotiate
   the use of channel bindings.

   Fortunately, it is possible to design GSS-API pseudo-mechanisms that
   simply wrap around existing mechanisms for the purpose of allowing
   applications to negotiate the use of channel bindings within their

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   existing methods for negotiating GSS-API mechanisms.  For example,
   NFSv4 [RFC3530] provides its own GSS-API mechanism negotiation, as
   does the MOUNT protocol for NFSv2/3 [RFC....].  [NOTE:  This is an
   indirect reference to the Channel Conjunction Mechanism (CCM).]

3.2.  SASL and channel bindings

   SASL does not provide for the use of channel bindings during
   initialization of SASL contexts.

   SASL applications MAY define their own exchange of integrity-
   protected channel bindings using established SASL integrity layers.

   Alternatively, SASL applications MAY use the GSS-* SASL mechanisms
   (which correspond to GSS-API mechanisms) to ensure the use of channel
   bindings through the GSS-API's facilities.

3.3.  Kerberos V and channel bindings

   Kerberos V does not provide for use of channel bindings, thus the
   same general approach given above (post-authentication protected
   channel bindings exchange) applies to Kerberos V as well.

   However, Kerberos V AP client applications also MAY use the AP-REQ's
   Authenticator's "checksum" field to send a hash of channel bindings
   material to Kerberos V AP servers.  Unfortunately, there is no slot
   in the AP-REP message for carrying the AP server's channel bindings
   (which justifies the statement that Kerberos V does not provide a
   channel bindings facility), so Kerberos V applications MUST establish
   a convention with regards to AP servers' handling of AP-REQ checksum
   data - and such applications have to trust the servers to respond
   with suitable error messages to AP-REQs bearing incorrect channel
   bindings.

4.  Channel bindings to secure layers

   Not every secure session protocol or interface provides for secure
   channels, and not every secure session protocol provides data
   suitable for use as channel bindings.

4.1.  Bindings to SSHv2 channels

   SSHv2 provides both, a secure channel and material (the SSHv2
   "session ID") that is suitable for use as channel bindings.

   Thus it is RECOMMENDED that the SSHv2 "session ID" be used as the
   channel bindings for SSHv2.

4.2.  Bindings to TLS channels

   TLS provides both, a secure channel and material (the TLS "finished"
   messages), that is suitable for use as channel bindings.

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   Thus it is RECOMMENDED that the concatenation of the client's and
   server's "finished" messages, in that order, be used as the channel
   bindings for TLS.

   Note that the TLS "session ID," in spite of being named similarly to
   the SSHv2 session ID, is not suitable for use as channel bindings
   because it is assigned by the server, so a MITM could assign the same
   session ID on the client side as it gets from the server.

4.3.  Bindings to IPsec transport mode IKEv2 IKE_SAs

   IPsec does not provide either a channel or material suitable for use
   as channel bindings.  However, it is possible to construct IPsec
   channels with a simple programming interface for binding connection-
   oriented transports to transport mode SAs, and it is possible to
   construct channel bindings for IKEv2 IKE_SAs.

   The RECOMMENDED channel bindings for IKEv2 IKE_SAs consist of a SHA-1
   hash of the concatenation of the octets normally signed by the IKEv2
   initiator and responder, in that order, in the AUTH payloads of the
   IKEv2 SA exchange for the initial (i.e., non-rekeyed) transport-mode
   IKE_SA that corresponds to the SA that a connection is being bound
   to.

4.3.1.  Interfaces for creating IPsec channels

   In order to build an IPsec channel some additional programming
   interfaces are needed.  Specifically, an interface is needed to
   express an application's desire to bind an as yet unconnected
   connection-oriented endpoint to an IKEv2 IKE_SA, as well as the
   application's desired binding parameters, plus an interface to query
   a connected endpoint to examine if the binding to IPsec succeeded as
   well as to obtain the necessary channel bindings.

   Two forms of transport binding to IPsec are possible: a) binding to
   an IKE_SA irrespective of authenticated identities, b) binding to
   IKEv2 authenticated identities.  Applications MAY request neither,
   either or both of these.  Additionally, applications MUST request
   integrity or confidentiality protection (the latter MUST imply the
   former) and MAY limit the set of IPsec integrity and/or
   confidentiality protection algorithms, acceptable key lengths, etc...
   Together these items constitute the connection binding parameters.

   Applications MUST agree a priori, whether by design, configuration or
   through some other form of out-of-band negotiation, on compatible
   binding parameters.  This is because existing connection-oriented
   transport protocols, such as TCP and SCTP, do not provide for
   negotiation of IPsec connection binding parameters, therefore, if the
   applications do not agree a priori, they will fail to interoperate.
   Note also that the binding status of an established connection cannot
   be changed without support for such binding negotiation in the
   transport protocol.

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   When a connection-oriented transport is bound to IPsec the host MUST
   NOT send or process any IP packets for that connection protected with
   any SA which either: a) is not the IKE_SA that the connection was
   bound to (or an SA that was derived therefrom in a cryptographically
   secure manner, such as through IKEv2 rekeying, or a CHILD_SA), b)
   does not authenticate the same IKEv2 identities that were bound to,
   or c) does not provide the protection service requested by the
   application.  That is, the host MUST enforce the connection binding
   requirements of its applications.  Server hosts determine the IKE_SA
   and/or IKEv2 IDs to which new connections are bound by inspection of
   the SA used to protect the initial packet for each new connection.

   In terms of the familiar sockets APIs this means having a socket
   option to set on sockets prior to calling connect() or listen() and
   an socket option (perhaps the same option) to get the binding
   state and channel bindings after a socket has been connect()ed or
   accept()ed.  The programming language-specific details of these
   interfaces are not specified here.

   More formally the following APIs are needed:

      - An interface for indicating an application's desired connection
	binding parameters:

	 - 'BINDING_TYPE', the type of binding, either or both of:

	    - 'IKE_SA_BINDING', an IKE_SA, not identified by the
	      application, and its rekeyed and CHILD_SA successors

	    and/or

	    - 'IKE_ID_BINDING', IKEv2 authenticated identities,
	      optionally specified by the application

	 - 'BINDING_PROT', the payload protection service desired, that
	   is, integrity or confidentiality and integrity protection

	 - 'BINDING_PROT_ALGS', the acceptable protection service
	   algorithms and algorithm parameters

	such that, once bound, no messages are sent, and no received
	messages are processed, for the given connection that are not
	protected by an SA that satisfies the binding requirements.

	Unspecified binding parameters (the IKE_SA and/or IKEv2
	authenticated IDs) are established by the first message sent
	(client-side) or received (server-side) for a connection to be
	bound.  For example, for TCP connections, the binding parameters
	are those of the SA selected for protecting the TCP SYN packet).

	Applications MUST agree a priori on the connection binding
	parameters to use (except for the BINDING_PROT_ALGS parameter,
	where the server-side MAY specify a super-set of the client's

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	BINDING_PROT_ALGS).  Applications MAY leave BINDING_PROT_ALGS
	unspecified, leaving the SPD as the control of what algorithms
	are used.

      - An interface for querying the binding state of a connection
	(i.e., "is this connection bound to IPsec?").

      - An interface for querying the channel bindings of a connection's
	IKE_SA binding.

      - An interface for querying the identities authenticated by IKEv2
	for the bound SAs.

   Connection binding can fail when bound IKE_SAs fail to rekey
   properly, when bound identities' credentials expired, or when there
   is disagreement, between client and server, on what type of
   connection binding, if any, is to be used.  Implementations of
   connection binding MUST cause the connection to reset or to hang
   under any of these conditions, but MUST specify which behaviour
   results so that applications may detect connection failure and act as
   appropriate.

   Note that where applications bind application-layer authentication to
   IKE_SAs, but not IKEv2 IDs, there is an optimization whereby the
   IKEv2 IKE_SA need not be authenticated.  That is, the use of
   authentication at the application layer with channel bindings to
   IKE_SAs gives meaning to "anonymous IPsec," thus enabling the use of
   such applications with IPsec and without having to deploy an IKEv2
   authentication infrastructure (for those applications).

   Connection binding to IPsec does not require changes to the IPsec SPD
   model, though the "bypass" and "apply" actions of SPD entries are
   irrelevant to connections bound to IPsec - the "discard" action and
   any actions selecting or constraining the usable integrity and
   confidentiality algorithms that can be used still apply.

4.5.  Bindings to other types of channels

   For secure session protocols that do not provide material suitable
   for use as channel bindings such material SHOULD be constructed by
   concatenating the octets from the messages exchanged during the
   initialization of a session in the chronological order in which they
   were exchanged and processed (which requires synchronous session
   initialization), or a strong hash thereof (such as SHA-1).

   Some secure session protocols do not provide a secure channel but
   which do provide per-message integrity or confidentiality protection
   services.  It is up to the network layers that use such protocols to
   build channels from such services; applications MUST NOT delegate
   session cryptographic protection to network layers that do not
   provide a secure channel.

   Kerberos V, certain GSS-API and SASL mechanisms, all provide session

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   cryptographic protection and the necessary key exchange, but they
   provide neither a channel nor material suitable for use as channel
   bindings.

   Thus the RECOMMENDED channel bindings for channels protected by
   Kerberos V consist of a SHA-1 hash of the concatenated octets of the
   AP-REQ and AP-REP messages, in that order (or, for user-to-user
   exchanges, the various messages exchanged, including the ticket
   request, ticket and AP messages, in the order in which they were
   generated and processed) used to initialize the channel's
   cryptographic protection.

   Similarly for channels protected by GSS-API security contexts the
   RECOMMENDED channel bindings consist of a SHA-1 hash of the
   concatenated octets of the context tokens exchanged to setup a
   GSS-API security context in the order in which they were generated
   and processed (i.e., starting with the initiator's initial context
   token followed by the acceptor's reply token, if any, followed by the
   initiator's reply token, if any, etc...).

5.  Benefits of channel bindings to secure channels

   The use of channel bindings to delegate session cryptographic
   protection include:

    o Performance improvements by avoiding double protection in cases
      where IPsec is in use and applications provide their own secure
      channels.

    o Performance improvements by leveraging hardware-accelerated IPsec.

    o Performance improvements by allowing RDMA hardware offloading to
      be integrated with IPsec hardware acceleration.

    o Latency improvements for applications that multiplex multiple
      users onto a single channel, such as NFS w/ RPCSEC_GSS.

6.  Security considerations

   When delegating session protection from one layer to another, one
   will almost certainly be making some session security trade-offs,
   such as using weaker data encryption/authentication modes.
   Implementors and administrators SHOULD understand these trade-offs.

   Channel bindings cannot and MUST NOT be used without mutual
   authentication (of client/user/initiator and server/user/acceptor)
   and/or without integrity-protected, authenticated exchange of channel
   bindings material.

   Anonymous secure channels SHOULD NOT be used without authentication
   and corresponding use of channel bindings (to the anonymous secure
   channels) at higher network layers, or for any purposes other than
   opportunistic encryption, since such channels provide no

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   authenticated protection on their own.

   The security of channel bindings depends on the security of the
   channels, the construction of the bindings and the security of the
   authentication and integrity protection used to exchange channel
   bindings.

7.  References

7.1.  Informative references

   [Needs references to NFSv2/3 use of RPCSEC_GSS, to NFSv4, to SCTP,
    and, possibly, to DNS, DNSSEC, TELNET, SPNEGO, SSHv2 gss keyex, and
    CCM.]

   [TELNET]
      J. Postel, J.K. Reynolds, RFC0854 (STD0008): "Telnet Protocol
      Specification," May 1993, Status: Standard.

   [DNS]
      P.V. Mockapetris, RFC1035 (STD0013): "Domain names -
      implementation and specification," November 1987, Status:
      Standard.

   [DNSSEC]
      B. Wellington, RFC3008: "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC)
      Signing Authority," November 2000, Status: Proposed Standard.

   [RFC2203]
      M. Eisler, A. Chiu, L. Ling, RFC2203: "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
      Specification," September 1997, Status: Proposed Standard.

   [RFC2623]
      M. Eisler, "NFS Version 2 and Version 3 Security Issues and the
      NFS Protocol's Use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5," June 1999,
      Status: Proposed Standard.

   [NFSv4]
      S. Shepler, et. al., RFC3530: "Network File System (NFS) version 4
      Protocol," April 2003, Status: Proposed Standard.

   [SPNEGO]
      E. Baize, D. Pinkas, RFC2478: "The Simple and Protected GSS-API
      Negotiation Mechanism," December 1998, Status: Proposed Standard.

   [CCM]
      M. Eisler, N. Williams, Internet-Draft: "The Channel Conjunction
      Mechanism (CCM) for GSS," May 2003, Status: Internet-Draft.

   ...

7.2.  Normative references

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   [Needs references to RFC2119, RFC2026, the GSS-API (RFCs 2743 &
    2744), SASL, SSHv2, IKEv2, IPsec, TCP, Kerberos V, SHA-1.]

   [RFC2026]
      S. Bradner, RFC2026:  "The Internet Standard Process - Revision
      3," October 1996, Obsoletes - RFC 1602, Status: Best Current
      Practice.

   [RFC2119]
      S. Bradner, RFC2119 (BCP14):  "Key words for use in RFCs to
      Indicate Requirement Levels," March 1997, Status: Best Current
      Practice.

   [RFC2743]
      J. Linn, RFC2743: "Generic Security Service Application Program
      Interface Version 2, Update 1," January 2000, Status: Proposed
      Standard.

   [RFC2744]
      J. Wray, RFC2744: "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
      C-bindings," January 2000, Status: Proposed Standard.

   [TCP]
      J. Postel, RFC0793 (STD0007): "Transmission Control Protocol,"
      September 1981, Status: Standard.

   ...

8.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank Mike Eisler for his work on the
   Channel Conjunction Mechanism I-D and for bringing the problem to a
   head, Sam Hartman for pointing out that channel bindings provide a
   general solution to the channel binding problem, Jeff Altman for his
   suggestion of using the TLS finished messages as the TLS channel
   bindings, as well as Bill Sommerfeld, Radia Perlman for their most
   helpful comments.

9.  Author's Address

   Nicolas Williams
   Sun Microsystems
   5300 Riata Trace Ct
   Austin, TX 78727
   Email: [email-masked]

Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published

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   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

N. Williams							[Page 14]

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