Subject: RE: Basic Cert-2-Directory mapping question

From: "Bob Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 19:34:33 -0700

Skip,

Just so it's clear, I probably should have defined at least one use 
model for what we have been talking about -- at least the use 
that I have in mind.

what I'm trying to get away from this the necessity of wasting all
of the bandwidth that is currently being used to repetitively 
download entire certificate chains containing the same information,
over and over again to the same client.  This is particularly the 
case in SSL/TLS and S/MIME, and I predict that when we start 
sending signed EDI transactions it will be the case there as well.

What I want to do to minimize all of this is to send only two things 
with a given transaction -- the digital signature itself, stripped down 
as far as possible; and the name of the signer, in a minimal form 
as possible without imposing a rigid repository schema.

ideally, the name of the signer should be a DN, whether in the form
of a classical civil name structure, and DNS name, or some other form
that is searchable, such as a DUNS number. 

Ideally, the structure of the DN should be compatible with existing 
RDN syntax, but perhaps with the addition of a new attribute type.
I think that we are agreed that SOMETHING new is going to be 
required, and if that is the case a new attribute that is consistent with the
current RDN syntactic structure would to my mind be preferable to 
introducing something else, such as a URL or URI.

Although I don't want to get completely hung up on the use of a 
dir= RDN qualifier vs. a more explicit URL-type qualifier, I'm don't 
think I agree with your concern about the paradigm shift in the 
DN semantics a dir= type of qualifier would cause.  Maybe I just 
don't understand.

I am inclined to say that "DN semantics" is close to being an oxymoron.
The fact is that the semantic definitions of most of the usual DN 
attributes are conspicuously vague.  Consider "serial", "locality", commonName,
or even "country".  Yes, we all understand what a country is -- it's 
whatever the UN says it is, or isn't, and questions about disputed territories
are brushed aside.  But that isn't a semantic definition, that is simply a name to
territory definition or mapping.  The real question is what is the relationship
between the country and the end-entity identified by the rest of the DN -- 
is it merely a directory qualifier, or is it the country of residence?, citizenship? 
place of doing business? location of the home office? country of 
incorporation of an enterprise? If I am referring to a ship, for example, that 
is owned an operated by a UK company, registered in Liberia ,and 
is currently docked in Miami, what country should I use for the RDN
of that ship?  

Since X.500 doesn't attempt to answer that question, I would claim that 
the only effective semantics for country is as a directory qualifier, under the 
old universal X.500 directory-in-the-sky assumption of a monopoly directory
service, or at least a monopoly naming infrastructure per country.

Since we know by now that the original assumption is no longer valid, 
if indeed it ever was, we can certainly use country to mean whatever 
we choose it to mean in terms of semantics, just as people have 
distorted the semantics of organization, and particularly
organizationalUnit, to contain just about anything they want.

(I'm not really suggesting an RDN containing a MPEG of my cat, but 
things that are nearly as strange have been done in the past.  
That doesn't make them "right", of course, just ubiquitous.)

But what that leaves us with is the need to qualify what used to be a root,
i.e., country, and to supply a new root, meaning basically who owns, 
operates, and defines the semantics and schema for all of the rest of t
he RDNs which follow.

I would submit that despite the semantic "recommendations" provided by 
the standards organizations, it is really the directory service provider who 
defines such things, or in some cases the Certificate Authority who creates a 
certificate, whether or not they actual deposit that certificate in an X.500 
directory

From this point of view, I believe that using a dir= type of directory service 
provider is not some kind of an ugly hack, but a reflection of reality, and a 
completely legitimate RDN qualifier.  It specifies in a consistent DN syntax
what the root of the DIT really is -- the name of the directory that contains 
and defines it.

Now I'll grant that it isn't very likely that existing X.500 directories would 
suddenly change their DIT structure to explicitly include a dir=  component
at the Top.  But I don't think that would be at all necessary, either -- it can be
done implicitly.

I wouldn't think it would be all that hard to define the attribute matching 
rules so that if the dir attribute (or one of the multi-=valued RDN components)
is the DNS address of the directory that is being accessed, the result is 
TRUE, and otherwise FALSE.

Another approach which might or might not work would be to use an alias,
although I don't know whether it is possible to define an alias for a node, 
rather than for a leaf.

For example, in Novell's own DIT, we don't even define c=US as the top 
component, although perhaps we "should".

But I would assume/hope that if we were concerned about that, we could 
define an alias of c=us, o=Novell Inc. to point to the o=Novell node that is 
actually at the top of our DIT.

Since you said that you actually considered this type of an approach
at one time, perhaps you can say more about what led you away from 
that approach.  I think you were right the first time.

Regards,

Bob

>>> "Slone, Skip" <[email-masked]> 01/16/01 01:45PM >>>
John,

You wrote, "I don't think the proposed "dir" attribute is semantically very
different
from any other naming attributes" and that "the mechanism for searching has
to treat the "dir" RDN somewhat differently from the other RDNs."

My concern with different semantics is not a matter of degree; it's the fact
that the semantics of DN must change -- at all -- to incorporate this
concept. If there are other ways to deal with the problem, I see no
compelling reason to change the semantics of something so fundamentally and
deeply entrenched in dozens of standards as DN. 

I must add here that I have not always opposed this concept. I actually
pursued this line of thinking two or three years ago in a different forum
(X.500) while working a different problem (Related Entries). At that time, I
was proposing that a "dnQualifer" be added to a DN to specify an access
point through which the entry named by the DN could be found. While pursuing
that line of thinking (which explored several syntactic/semantic variants),
the semantic-shift problem kept getting in the way. In the end, we settled
on a separate mechanism rather than change the semantics of DN. Flawed as it
may be, DN is still a widely accepted concept; changing it will be an uphill
struggle.

 -- Skip

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2001 10:52 AM
To: Slone, Skip
Cc: 'Bob Jueneman'; [email-masked] 
Subject: RE: Basic Cert-2-Directory mapping question

>As I read your suggestion, you want to add an element to the DN
>that directs the user to the appropriate directory. The new
>element is syntactically an RDN, but semantically is something
>different.  The resulting new-style DN appears to me to
>semantically comparable to an LDAP URL.

I don't think the proposed "dir" attribute is semantically very different
from any other naming attributes.  What we're trying to do with names in
certificates is to maintain the X.500 illusion that a DN uniquely
identifies an entry in some global directory.  But we don't have a single
global directory; instead we have a collection of directories which don't
talk to one another - i.e. instead of the single DN root assumed by X.500,
we actually have multiple roots, one for each directory.

The obvious way to resolve this sort of problem is to introduce a new
"meta-root" that sits above all the directory roots.  This corresponds to
adding an RDN to the most significant end of each DN that names the
particular directory within which the named entry lies.  Precisely how a
directory is named is TBD, but it must give an end-system enough
information to for a query for that directory, without requiring prior
knowledge of the directory, so an obvious possibility (for an LDAP
directory) is scheme and hostport portions of an LDAP URL.

Individual directories could either store this attribute explicitly within
the entry (which would mean that these directories could be directly
searched using the full DN) or, more likely, the "dir" attribute would have
to be removed before searching an individual directory.  So yes, the
mechanism for searching has to treat the "dir" RDN somewhat differently
from the other RDNs, but in terms of a naming model, it behaves just like
any other RDN.

As Bob points out, the "dir" attribute could be multi-valued, allowing
information about an entry to reside in multiple directories (provided that
the directories can all agree to use the same name for the entry).

John

"Slone, Skip" <[email-masked]> on 01/16/2001 09:16:13 AM

To:   "'Bob Jueneman'" <[email-masked]>
cc:   [email-masked] 
Subject:  RE: Basic Cert-2-Directory mapping question

Bob,

I'm glad to hear we agree on the nature of the problem.  From that point of
agreement, we can move the discussion to one of "what do we do about it?"

In abstract terms, it appears to me that "what we can do about it" falls
into two broad categories:
 1) we can create a mechanism for explicitly identifying the appropriate
directory, or
 2) we can remove the barriers that currently prevent the directory from
being discovered implicitly based upon existing information

I would say that your approach fits in category 1, while my approach fits
in
category 2. Either approach has validity IMHO and is worthy of
consideration.

As I read your suggestion, you want to add an element to the DN that
directs
the user to the appropriate directory. The new element is syntactically an
RDN, but semantically is something different.  The resulting new-style DN
appears to me to semantically comparable to an LDAP URL.

Assuming we're on the same page up to this point, I'll say that my concern
with this approach is that it changes the semantics of DN, potentially
causing interoperability problems in that both clients and servers that
understand the semantics as currently defined would have problems when
encountering the new-style name.  If we were to go with a "category 1" fix
to the problem, I would rather see a new mechanism employed, such as a new
PKIX-defined certificate extension that explicitly gives repository
location
information.  As a new construct, we would be free to define whatever
semantics we want, and could readily use existing concepts such as URLs.

Now, in defense of my approach, I think we can all probably agree that *IF*
the original concept of X.500-style distributed, global name resolution
were
a practical reality, we would be able to plug into the nearest DSA and find
the named entry regardless of where it resides physically. Of course I
emphasized the word "if" to imply that we can also probably agree that that
original X.500 concept is not going to occur anytime soon, if ever. What I
was proposing instead, was a "category 2" fix -- a way of removing that
barrier by providing an alternative way of doing distributed name
resolution.  The alternative mechanism I proposed was one which builds upon
an existing, working, global infrastructure that already has the requisite
registration infrastructure in place.  Without digging into the specifics,
I
would like to know if you or others believe that this *concept* has merit.

 -- Skip

-----Original Message-----
From: Bob Jueneman [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Monday, January 15, 2001 2:11 PM
To: [email-masked] 
Cc: [email-masked] 
Subject: RE: Basic Cert-2-Directory mapping question

Skip,

I don't particularly like the mechanism you've proposed, at least as
I understand it. But I absolutely and completely agree with you
as to the nature of the problem that has to be solved.

Civil attribute type names will always be with us, and hence must be
dealt with, for at least two fundamental reasons:

1.  An address is not a name, although it may be a pseudonym.  I
don't want to be forced to change my identity, or to an extent
my basis "self-hood," every time I change my ISP.  And I especially
don't want some system administrator telling me that my name
must be limited to 8 characters, or that I have to change my name
because someone else has already used that same name within
that same system administrator's ill-conceived naming scheme.

2.  E-mail address and other cyberspace identifiers fail to provide the
essence of PKI from a nonrepudiation standpoint, i.e., what I call the
"where do you send the sheriff" question.

Granted, not all uses of PKI will or should involve legal nonrepudiation.
But to the extent that at least some uses WILL have legal consequences,
then the establishment of a globally unique and credible identity that is
grounded in "meat-space" rather then cyberspace is absolutely essential.

For those legally binding transaction to be worth anything at all, they
have to be enforceable. And that means that a judgement may have
to be enforced upon someone, either by seizing the assets or putting
them in jail.  And only in science fiction does the sheriff ride off into
cyberspace to arrest someone.

If I as a relying party wish to trade with someone, then I either want to
charge her credit card (in which case PKI is demonstrably not necessary)
or I want to know that she is the Mary Smith who resides at 123 Anywhere
St,
Metropolis, NY.

The inclusion of that civil address not only servers to distinguish her
from the other Mary Smiths, but more importantly it establishes a nexus
or link between her identity and her probable whereabouts, and
probably valuable real property as well.

So civil addresses, both corporate or "organizationalPerson", or the
harder-to-deal-with residentialPerson type will presumably always
be with us, and will have to be dealt with.

And unfortunately, perhaps, here int he US the simple and inescapable
fact of the matter is that neither the federal nor the state governments
operate the type of presumptively authoritative name registration
authorities that are relatively common in other countries. I am perfectly
free to move from one city to another, or from address to another in
the same city, and to never notify anyone in authority at all, including
the tax authorities.  No one will ever say, "Papers, please."

(Granted, if I choose to do that I may not be able to register to vote,
but over half the population doesn't vote anyway.  And the last time
I registered, no one checked to see that I actually lived there -- that
one of the problems we have with our voting system, even outside
of the State of Florida.. And I may not be able to get a driver's license
in order to legally drive a car, but a lot of illegal immigrants don't have
driver's licenses either, although that doesn't keep them from driving.)

So merely trying to ignore the problem of civil addressing schemes
won't solve that problem.  And neither will various approaches that
make certain assumptions about monopoly name registration
authorities, or try to divine or impute where a directory containing
a particular name might be found based on some kind of a Karnak
mentalist act.

The primary issue is not the question of whether the name space
is flat or hierarchical, or how hierarchical, much less what the
"approved" schema is.  What will be, will be, for reasons that
are beyond our scope and power to influence, even if we wanted
to.

So.

We cannot force a person to deposit his certificate or other useful
information into a specific directory, even if we wanted to.  Nor can
we reliably impute a likely directory where such information might
be found, at least in the absence of a monopoly or governmental
mandate.

The best we can do is to ASK the user where he has deposited
such information, if anywhere, and to include that information
EXPLICITLY in any directory or pseudo-directory reference, such
as a DN.

Although at one time I liked the notion of prefixing the DN with a
URL, I have come to believe that John Wray's suggestion is the
better way forward.

He said:
>
>Bob,
>
>Accepting the fact that the X.500 dream of a single global directory is
not
>going to happen any time soon, DNs can still be turned into globally
>significant pointers into a federation of directories in the way you
>suggest, but it doesn't require altering the DN syntax (and therefore
>doesn't have to break existing implementations).  All that's needed is a
DN
>attribute that names the particular directory within which the name
>resides.  e.g. instead of "c=us;..;cn=My Name" you'd have "dir=My
>Directory;c=us;...;cn=My Name", where "My Directory" is the URL of a
>directory access point.

By including an explicit directory qualifier of the form dir="directory
URL"
at the root (top) of the RDN chain, we have implicitly qualified all of the
rest
of the RDN, which is a Good Thing.

By defining the syntax of the "dir" attribute appropriately, we could
include
both the access type (LDAP, http, etc.) and port number appropriately,
either a default or explicitly indicated.

And by making the dir component multivalued, we could accommodate
a choice of multiple directories and multiple directory types.

Once again -- the essence of the problem is not the format of the directory
name but where a directory containing that name can be found.
Including that information as a top-level qualifying component solves that
problem (and potentially several others, such as name scope qualification)
very neatly.

Bob

Robert R. Jueneman
'Security Architect
Novell, Inc. -- the leading provider of Net services software
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>>> "Slone, Skip" <[email-masked]> 01/15/01 09:08AM >>>
>Oscar,
>
>No offense taken, thus no apology needed.
>
>My comments from the soapbox last week were actually intended for the
>community at large, and were meant to convey frustration at the apparent
>unwillingness of solution providers in general to hear about -- and solve
--
>real world problems that are faced by users like myself in large, complex
>environments.
>
>When I say "my environment is not so simple," the response I hear is
"let's
>not talk about the complexity; let's make some simplifying assumptions
>instead."
>
>When I say "I have a nail AND a screw and need to put them both in the
>wall," the response I hear is "we have provided you with a perfectly
>adequate hammer, therefore you don't have a screw."
>
>As I was using the nail/hammer analogy, dc-based names are the nails;
>civil-attribute-based names are the screws. No matter how good a job my
>company does of using nails and nails alone, we still have tens of
thousands
>of trading partners, many of whom prefer screws to nails and will continue
>to use them indefinitely. Without a screwdriver, it's hard to do business
>with them.
>
>I don't really care what the screwdriver looks like.  I've suggested a
>fairly simple design that I think will work. So far, no one has commented
on
>the design. What I've heard instead is a chorus of "we still don't like
>screws."  Well, I don't like them either, but I still have to deal with
>them.  If I'm simply overlooking a screwdriver that we have lying around
>somewhere, I would appreciate someone pointing it out to me.
>
> -- Skip
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Oscar Jacobsson [mailto:[email-masked]] 
>Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 5:16 PM
>To: Slone, Skip
>Cc: 'Sharon Boeyen'; [email-masked] 
>Subject: RE: Basic Cert-2-Directory mapping question
>
>
>> From: Slone, Skip [mailto:[email-masked]] 
>> In response to this, I'm inclined to join Sharon on Marshall's soapbox
and
>> echo her words:
>>
>> "... I believe a more constructive approach is to accept the fact that
>> different parts of the world and different environments will use a
variety
>> of nameforms ... We are not the global naming police either and should
not
>> try to impose the rules that anyone uses to name entities to which they
>> issue certificates."
>
>I'm sorry if I came across as clamouring for rules be imposed. I know that
>this working group has a tendency to be wary of suggestions that don't
cater
>for distinguished names containing cat MPEGs, so I should probably have
been
>more careful. The requirements I suggested were for a possible naming
>standards document, conformance to which need not be enforced.
>
>The case at hand is not, IMHO, one of dictating that "all distinguished
>names must be according to our will, or you shall feel our wrath". A
>document however, outlining a naming strategy that would require of the
>users of certificates named accordingly no a-priori knowledge of their
>issuer (save for eventually having to reach something explicitly trusted
in
>the chain) in order to perform path validation, is something I would
>personally consider very valuable indeed. I'm reasonably confident that
>organizations intending to act as certification authorities or trusted
third
>parties would agree.
>
>> And to quote someone Sharon and I both know, "If all you have is a
hammer,
>> every problem looks like a nail."
>
>It seems I was less than clear here as well. :-(
>
>My intention was to point out that there are actually two separate
problems
>here (one nail, if you will, and one screw) each looking for its own
>solution:
>
>1. Defining a repository, and subsequently entry, discovery process for
>arbitrarily named entries.
>
>2. Defining a naming scheme that _if applied_ would automate this
repository
>and entry discovery process.
>
>I am only trying to address the second of these problems. The first is
only
>an issue because nobody seems to have properly addressed the second before
>deploying certificates on the Internet en masse. The further we wait
before
>addressing number two, the more of a problem number one will become.
>
>I should probably make a habit of pointing out that the opinions stated
here
>are my very own, and not necessarily those of my employer.
>
>Cheers,
>
>//oscar

---

From: Polar Humenn <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 10:26:29 -0500 (EST)

Bob,

I think the thing you are trying to get here is:

1. I have a signature made by a private key.
2. How do I find the corresponding public key to verify it.
3. How do I trust the public key.

You want a minimal stripped down signature, and a pointer the place in
which one *might* find the public key. At this point, I don't even need a
certificate, correct? I can just simply trust the public key.

However, for non-repudiation, and "where do I send the sherrif" motif,
certification of that public key is necessary to tie it to some attributes
in which you can make a trust decision. This is necessary, because that
certificate must be a matter of *public* record. However, public records
are strewn all over the place. You cannot go into the Motor Vehichle
department of Utah and ask for a copy of someones New York State Drivers
License, or their birth certificate.

It seems fundamental to me, that you need a protocol, a pointer to a
service of that protcol, and an identifier with which to get that
certificate. 

In CORBA, there is a service called the Person IDentification Service
(PIDS). This service was built my many learned people in the business of
identification, i.e. hosptial patient registration. In this service, they
encounter all such problems as spliting and merging identities based on
*traits*, i.e. the two John Smiths problem. Traits can be considered very
dynamic things and change all the time. However, the basic cruxt is that
it all comes down to an object reference called an Identity.

Now, I know in the IETF you may not have the luxury of flinging CORBA
object references around, however, the basic premise is that you have the
following items in order to identify something:

1: a specification of a protocol, 
2: a location of a service supporting that protocol, 
3: and an identifier within that protocol.

Item 1, isn't much good if you don't have item 2 as well. And Item 3
is pretty much useless without 1 and 2.

Whether that service is LDAP, DAP, DNS, CORBA Naming, or PIDS, it doesn't
much matter, but there has to be something. Having the Identifer (#3) is
just not good enough.

Finding the end entity certificate (i.e. the signing key) shouldn't be
that hard. A signature can contain all items 1,2,3. Since the signing
entity can provide that information, correct?

However, I think the basic problem lies path discovery and validation
because certificates themselves do not contain items 1 and 2 of their
issuers.

Would you say that this is a correct interpretation of the problem?
Unfortuately, a certificate is a signature and it's missing important
information about its signer, such where to find its public key, and quite
possibly a certificate for that public key. 

I seem to remember something about an AuthorityInfo extension. Does that
solve the problem well enough?

Cheers,
-Polar

> >unwillingness of solution providers in general to hear about -- and solve

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Polar Humenn                  Adiron, LLC
mailto:[email-masked]       2-212 CST      
Phone: 315-443-3171           Syracuse, NY 13244-4100
Fax:   315-443-4745           http://www.adiron.com

---

From: Janus Liebregts <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 17:37:04 +0100

Bob,

this relationship depends on the context and can have several forms.

1. in a 'doing-business'-pki
2. in a 'legal'-pki or as you call it a 'send-the-sheriff'-pki 
in both cases not the DN of the ship is important, but the company
responsible for the ship and it's representative, I suggest the captain. 

In a 'doing business'-pki what matters is, which authorizations does the
captain have. The captain could be an dutchman acting on behalf of a UK
company and the same person could also act on behalf of another
(Liberian) company.
So the DN of the captain: cn=captain, o=UK-company, c=GB
which has a 'Role Occupant'DN: cn=John Smith, l=Eindhoven, c=NL

in the 'legal'-pki where the ship is operated by a company under the
legal system of Liberia:
cn=captain, o=Liberian-company, c=LR
with the same 'Role Occupant'

in these cases country represents the legal system of UK and Liberia
so cn= operates on behalf of o= which operates under the laws of c=
and cn= operates as a citizen of l= under the laws of c= or laws of
st=,c=

what l= represents depends on local law.

An other possible solution for solving the jurisdiction problem is
defining yet another certificate extension as done in the
'Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates
Profile' (http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-qc-06.txt) 
but this requires other law systems to recognize and accept this
extension. This will be the case in the countries of the European Union
by means of the ETSI QCP-standards which implements the EU-directive on
digital signatures. 
According to this ietf-draft:
"A typical statement suitable for inclusion in the Qualified Certificate
Statements extension MAY be a statement by the issuer that the
certificate is issued as a Qualified Certificate in accordance with a
particular legal system"
and
"The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for
issuing the certificate. The name SHOULD be an officially registered
name of the organization"

3. 'access & authorization'-pki
it doesn't matter what is meant by country, any company can make his own
rules for his own domain or even choose some other or mixed naming
scheme. When inter-businnes 'access & authorization' is required, you
have to agree on a naming policy and build a:

4. 'branch oriented A&A'-pki
There we could have the super-branch-organisation (Root) which certifies
members, with names recognized by all it's members (domain) and which
can give some meaning to country. One company can be member of more
branches and can have different names in different domains, so the
branch oriented pki's gather and form a:

5. 'inter branch oriented A&A'-pki

etc....

For building legal pki's, I think governments should take their
responsibility by building national pki's issuing identity certificates
to persons and companies.

From legal point of view there should be a federation of pki's; one per
legal system.
In the CP of such a national RootCA their should be some lines:
"The issuer name SHOULD be an officially registered name of the person
or organization"
and
"The certificates are issued in accordance with the (fill in your
country) legal system"

The dutch law defines some Naming Authorities (NA)

-NA for persons: local authorities (de gemeente, burgerlijke stand
http://www.wetten.nu/wetgeving/nl00087/nl00087-08.cfm)
-NA for local authorities: the community council (de gemeenteraad
http://www.wetten.nu/wetgeving/nl00096/nl00096-02.cfm#P788_75618)
-NA for companies: chambers of commerce have a delegated task
(Handelsregisterwet 1996 & Handelsnaamwet)
(excuse my bad translations in the above)

The first step in my opinion would be bringing in line the used
Organizational Name in certificates with the name registered with the
local Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce could operate their
own CA and doing the task they already do: registering companies,
distinguishing between them and register which person has which
authorization or which people can act on behalf of this organization.

As this infrastructure is not in place yet, I suggest, when building
national or legal pki's, Naming Authorities should bring in line the
used names with the ones as registered with the Chamber of Commerce. The
dutch Chamber of commerce has an on-line register with officially
registered company names: http://www.kvk.nl/kvk/kvk-online.html?type=h
(for using it read Handelsnaam=company name, Plaatsnaam=city, Start
zoeken= start searching)

Step 1. register officially (according to law) the name
Step 2. make a DN from 'officially registered name'
 c=NL (according to dutch law), o= organizational name (according to
chamber of commerce), cn/ou= whatever (according to organization)
 c=NL (according to dutch law), l= community name (according to the
community council), cn=personsname (according to local authorities,
burgelijke stand in the Netherlands)
Step 3. certify the binding public-key/DN

My overall view is, make the contents of a certificate as bare as
possible and store everything else in the ldap-entry belonging to this
certificate. This is an entry which is controlled by the (privacy wishes
of the) subject.

But the basic question is where to find that ldap-entry, not knowing the
starting point. In my point of view every pki can have it's own
bootstrap. Pki's based on dc-naming have their bootstrap in DNS by the
named.root (ftp://ftp.rs.internic.net/domain/named.root) and adding a
SRV-record. I think a legal-pki based on X.521-naming will have some
sort of bootstrap defining the ip-adresses of the top level DSA's in
some similar file. 

We claim to operate the c=NL tree according to SURFnet, which is
according to NameFlow which is our bootstrap
(http://www.nameflow.net/nameflow.html). I would be happy if some other
organizations, also would operate a C=NL tree with some other guarantees
about naming entities. I as a trust builder then could choose my level
of trust, until then let's build the infrastructure on the current
naming policy...

regards,
janus
ldap://ldap.surfnet.nl/cn=Janus Liebregts,o=SURFnet,c=NL