Subject: Re: Certificate Policy Standardization

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 09:31:26 +0000

> Personally I'm not aware of any problems solved with the help of policy
> OIDs. ;-) Maybe others on this list feel more enlightened.

For me, OIDs are yet to have their time. As a concept they are elegant
but will resist widespread use until security-exploiting applications
support them. Until then they are destined to stay on the back-burner.
I encourage people to adopt their use, however, if only to future-proof
themselves and I don't see any harm whatsoever in embedding in a certificate
some mechanism that links the trust level it represents to a real-world
legal mechanism, even if at present the software support for such a link
is absent.

Chris

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From: "Anders Rundgren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 12:31:19 +0100

>support them. Until then they are destined to stay on the back-burner.

Sure.

>legal mechanism, even if at present the software support for such a link

In case you are advicing people setting up CAs, I would (in case the
CP OID stuff stays forever in the backburner), also recommend them
to only apply one CP per CA root, as anyhting else is actually
incompatible with some 99.9% of existing RP software.

/anders

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From: "Anders Rundgren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 12:31:19 +0100

Sure.

/anders

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From: "Anders Rundgren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 12:31:19 +0100

Sure.

/anders