Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt

From: "Turner, Sean P." <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 11:10:28 -0400

Comments as follows (r=replace):

1. Abstract: To the sentence beginning with "The X.509 v3 CRL format is
described in detail," add "an Internet specific extension is defined,".  AIA
is an internet specific extension. 

2. Sec 1 para 7 last sentence: replace a conforming certificate/conforming
certificates.  There are three cert examples in Appendix C.

3. Sec 1 last *, Sec 8, and Sec 10: r RFC 2510/RFC 4210

4. Sec 4 1st para last sentence: remove required to support a PKI.  All of
the internet defined extensions are optional so they can't be required to
support a PKI for the internet community.

5. Sec 4.1.2.4 last para penultimate and last sentence: r section
7.1/section 7.1 and 7.3.  7.3 needs to be added as issuer names can be
expressed using the domainComponent attribute.

6. Sec 4.2.1.2: Can we suggest using something other than SHA-1 for key id
generation? How about striking SHA-1 from the methods and adding the new
sentence to both: The hash algorithm employed can be the same algorithm
paired with the signature algorithm (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384).

7. Sec 4.2.1.6/4.1.2.6: The 2nd paragraph of 4.2.1.6 points out that since
the SAN is bound to the public key that the CA MUST verify the each part of
the SAN. I think a similar statement ought to be added to the subject
section (4.1.2.6) to indicate that "All parts of the subject name MUST be
verified by the CA as it is bound to the public key".

8. Sec 4.2.1.10: 3rd para indicates that CAs MUST NOT impose name
constraints on ediPartyName or registeredID but the 14th para (the one
before the ASN.1) indicates that ediPartyName and registeredId are not
defined in this spec but MAY be defined in another spec. Sounds to me like
it would be hard to convince a customer that you could write a name
constraints that can ever be 3280bis compliant since whatever you wrote MUST
NOT be imposed/implemented. It's not clear that the name constraints
shouldn't be imposed because they're not defined in the spec or whether they
should never ever be imposed.

9. Sec 4.2.1.10: 3rd para indicates that CAs MUST NOT impose name
constraints on x400Address name forms but the last sentence in the 10th para
last says X400Address MUST be applied to x.400 addresses. See #8.

10. Sec 4.2.2.1 4th to last para: r HTTP or LDAP URI/HTTP [RFC 1738] or LDAP
[RFC 2255] URI. Makes it consistent with AIA in CRL section.

11. Sec 4.2.2.2 3rd to last para: r HTTP or LDAP URI/HTTP [RFC 1738] or LDAP
[RFC 2255] URI.  Makes it consistent with AIA sections.

12. Sec 5 3rd to last para: r This profile does not define any private
Internet CRL extensions or CRL entry extensions/This profiles defines one
CRL extension and no CRL entry extensions.  AIA is defined in this spec.

13. Sec 5.2.5 8th para (one before the ASN.1): The sentence about the
onlyContainsAttributeCerts seems to hang. Recommend adding "In either case"
to the beginning of the sentence to address the case when either
onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE. Additionally,
recommend adding the following for completeness as a new last paragraph: "If
the scope of the CRL only includes attribute certificates then the
onlyContainsAttributeCerts MUST be set to TRUE and both
onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts MUST be set to FALSE."

14. Sec 5.2.7: Remove ASN.1.  It's already referenced in the 1st para,
duplication leads to errors, and the other sections that reused ASN.1 from
certificate sections did not duplicate the ASN.1 (see AKI/IAN).

15. Sec 5.3.1: Can we add an ASN.1 comment to say the enumerated value #7 is
never used?

16. Sec 4.2.1.6 1st para: r These identities may be included in addition to
or in the place of the identity/These identities may be included in addition
to or in the place of, in the case of non-CAs, the identity.  The paragraph
mixes SAN and IAN, but assumed the 2nd sentence addressed SAN.

17. Sec 4.2.1.6: Add the following to clarify that there is no dependency in
this spec between SAN and IAN: This specification places no requirement on
CAs, whose certificate includes Issuer Alterative name, to include Subject
Alternative names in certificates issued by the CA. 

18. Sec 4.2.1.7: Add the following three sentences to be explicit about the
checks not made: Issuer Alternative names are not constrained by name
constraints. If a CA certificate has a Subject Alternative name, the
specification does not require CAs to populate the Issuer Alternative name
in certificates issued by the CA. Further, the chain of Issuer Alternative
and Subject Alternative names, as is done with issuer and subject names, is
not checked during the certificate path validation algorithm in section 6.

19. Sec 5.2.2: Add the following: Issuer Alternative names are not
constrained by name constraints. If a CA certificate has a Subject
Alternative name, this specification does not require CAs to populate the
Issuer Alternative name in CRLs issued by the CA.

Feel free to wordsmith any of the suggested text.

spt

---

From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 16:20:50 -0400

>is an internet specific extension.
Modified abstract to note that both standard and Internet-specific CRL 
extensions are described.

>certificates.  There are three cert examples in Appendix C.
Done.

>3. Sec 1 last *, Sec 8, and Sec 10: r RFC 2510/RFC 4210
Done.

>support a PKI for the internet community.
The full sentence is "This section also defines private extensions 
required to support a PKI for the Internet community."  These extensions 
(authorityInfoAccess an subjectInfoAccess) are needed even though it is 
not necessary to include them in all certificates. 

>expressed using the domainComponent attribute.
Section 7.1 has been modified to note that domainComponent attributes in 
DNs MUST be compared as specified in section 7.3.

>paired with the signature algorithm (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384).
Section 4.2.1.2 simply states that the two methods described are two 
common methods for generating key identifiers.  The text explicitly does 
not restrict CAs to using these methods.

It is also not clear why one would want to use SHA-256, SHA-384, etc. 
instead of SHA-1.  There are no security issues associated with key 
identifiers, so it would seem that using a hash algorithm with a longer 
output would just make the certificates larger.

>verified by the CA as it is bound to the public key".
It is my understanding the the statement in 4.2.1.6 was added because 
there were cases in which CAs were verifying the name they included in 
the subject field but not names included in the subjectAltName 
extension.  Are you aware of a similar problem with the subject field?

>should never ever be imposed.
3280bis states:

      The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName,
      ediPartyName, and registeredID are not defined by this specification,
      however syntax and semantics for name constraints for other name
      forms may be specified in other documents.

A CA conforming to 3280bis MUST NOT impose name constraints on the 
x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms.  Period.  
However, just as [SRVSAN] specifies the syntax and semantics for name 
constraints on the SRVName name form, other documents could specify the 
syntax and semantics for name constraints on other name forms.  Given 
that 3280bis forbids conforming CAs from imposing name constraints on 
the x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms, it would seem 
to be inappropriate for another PKIX (or even IETF) document to specify 
syntax and semantics for name constraints on ediPartyName or 
registeredID name forms, but 3280bis is just one profile of X.509.  A 
different profile of X.509 may permit the specification of name 
constraints on these name forms and may specify the syntax and semantics 
for imposing constraints on those name forms.  While 3280bis states that 
conforming CAs MUST NOT impose name constraints on these name forms, 
conforming relying parties are permitted to implement the ability to 
process name constraints on these name forms since conforming relying 
parties are not restricted to only accepting certificates that are 
issued in conformance with 3280bis.

>last says X400Address MUST be applied to x.400 addresses. See #8.
While a conforming CA MUST not impose name constraints on the 
x400Address name form, a conforming relying party MAY implement the 
ability to process  such constraints.  As with any other name form, if a 
certificate includes name constraint on the x400Address name form and a 
subsequent certificate in the certification path includes a 
subjectAltName extension with an x400Address name, the relying party 
MUST either process the constraint or reject the certification path.

>[RFC 2255] URI.  Makes it consistent with AIA sections.
Done.  Although 2255 was replaced with 4516.

>CRL extension and no CRL entry extensions.  AIA is defined in this spec.
 The sentence was replaced with the following:

      This profile defines one private Internet CRL extension but does 
not define
      any private CRL entry extensions.

>onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts MUST be set to FALSE."
This sentence was really meant to say that onlyContainsAttributeCerts 
MUST be set to FALSE in all cases, not just when either 
onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE.  In order 
to make this more clear, the sentence about onlyContainsAttributeCerts 
has been moved to the end of the paragraph and now reads:

      Conforming CRLs issuers MUST set the onlyContainsAttributeCerts 
boolean
      to FALSE.

>certificate sections did not duplicate the ASN.1 (see AKI/IAN).
Done.

>15. Sec 5.3.1: Can we add an ASN.1 comment to say the enumerated value #7 is
Done.

>mixes SAN and IAN, but assumed the 2nd sentence addressed SAN.
Section 4.1.2.6 already very clearly states under what circumstances a 
non-empty DN is required.  I don't think that information needs to be 
repeated here.

>Alternative names in certificates issued by the CA.
While this statement is certainly true, I don't understand the need to 
include it in section 4.2.1.6.  Is there any reason that readers of 
3280bis would believe that any certificate that includes an 
issuerAltName extension would also need to include a subjectAltName 
extension?

>not checked during the certificate path validation algorithm in section 6.
The following was added to section 4.2.1.7:

      Issuer alternative names are not processed as part of the 
certification path
      validation algorithm in section 6. (That is, issuer alternative 
names are not
      used in name chaining and name constraints are not enforced.)

---

From: "Turner, Sean P." <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2006 10:03:50 -0400

David comments in-line.  I snipped out the ones that you accepted or you
resolved. 
------------------

> >4. Sec 4 1st para last sentence: remove required to support 
> a PKI.  All 
> >of the internet defined extensions are optional so they can't be 
> >required to support a PKI for the internet community.
> >  
> >
> The full sentence is "This section also defines private 
> extensions required to support a PKI for the Internet 
> community."  These extensions (authorityInfoAccess an 
> subjectInfoAccess) are needed even though it is not necessary 
> to include them in all certificates. 

Exactly - they are needed but not required. I still think the sentence ought
to read: This section also defines extension to support the PKI for the
internet community.  There's no need to say required. 
 
> >6. Sec 4.2.1.2: Can we suggest using something other than 
> SHA-1 for key 
> >id generation? How about striking SHA-1 from the methods and 
> adding the 
> >new sentence to both: The hash algorithm employed can be the same 
> >algorithm paired with the signature algorithm (e.g., SHA-1, 
> SHA-256, SHA-384).
> >  
> >
> Section 4.2.1.2 simply states that the two methods described 
> are two common methods for generating key identifiers.  The 
> text explicitly does not restrict CAs to using these methods.

This one didn't come across very well. I know there's no security issue and
there are just examples but sometimes people just implement the examples and
we end up getting stuck with those. Further I'm trying to avoid silly things
like somebody saying I won't use a spec that has SHA1 and they don't
understand that they're only examples.

> instead of SHA-1.  There are no security issues associated 
> with key identifiers, so it would seem that using a hash 
> algorithm with a longer output would just make the 
> certificates larger.

I wasn't clear with the use any hash algorithm part. I think the example
should still indicate that a 160bit output is used with whatever hash
algorithm is used. So for logner hash outputs they only use 160bits of it.
It doesn't matter which bits as long as the CA is consistent.
 
> >7. Sec 4.2.1.6/4.1.2.6: The 2nd paragraph of 4.2.1.6 points out that 
> >since the SAN is bound to the public key that the CA MUST verify the 
> >each part of the SAN. I think a similar statement ought to 
> be added to 
> >the subject section (4.1.2.6) to indicate that "All parts of the 
> >subject name MUST be verified by the CA as it is bound to 
> the public key".
> >  
> >
> It is my understanding the the statement in 4.2.1.6 was added 
> because there were cases in which CAs were verifying the name 
> they included in the subject field but not names included in 
> the subjectAltName extension.  Are you aware of a similar 
> problem with the subject field?

No.  It was a motherhood and apple pie statement.
 
> >defined in this spec but MAY be defined in another spec. 
> Sounds to me 
> >like it would be hard to convince a customer that you could write a 
> >name constraints that can ever be 3280bis compliant since 
> whatever you 
> >wrote MUST NOT be imposed/implemented. It's not clear that the name 
> >constraints shouldn't be imposed because they're not defined in the 
> >spec or whether they should never ever be imposed.
> >  
> >
> 3280bis states:
> 
> A CA conforming to 3280bis MUST NOT impose name constraints 
> on the x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms. 
>  Period.  
> However, just as [SRVSAN] specifies the syntax and semantics 
> for name constraints on the SRVName name form, other 
> documents could specify the syntax and semantics for name 
> constraints on other name forms.  Given that 3280bis forbids 
> conforming CAs from imposing name constraints on the 
> x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms, it 
> would seem to be inappropriate for another PKIX (or even 
> IETF) document to specify syntax and semantics for name 
> constraints on ediPartyName or registeredID name forms, but 
> 3280bis is just one profile of X.509.  A different profile of 
> X.509 may permit the specification of name constraints on 
> these name forms and may specify the syntax and semantics for 
> imposing constraints on those name forms.  While 3280bis 
> states that conforming CAs MUST NOT impose name constraints 
> on these name forms, conforming relying parties are permitted 
> to implement the ability to process name constraints on these 
> name forms since conforming relying parties are not 
> restricted to only accepting certificates that are issued in 
> conformance with 3280bis.

I don't understand why these name forms were specifically picked out. For
x400Address I assume it's that nobody cares, but you could easily write a
rule that said the OR Address attributes (just like DNs) must be within the
ones included. I write the rules if we decide we need them. For registeredId
I get that it's an OID so there's structure to it so it's imposible to write
rules but why couldn't somebody decide to carve up an OID tree and say
something like make sure the 1st 6 components of the OID are present in all
names. For the ediPartyName you could say the nameAssigner must be present
in all PKCs.

If there is no way I can say with a straight face that a CA that requires a
name constraints for x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID is
compliant, I've got a problem with this what it says because being compliant
with RFC3280 is the gold standard; besides I think the rules are easy enough
to write I don't understand why these particular name forms were omitted
(there may be good reasons I'm unaware of).
 
> >constraints on x400Address name forms but the last sentence 
> in the 10th 
> >para last says X400Address MUST be applied to x.400 
> addresses. See #8.
> >  
> >
> x400Address name form, a conforming relying party MAY 
> implement the ability to process  such constraints.  As with 
> any other name form, if a certificate includes name 
> constraint on the x400Address name form and a subsequent 
> certificate in the certification path includes a 
> subjectAltName extension with an x400Address name, the 
> relying party MUST either process the constraint or reject 
> the certification path.

See above.
 
> >onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE. 
> >Additionally, recommend adding the following for 
> completeness as a new 
> >last paragraph: "If the scope of the CRL only includes attribute 
> >certificates then the onlyContainsAttributeCerts MUST be set to TRUE 
> >and both onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts MUST 
> be set to FALSE."
> >  
> >
> This sentence was really meant to say that 
> onlyContainsAttributeCerts MUST be set to FALSE in all cases, 
> not just when either onlyContainsUserCerts or 
> onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE.  In order to make this 
> more clear, the sentence about onlyContainsAttributeCerts has 
> been moved to the end of the paragraph and now reads:
> 
>       Conforming CRLs issuers MUST set the 
> onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean
>       to FALSE.

Are we not addressing the case when the CRL is only for attribute
certificates?

> >16. Sec 4.2.1.6 1st para: r These identities may be included in 
> >addition to or in the place of the identity/These identities may be 
> >included in addition to or in the place of, in the case of 
> non-CAs, the 
> >identity.  The paragraph mixes SAN and IAN, but assumed the 
> 2nd sentence addressed SAN.
> >  
> >
> Section 4.1.2.6 already very clearly states under what 
> circumstances a non-empty DN is required.  I don't think that 
> information needs to be repeated here.

I'm only hoping to clarify the 1st paragraph. It's unclear whether the
"these" refers to SAN or IAN after a couple of reads of the 1st para since
IAN is thrown in later in the paragraph.  If you add the ", in the case of
non-CAs," it's clear that the 2nd sentence refers to the SAN. 

> >17. Sec 4.2.1.6: Add the following to clarify that there is no 
> >dependency in this spec between SAN and IAN: This 
> specification places 
> >no requirement on CAs, whose certificate includes Issuer Alterative 
> >name, to include Subject Alternative names in certificates 
> issued by the CA.
> >  
> >
> While this statement is certainly true, I don't understand 
> the need to include it in section 4.2.1.6.  Is there any 
> reason that readers of 3280bis would believe that any 
> certificate that includes an issuerAltName extension would 
> also need to include a subjectAltName extension?

I'm only trying to protect against something silly like somebody who assumes
that the issuer/subject fields are in all PKCs then IAN/SAN ought to be in
all certificate too. An explicit indication that there is no requirement to
include one if the other is present removes any doubt.

spt 

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Turner, Sean P." <[email-masked]>
To: "'David A. Cooper'" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "'pkix'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2006 10:03:50 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Sender: [email-masked]

David comments in-line.  I snipped out the ones that you accepted or you
resolved. 
------------------

> >4. Sec 4 1st para last sentence: remove required to support 
> a PKI.  All 
> >of the internet defined extensions are optional so they can't be 
> >required to support a PKI for the internet community.
> >  
> >
> The full sentence is "This section also defines private 
> extensions required to support a PKI for the Internet 
> community."  These extensions (authorityInfoAccess an 
> subjectInfoAccess) are needed even though it is not necessary 
> to include them in all certificates. 

Exactly - they are needed but not required. I still think the sentence ought
to read: This section also defines extension to support the PKI for the
internet community.  There's no need to say required. 
 
> >6. Sec 4.2.1.2: Can we suggest using something other than 
> SHA-1 for key 
> >id generation? How about striking SHA-1 from the methods and 
> adding the 
> >new sentence to both: The hash algorithm employed can be the same 
> >algorithm paired with the signature algorithm (e.g., SHA-1, 
> SHA-256, SHA-384).
> >  
> >
> Section 4.2.1.2 simply states that the two methods described 
> are two common methods for generating key identifiers.  The 
> text explicitly does not restrict CAs to using these methods.

This one didn't come across very well. I know there's no security issue and
there are just examples but sometimes people just implement the examples and
we end up getting stuck with those. Further I'm trying to avoid silly things
like somebody saying I won't use a spec that has SHA1 and they don't
understand that they're only examples.

> instead of SHA-1.  There are no security issues associated 
> with key identifiers, so it would seem that using a hash 
> algorithm with a longer output would just make the 
> certificates larger.

I wasn't clear with the use any hash algorithm part. I think the example
should still indicate that a 160bit output is used with whatever hash
algorithm is used. So for logner hash outputs they only use 160bits of it.
It doesn't matter which bits as long as the CA is consistent.
 
> >7. Sec 4.2.1.6/4.1.2.6: The 2nd paragraph of 4.2.1.6 points out that 
> >since the SAN is bound to the public key that the CA MUST verify the 
> >each part of the SAN. I think a similar statement ought to 
> be added to 
> >the subject section (4.1.2.6) to indicate that "All parts of the 
> >subject name MUST be verified by the CA as it is bound to 
> the public key".
> >  
> >
> It is my understanding the the statement in 4.2.1.6 was added 
> because there were cases in which CAs were verifying the name 
> they included in the subject field but not names included in 
> the subjectAltName extension.  Are you aware of a similar 
> problem with the subject field?

No.  It was a motherhood and apple pie statement.
 
> >defined in this spec but MAY be defined in another spec. 
> Sounds to me 
> >like it would be hard to convince a customer that you could write a 
> >name constraints that can ever be 3280bis compliant since 
> whatever you 
> >wrote MUST NOT be imposed/implemented. It's not clear that the name 
> >constraints shouldn't be imposed because they're not defined in the 
> >spec or whether they should never ever be imposed.
> >  
> >
> 3280bis states:
> 
> A CA conforming to 3280bis MUST NOT impose name constraints 
> on the x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms. 
>  Period.  
> However, just as [SRVSAN] specifies the syntax and semantics 
> for name constraints on the SRVName name form, other 
> documents could specify the syntax and semantics for name 
> constraints on other name forms.  Given that 3280bis forbids 
> conforming CAs from imposing name constraints on the 
> x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms, it 
> would seem to be inappropriate for another PKIX (or even 
> IETF) document to specify syntax and semantics for name 
> constraints on ediPartyName or registeredID name forms, but 
> 3280bis is just one profile of X.509.  A different profile of 
> X.509 may permit the specification of name constraints on 
> these name forms and may specify the syntax and semantics for 
> imposing constraints on those name forms.  While 3280bis 
> states that conforming CAs MUST NOT impose name constraints 
> on these name forms, conforming relying parties are permitted 
> to implement the ability to process name constraints on these 
> name forms since conforming relying parties are not 
> restricted to only accepting certificates that are issued in 
> conformance with 3280bis.

I don't understand why these name forms were specifically picked out. For
x400Address I assume it's that nobody cares, but you could easily write a
rule that said the OR Address attributes (just like DNs) must be within the
ones included. I write the rules if we decide we need them. For registeredId
I get that it's an OID so there's structure to it so it's imposible to write
rules but why couldn't somebody decide to carve up an OID tree and say
something like make sure the 1st 6 components of the OID are present in all
names. For the ediPartyName you could say the nameAssigner must be present
in all PKCs.

If there is no way I can say with a straight face that a CA that requires a
name constraints for x400Address, ediPartyName, or registeredID is
compliant, I've got a problem with this what it says because being compliant
with RFC3280 is the gold standard; besides I think the rules are easy enough
to write I don't understand why these particular name forms were omitted
(there may be good reasons I'm unaware of).
 
> >constraints on x400Address name forms but the last sentence 
> in the 10th 
> >para last says X400Address MUST be applied to x.400 
> addresses. See #8.
> >  
> >
> x400Address name form, a conforming relying party MAY 
> implement the ability to process  such constraints.  As with 
> any other name form, if a certificate includes name 
> constraint on the x400Address name form and a subsequent 
> certificate in the certification path includes a 
> subjectAltName extension with an x400Address name, the 
> relying party MUST either process the constraint or reject 
> the certification path.

See above.
 
> >onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE. 
> >Additionally, recommend adding the following for 
> completeness as a new 
> >last paragraph: "If the scope of the CRL only includes attribute 
> >certificates then the onlyContainsAttributeCerts MUST be set to TRUE 
> >and both onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts MUST 
> be set to FALSE."
> >  
> >
> This sentence was really meant to say that 
> onlyContainsAttributeCerts MUST be set to FALSE in all cases, 
> not just when either onlyContainsUserCerts or 
> onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE.  In order to make this 
> more clear, the sentence about onlyContainsAttributeCerts has 
> been moved to the end of the paragraph and now reads:
> 
>       Conforming CRLs issuers MUST set the 
> onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean
>       to FALSE.

Are we not addressing the case when the CRL is only for attribute
certificates?

> >16. Sec 4.2.1.6 1st para: r These identities may be included in 
> >addition to or in the place of the identity/These identities may be 
> >included in addition to or in the place of, in the case of 
> non-CAs, the 
> >identity.  The paragraph mixes SAN and IAN, but assumed the 
> 2nd sentence addressed SAN.
> >  
> >
> Section 4.1.2.6 already very clearly states under what 
> circumstances a non-empty DN is required.  I don't think that 
> information needs to be repeated here.

I'm only hoping to clarify the 1st paragraph. It's unclear whether the
"these" refers to SAN or IAN after a couple of reads of the 1st para since
IAN is thrown in later in the paragraph.  If you add the ", in the case of
non-CAs," it's clear that the 2nd sentence refers to the SAN. 

> >17. Sec 4.2.1.6: Add the following to clarify that there is no 
> >dependency in this spec between SAN and IAN: This 
> specification places 
> >no requirement on CAs, whose certificate includes Issuer Alterative 
> >name, to include Subject Alternative names in certificates 
> issued by the CA.
> >  
> >
> While this statement is certainly true, I don't understand 
> the need to include it in section 4.2.1.6.  Is there any 
> reason that readers of 3280bis would believe that any 
> certificate that includes an issuerAltName extension would 
> also need to include a subjectAltName extension?

I'm only trying to protect against something silly like somebody who assumes
that the issuer/subject fields are in all PKCs then IAN/SAN ought to be in
all certificate too. An explicit indication that there is no requirement to
include one if the other is present removes any doubt.

spt 

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Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2006 16:32:57 +0100
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------=_NextPart_000_0012_94DF94B0.895253EE--

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-04.txt 
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 15:50:01 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
	Author(s)	: D. Cooper, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-04.txt
	Pages		: 141
	Date		: 2006-6-27
	
This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate
   revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet.  An overview of this
   approach and model are provided as an introduction.  The X.509 v3
   certificate format is described in detail, with additional
   information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name
   forms.  Standard certificate extensions are described and two
   Internet-specific extensions are defined.  A set of required
   certificate extensions is specified.  The X.509 v2 CRL format is
   described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific
   extensions.  An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is
   described.  An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the
   appendices.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-04.txt

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ENCODING mime
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--NextPart--

Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 15:28:15 -0400
To: "Manger, James H" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: SRV Name: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt: typos, examples
Sender: [email-masked]

James:

>8. Appendix A.  Are the modules names supposed to end with "..SAN88" and
>"..SAN93", or is it supposed to be "..ASN88" and "..ASN93"?

I was thinking "Subject Alt Name" when I used "SAN" in the name.

Russ 

Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 15:25:39 -0400
To: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>, "Manger, James H" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: SRV Name: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt: typos, examples
Sender: [email-masked]

Stefan:

>5. Why bother with the (SIZE (1..MAX)) restriction?  Delete it.
>
><Stefan> It seems to be the custom to use it. I don't feel enough of an
>ASN.1 expert to have the correct answer. Someone else may have an
>opinon. I'll be happy to remove it as long as it works.

This is used to indicate that a string, set, or sequence cannot have 
zero elements.

Russ

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-27.txt 
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 18:50:01 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-27.txt
	Pages		: 84
	Date		: 2006-6-26
	
SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
   certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
   validation (e.g. making sure that none of the certificates in the
   path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
   which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
   of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
   policies.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-27.txt

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	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
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	access-type="mail-server";
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Content-ID:	<[email-masked]>

ENCODING mime
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--OtherAccess
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	name="draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-27.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
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--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--

Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 16:20:50 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
CC: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

Done.

Done.

3280bis states:

Done.

Done.

>Issuer Alternative name in CRLs issued by the CA.

Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 15:21:52 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-04.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

All,

On Friday, I submitted draft 4 of 3280bis for posting.  A diff file 
highlighting the changes between drafts 3 and 4 is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/draft3280bis-03todraft3280bis-04_diff.html.

Draft 4 includes the following changes:

1. References to RFCs were updated as follows:
           RFC 2247 replaced with RFC 4519
           RFC 2253  replaced with RFC 4514
           RFC 2252 replaced with RFC 4512
           RFC 2255 replaced with RFC 4516
           RFC 2510 replaced with RFC 4210
           RFC 2587 replaced with RFC 4523
           draft-ietf-ldapbis-strprep-07.txt replaced with RFC  4518

2. All references to RFC 3279 now mention RFC 4055 and RFC 4491 as well. 
(All three RFCs are listed as informative references.)

3. Section 4.2.1.6 (subjectAltName):  Reference to section 7.5 clarified 
to note that the section addresses email addresses that contain 
internationalized domain names rather than internationalized email 
addresses.

4. Section 4.2.1.7 (issuerAltName): Text added to clarify that the 
issuerAltName extension is not processed during certification path 
validation (i.e., it is not used in name chaining and name constraints 
are not enforced).

5. Section 4.2.1.10 (nameConstraints):  Clarified that for DNS names, 
"host.example.com" is a match for the constraint "host.example.com".  
Also clarified that constraints of on the directoryName name form are 
not applied to the subject field if the subject contains an empty DN.

6. Section 7 (Processing Rules for Internationalized Names):  made 
changes based on comments from Kurt Zeilenga.

7. Numerous minor typographic and syntactic errors were corrected.

Dave

Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 14:51:08 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-27.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

All,

On Friday, I submitted draft 27 of SCVP for posting.  It contains the 
updated references mentioned below, but no other changes.  A diff file 
comparing drafts 26 and 27 is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/wdiff_draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26_to_27.html.

Dave

David A. Cooper wrote:

> Seth Hitchings wrote:
>
>> Should the CMS reference in section 11.1 be updated to RFC 3852? 
>>
> Seth,
>
> Yes.  I believe that the [CMS] reference should be updated from 3369 
> to 3852.  Also, the [UTF8] reference should be updated from 2279 to 
> 3629 and the [IKE] reference should be updated from 2409 to 4306.
>
> Updating the [UTF8] and [IKE] should only affect the References section.
>
> Updating the [CMS] reference will also require changing the ASN.1 in 
> section 8 so that ContentInfo is imported from the 
> CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 module rather than the 
> CryptographicMessageSyntax, but I don't think that should cause any 
> problems.
>
> Dave

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2006 13:09:53 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Brad Hards" <[email-masked]>, "Sharon Boeyen" <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Personally I feel positive about such initiative even though I fear the
volume of debates it might cause. I would like to hear the rest of the
WG on this.

I do acknowledge that we are facing practical problems out there that
the standard can't solve today.

Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Brad Hards
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 14:03
To: Sharon Boeyen
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

On Friday 23 June 2006 21:12 pm, Sharon Boeyen wrote:
> There should not be any escape clause in 3280bis for any
non-conformant
> behavior. 3280bis is a profile of X.509 - it is not a narrative to
describe
> various types of non-conformant behavior, regardless of what it is.
Perhaps there might be a role for an Informational RFC that explains the

various issues that are a source of concern. Ideally it would provide
some 
guidance on how to deal with the non-conformant behaviour. At the very
least 
it could explain the consequences of particular courses of action.

Brad

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2006 13:04:50 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Sharon Boeyen" <[email-masked]>, "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69786.668350C3
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	charset="us-ascii"
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Sharon,

=20

I fully agree. We should not describe any non conformant behavior. I
hope you haven't interpreted my question in that manner.

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 13:12
To: Stefan Santesson; Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

There should not be any escape clause in 3280bis for any non-conformant
behavior. 3280bis is a profile of X.509 - it is not a narrative to
describe various types of non-conformant behavior, regardless of what it
is.=20

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 5:28 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Santosh,

	=20

	Yes, you are correct that the path will validate without any
error in your example.=20

	It will also have an empty set of valid policies. So accepting
the EE certificate policies as valid (using that path) do require some
kind of non-conformant policy checking.

	=20

	I agree on your conclusion. However I have experienced
implementers not feeling sure about this principle. Especially when it
comes to configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and not
just some mode switch in the OS.

	The escape clause in pki4ipsic was driven by this uncertainty.

	=20

	=20

	Stefan Santesson

	Senior Program Manager

	Windows Security, Standards

=09
________________________________

	From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
	Sent: den 23 juni 2006 02:48
	To: Stefan Santesson; [email-masked]
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	=20

	Stefan,

	=20

	On disagree with you on 2.  You seem to be asking for 2 and then
saying that it is not valid.

	=20

	A path validation profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require
explicit policy") with setting acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is
valid X.509 and 3280 configuration.  In that case, there will not be a
policy failure and relying party can always make additional checks.  I
encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of X.509.  If you see
any errors in Annex J, please let me know.

	=20

	As to Standard compliant implementation putting itself in
non-compliant mode, that is always acceptable.  In that mode it will NOT
be standard compliant; that is all.

=09
________________________________

	From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 8:39 PM
	To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	=20

	Santosh,

	=20

	There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic
solution to the problem.

	=20

	1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to
policy processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems
with EKU settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new
applications and usages.

	2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end
certificate, that policy will not be valid unless supported by the path,
regardless if policy constraints was set or not.

	=20

	In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do
the job. In the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a
new application fit into an existing infrastructure-

	=20

	The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation
allow configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation
process, or does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

	=20

	=20

	Stefan Santesson

	Senior Program Manager

	Windows Security, Standards

=09
________________________________

	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
	Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
	To: [email-masked]
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	=20

	Stefan,

	=20

	I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

	=20

	I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

	=20

	You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The
basic premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

	=20

	Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the
result you seek.

=09
________________________________

	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Guida, Richard
[JJCUS]
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
	To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	=20

	Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing
that stops a relying party from writing software that would perform
processing extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying
party can choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such
non-compliance only puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that
is a "good thing" relatively speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems
to me that Sharon is absolutely correct (assuming she and I are
interpreting your proposal properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this
would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.  And so it should be
treated as such.  Very best regards -- Rich

	=20

	=20

	=20

	Richard A. Guida=20
	Director, Information Security=20

	Johnson & Johnson=20
	Room GS8217=20
	410 George Street=20
	New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
	Phone:  732 524 3785=20

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
		Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
		To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I
strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because
this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

		=20

		My understanding of your comment is that the escape
clause would enable a path validation engine to process the certificate
policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding?=20

		=20

		If it is a correct understanding, then any such
implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509
and as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional
elements but cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

		=20

		Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

		=20

		Cheers,

		Sharon

			-----Original Message-----
			From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
			Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
			To: [email-masked]
			Cc: Stephen Kent
			Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape
clause

			As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would
like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic
they deploy on certificate validation.

			=20

			The background is the fact that many deployed
PKIs are misconfigured.2

			One such common misconfiguration is assignment
of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

			X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

			=20

			Application wanting to use certificate policies
in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification
could be reasonable if the security implications has been well though
through.

			However it is not clear if an implementation
allowing such local configuration could be regarded as standard
compliant.

			=20

			There are more examples where deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

			=20

			The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX WG.

			=20

			The result was that the pki4ipsec profile
included an escape clause as follows:

			=20

			4.1.  X.509 Certificates
			=20
			   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with
certificates have often had little
			   control over the capabilities of CAs
available to them.
			   Implementations of this specification may
include configuration knobs
			   to disable checks required by this
specification in orde!
			 r t
			 o permit
			   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
			   certificates exist for a specific reason
involving the security of
			   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks
MUST be enabled by default.
			   Administrators and users ought to understand
the security purpose for
			   the various checks, and be clear on what
security will be lost by
			   disabling the check.

			=20

			=20

			I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification
that clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

			At least I think it is necessary to clearly
allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as long as
this is not the default functionality.

			=20

			=20

			Stefan Santesson

			Senior Program Manager

			Windows Security, Standards

		=09
________________________________

			From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
			Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
			To: [email-masked]
			Subject: last call for 3280bis

			=20

			Folks,

			=20

			Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I
am initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

			=20

			The last call will last for two weeks. In
deference to the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is
a holiday for many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

			=20

			Steve

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:navy'>Sharon</span></font></st1:place></st1:City><font size=3D2
color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I fully agree. We should not =
describe any
non conformant behavior. I hope you haven&#8217;t interpreted my =
question in
that manner.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 23 juni 2006 =
13:12<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson; =
Santosh
Chokhani; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>There should not be any escape =
clause in
3280bis for any non-conformant behavior. 3280bis is a profile of X.509 - =
it is
not a narrative to describe various types of non-conformant behavior,
regardless of what it is.</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Friday, June 23, =
2006 5:28
AM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Yes, you are correct that the path =
will
validate without any error in your example. =
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It will also have an empty set of =
valid
policies. So accepting the EE certificate policies as valid (using that =
path)
do require some kind of non-conformant policy =
checking.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree on your conclusion. However =
I have
experienced implementers not feeling sure about this principle. =
Especially when
it comes to configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and =
not just
some mode switch in the OS.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The escape clause in pki4ipsic was =
driven
by this uncertainty.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Santosh Chokhani
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 23 juni 2006 =
02:48<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>On disagree with you on 2. =
&nbsp;You seem
to be asking for 2 and then saying that it is not =
valid.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>A path validation profile (assuming =
we
agree to ignore &quot;require explicit policy&quot;) with setting =
acceptable policy
set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and 3280 configuration. &nbsp;In that =
case,
there will not be a policy failure and relying party can always make =
additional
checks. &nbsp;I encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of =
X.509.
&nbsp;If you see any errors in Annex J, please let me =
know.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As to Standard compliant =
implementation
putting itself in non-compliant mode, that is always acceptable. =
&nbsp;In that
mode it will NOT be standard compliant; that is =
all.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Stefan Santesson
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 8:39
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are 2 distinct reasons why =
your
approach is not a generic solution to the =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in'><font =
size=3D2
color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>1)</span></font><font size=3D1 color=3Dnavy><span =
style=3D'font-size:
7.0pt;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with =
EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications =
and
usages.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in'><font =
size=3D2
color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>2)</span></font><font size=3D1 color=3Dnavy><span =
style=3D'font-size:
7.0pt;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, =
that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if =
policy
constraints was set or not.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In the perfect world, compliant =
path
processing will always do the job. In the real world, you may need to =
tweak the
rules to make a new application fit into an existing =
infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The question is still: Can a =
standards
compliant implementation allow configuration of non conformant =
modifications to
the validation process, or does that make the implementation as a whole =
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Santosh Chokhani<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a
long-held view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or
business argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless =
field.
&nbsp;A relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. =
&nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &quot;state&quot; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard =
[JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment
correctly I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be =
added
because this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt" styl!><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69786.668350C3--

From: Brad Hards <[email-masked]>
To: Sharon Boeyen <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 22:02:43 +1000
Cc: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

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On Friday 23 June 2006 21:12 pm, Sharon Boeyen wrote:
> There should not be any escape clause in 3280bis for any non-conformant
> behavior. 3280bis is a profile of X.509 - it is not a narrative to descri=
be
> various types of non-conformant behavior, regardless of what it is.
Perhaps there might be a role for an Informational RFC that explains the=20
various issues that are a source of concern. Ideally it would provide some=
=20
guidance on how to deal with the non-conformant behaviour. At the very leas=
t=20
it could explain the consequences of particular courses of action.

Brad

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 04:44:17 -0700
From: "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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	charset="us-ascii"
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Stefan,

=20

We seem to be converging.

=20

The way the relying party should see it and that is why I find the path
processing to be compliant with X.509 and 3280 is as follows:

=20

The path is good for no policies.  The relying party accepts a path that
is not good for any policy and makes an additional check (which the
standards permit) to see if the end certificate has the desired policy.

=20

I hope this clarifies the standard compliance.

________________________________

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 5:28 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Santosh,

=20

Yes, you are correct that the path will validate without any error in
your example.=20

It will also have an empty set of valid policies. So accepting the EE
certificate policies as valid (using that path) do require some kind of
non-conformant policy checking.

=20

I agree on your conclusion. However I have experienced implementers not
feeling sure about this principle. Especially when it comes to
configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and not just some
mode switch in the OS.

The escape clause in pki4ipsic was driven by this uncertainty.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 02:48
To: Stefan Santesson; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

On disagree with you on 2.  You seem to be asking for 2 and then saying
that it is not valid.

=20

A path validation profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require explicit
policy") with setting acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509
and 3280 configuration.  In that case, there will not be a policy
failure and relying party can always make additional checks.  I
encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of X.509.  If you see
any errors in Annex J, please let me know.

=20

As to Standard compliant implementation putting itself in non-compliant
mode, that is always acceptable.  In that mode it will NOT be standard
compliant; that is all.

________________________________

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 8:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Santosh,

=20

There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic solution
to the problem.

=20

1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with
EKU settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new
applications and usages.

2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if
policy constraints was set or not.

=20

In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do the job.
In the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a new
application fit into an existing infrastructure-

=20

The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow
configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation process,
or does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

=20

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

=20

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic
premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

=20

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>We seem to be =
converging.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The way the relying party should =
see it
and that is why I find the path processing to be compliant with X.509 =
and 3280
is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The path is good for no =
policies.&nbsp; The
relying party accepts a path that is not good for any policy and makes =
an
additional check (which the standards permit) to see if the end =
certificate has
the desired policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I hope this clarifies the standard
compliance.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Stefan Santesson
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Friday, June 23, =
2006 5:28
AM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Yes, you are correct that the path =
will
validate without any error in your example. =
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It will also have an empty set of =
valid
policies. So accepting the EE certificate policies as valid (using that =
path)
do require some kind of non-conformant policy =
checking.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree on your conclusion. However =
I have
experienced implementers not feeling sure about this principle. =
Especially when
it comes to configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and =
not just
some mode switch in the OS.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The escape clause in pki4ipsic was =
driven
by this uncertainty.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Santosh Chokhani
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 23 juni 2006 =
02:48<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>On disagree with you on 2. =
&nbsp;You seem
to be asking for 2 and then saying that it is not =
valid.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>A path validation profile (assuming =
we
agree to ignore &#8220;require explicit policy&#8221;) with setting =
acceptable
policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and 3280 configuration. &nbsp;In =
that
case, there will not be a policy failure and relying party can always =
make
additional checks. &nbsp;I encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex =
J of
X.509. &nbsp;If you see any errors in Annex J, please let me =
know.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As to Standard compliant =
implementation
putting itself in non-compliant mode, that is always acceptable. =
&nbsp;In that
mode it will NOT be standard compliant; that is =
all.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Stefan Santesson
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 8:39
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are 2 distinct reasons why =
your
approach is not a generic solution to the =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo6'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with =
EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications =
and
usages.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo6'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, =
that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if =
policy
constraints was set or not.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In the perfect world, compliant =
path
processing will always do the job. In the real world, you may need to =
tweak the
rules to make a new application fit into an existing =
infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The question is still: Can a =
standards
compliant implementation allow configuration of non conformant =
modifications to
the validation process, or does that make the implementation as a whole
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Santosh Chokhani<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a =
long-held
view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or business
argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless field. =
&nbsp;A
relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. &nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &#8220;state&#8221; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard =
[JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment
correctly I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be =
added
because this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they deploy
on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C696BA.DCDC9215--

From: Sharon Boeyen <[email-masked]>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <[email-masked]>, Santosh Chokhani <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 07:12:13 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C696B5.8CC0B636
Content-Type: text/plain

There should not be any escape clause in 3280bis for any non-conformant
behavior. 3280bis is a profile of X.509 - it is not a narrative to describe
various types of non-conformant behavior, regardless of what it is. 
-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 5:28 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Santosh,

Yes, you are correct that the path will validate without any error in your
example. 

It will also have an empty set of valid policies. So accepting the EE
certificate policies as valid (using that path) do require some kind of
non-conformant policy checking.

I agree on your conclusion. However I have experienced implementers not
feeling sure about this principle. Especially when it comes to configuration
options enabled by an administrative UI and not just some mode switch in the
OS.

The escape clause in pki4ipsic was driven by this uncertainty.

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

  _____  

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 02:48
To: Stefan Santesson; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Stefan,

On disagree with you on 2.  You seem to be asking for 2 and then saying that
it is not valid.

A path validation profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require explicit
policy") with setting acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and
3280 configuration.  In that case, there will not be a policy failure and
relying party can always make additional checks.  I encourage you to look at
Section J.3 in Annex J of X.509.  If you see any errors in Annex J, please
let me know.

As to Standard compliant implementation putting itself in non-compliant
mode, that is always acceptable.  In that mode it will NOT be standard
compliant; that is all.

  _____  

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 8:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Santosh,

There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic solution to
the problem.

1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications and
usages.

2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if policy
constraints was set or not.

In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do the job. In
the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a new application
fit into an existing infrastructure-

The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow
configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation process, or
does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Stefan,

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party viewpoint.
This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and no one had
provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the require
explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can always set
acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require explicit policy)
flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.  Now, the user can
examine the end certificate policy.

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic premise is
that if some field in the last certificate only is of interest and the
"state" in the path validation process does not impact it, that need not be
path of path validation engine.

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops a
relying party from writing software that would perform processing extensions
only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes, that would not
be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to be non-compliant if
it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the relying party at risk, not
others - so that is a "good thing" relatively speaking.  But in the final
analysis, seems to me that Sharon is absolutely correct (assuming she and I
are interpreting your proposal properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this
would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated
as such.  Very best regards -- Rich

Richard A. Guida 
Director, Information Security 

Johnson & Johnson 
Room GS8217 
410 George Street 
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901 
Phone:  732 524 3785 

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On
Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such an
escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis
non-compliant with X.509. 

My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable a
path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA
certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct
understanding? 

If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is
non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate
certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but cannot reverse
the mandatory processing from X.509.

Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

Cheers,

Sharon

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question
whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying
parties to select what validation logic they deploy on certificate
validation.

The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2

One such common misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and
their inclusion in CA certificates.

X.509 path processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the
list of EE certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many
deployments have included pure CA certificate policies in CA certificates,
policies that are not included in any EE certificates and as such, policy
processing is not possible in such PKIs.

Application wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply
forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path processing rules.
For a relying party such modification could be reasonable if the security
implications has been well though through.

However it is not clear if an implementation allowing such local
configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

There are more examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs
would need similar measures to work.

The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and
this lead to an intense debate which included core participants from the
PKIX WG.

The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as
follows:

4.1.  X.509 Certificates
 
   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little
   control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.
   Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs
   to disable checks required by this specification in orde!
 r t
 o permit
   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.  However, all checks on
   certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of
   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.
   Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for
   the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by
   disabling the check.

I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape
clause or corresponding clarification that clearly allows local
configuration of the validation logic.

At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of
standards compliant applications as long as this is not the default
functionality.

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
To: [email-masked]
Subject: last call for 3280bis

Folks,

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call on
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile" (
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>
http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. Independence
Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many folks), all comments
must be received by July 5th.

Steve

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<BODY lang=3DEN-US vLink=3Dblue link=3Dblue>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D177290911-23062006><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>There 
should not be any escape clause in 3280bis for any non-conformant =
behavior.=20
3280bis is a profile of X.509 - it is not a narrative to describe =
various types=20
of non-conformant behavior, regardless of what it is.</FONT></SPAN>
<DIV></DIV><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2>-----Original =
Message-----<BR><B>From:</B>=20
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<B>On Behalf=20
Of </B>Stefan Santesson<BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, June 23, 2006 5:28=20
AM<BR><B>To:</B> Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]<BR><B>Subject:</B> =
RE: last=20
call for 3280bis - escape clause<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=3DSection1>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Santosh,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Yes, you =
are correct=20
  that the path will validate without any error in your example.=20
  <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">It will =
also have an=20
  empty set of valid policies. So accepting the EE certificate policies =
as valid=20
  (using that path) do require some kind of non-conformant policy=20
  checking.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I agree on =
your=20
  conclusion. However I have experienced implementers not feeling sure =
about=20
  this principle. Especially when it comes to configuration options =
enabled by=20
  an administrative UI and not just some mode switch in the=20
  OS.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The escape =
clause in=20
  pki4ipsic was driven by this =
uncertainty.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dmaroon =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan=20
  Santesson</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#400040 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Senior =
Program=20
  Manager</SPAN></FONT><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#400040 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Windows =
Security,=20
  Standards</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" =
align=3Dcenter><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2>
  </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20
  face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma"> Santosh=20
  Chokhani [mailto:[email-masked]] <BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> den 23 juni 2006 =
02:48<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> Stefan Santesson;=20
  [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">Subject:</SPAN></B>=20
  RE: last call for 3280bis - escape =
clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">On =
disagree with you=20
  on 2. &nbsp;You seem to be asking for 2 and then saying that it is =
not=20
  valid.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">A path =
validation=20
  profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require explicit policy") with =
setting=20
  acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and 3280 =
configuration.=20
  &nbsp;In that case, there will not be a policy failure and relying =
party can=20
  always make additional checks. &nbsp;I encourage you to look at =
Section J.3 in=20
  Annex J of X.509. &nbsp;If you see any errors in Annex J, please let =
me=20
  know.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">As to =
Standard=20
  compliant implementation putting itself in non-compliant mode, that =
is always=20
  acceptable. &nbsp;In that mode it will NOT be standard compliant; =
that is=20
  all.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" =
align=3Dcenter><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2>
  </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20
  face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma"> Stefan=20
  Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]] <BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Thursday, June 22, 2006 =
8:39=20
  PM<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> Santosh =
Chokhani;=20
  [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">Subject:</SPAN></B>=20
  RE: last call for 3280bis - escape =
clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Santosh,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">There are =
2 distinct=20
  reasons why your approach is not a generic solution to the=20
  problem.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal=20
  style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l1 =
level1 lfo4"><![if !supportLists]><FONT=20
  face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><SPAN=20
  style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">1)<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
  </SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3Dnavy=20
  size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">The=20
  problem is generic and does not only apply to policy processing. The =
pki4ipsec=20
  issue was e.g. motivated from problems with EKU settings in existing=20
  certificates that does not satisfy new applications and=20
  usages.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal=20
  style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l1 =
level1 lfo4"><![if !supportLists]><FONT=20
  face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><SPAN=20
  style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">2)<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
  </SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3Dnavy=20
  size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">If you=20
  need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that policy will =
not be=20
  valid unless supported by the path, regardless if policy constraints =
was set=20
  or not.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">In the =
perfect world,=20
  compliant path processing will always do the job. In the real world, =
you may=20
  need to tweak the rules to make a new application fit into an =
existing=20
  infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The =
question is=20
  still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow configuration =
of non=20
  conformant modifications to the validation process, or does that make =
the=20
  implementation as a whole =
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dmaroon =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan=20
  Santesson</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#400040 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Senior =
Program=20
  Manager</SPAN></FONT><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#400040 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Windows =
Security,=20
  Standards</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" =
align=3Dcenter><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2>
  </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20
  face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">=20
  [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Santosh =
Chokhani<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> =
[email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> RE: last call for =
3280bis -=20
  escape clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I agree =
with=20
  sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and =
Sharon.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I have a =
simple=20
  solution to your concern from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This =

  observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and no one had =
provided a=20
  convincing logical or business argument) that the require explicit =
policy=20
  setting is a useless field. &nbsp;A relying party can always set =
acceptable=20
  policies to none. &nbsp;In that scenario, (require explicit policy) =
flag not=20
  withstanding, path validation will succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can =
examine=20
  the end certificate policy.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">You and I =
have had=20
  this discussion in another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that =
if some=20
  field in the last certificate only is of interest and the "state" in =
the path=20
  validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path=20
  validation engine.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Thus, you =
can=20
  judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you=20
  seek.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" =
align=3Dcenter><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2>
  </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20
  face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">=20
  [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Guida, Richard=20
  [JJCUS]<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> =
Thursday, June=20
  22, 2006 2:48 PM<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">To:</SPAN></B> Sharon=20
  Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cc:</SPAN></B> Stephen Kent<BR><B><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> RE: last call for =
3280bis -=20
  escape clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan - =
perhaps I am=20
  missing something, but there is nothing that stops a relying party =
from=20
  writing software that would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only =
on CA=20
  certs as you propose.&nbsp; As <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City=20
  w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> properly notes, that would =
not be=20
  RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to be =
non-compliant if it=20
  wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance only puts the relying party at =
risk, not=20
  others - so that is&nbsp;a "good thing" relatively speaking.&nbsp; =
But in the=20
  final analysis, seems to me that <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City=20
  w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is absolutely correct =
(assuming she=20
  and I are interpreting your proposal properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is =

  redefined, this would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.&nbsp; =
And so it=20
  should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; Very best regards --=20
  Rich</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P><B><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Richard A.=20
  Guida</SPAN></FONT></B> <BR><B><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Director,=20
  Information Security</SPAN></FONT></B> <o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><B><I><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" color=3Dred size=3D5><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 18pt; COLOR: red; FONT-STYLE: =
italic">Johnson=20
  &amp; Johnson</SPAN></FONT></I></B> <BR><FONT face=3DArial =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Room =
GS8217</SPAN></FONT>=20
  <BR><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">410 <st1:address=20
  w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'">=20
  <BR></SPAN></FONT><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State=20
  w:st=3D"on">New Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode=20
  w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></SPAN></FONT> =
<BR><FONT=20
  face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Phone:&nbsp; 732 524=20
  3785</SPAN></FONT> <o:p></o:p></P>
  <BLOCKQUOTE style=3D"MARGIN-TOP: 5pt; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 5pt; =
MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in">
    <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><FONT =
face=3DTahoma=20
    size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">-----Original=20
    Message-----<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">From:</SPAN></B>=20
    [email-masked] =
[mailto:[email-masked]]<B><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Sharon =
Boeyen<BR><B><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57=20
    PM<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> 'Stefan =
Santesson';=20
    [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">Cc:</SPAN></B>=20
    Stephen Kent<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> RE:=20
    last call for 3280bis - escape clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN =

    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan, =
if I=20
    understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such an escape =
clause=20
    cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis =
non-compliant=20
    with X.509. </SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN =

    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">My =
understanding of=20
    your comment is that the escape clause would enable a path =
validation engine=20
    to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but =
ignore=20
    those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct understanding?=20
    </SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN =

    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">If it is =
a correct=20
    understanding, then any such implementation is non-conformant to =
X.509. 3280=20
    is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate certain optional =
elements or=20
    exclude optional elements but cannot reverse the mandatory =
processing from=20
    X.509.</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN =

    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Apologies if I've=20
    misunderstood your question.</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN =

    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Cheers,</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on"><FONT face=3DArial=20
    color=3Dblue size=3D2><SPAN=20
    style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Sharon</SPAN></FONT></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <BLOCKQUOTE=20
      style=3D"MARGIN-TOP: 5pt; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 5pt; MARGIN-RIGHT: =
0in"><P=20
      class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><FONT =
face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma">-----Original=20
      Message-----<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">From:</SPAN></B>=20
      [email-masked] =
[mailto:[email-masked]]=20
      <B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of =
</SPAN></B>Stefan=20
      Santesson<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: =
bold">Sent:</SPAN></B>=20
      Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM<BR><B><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> =
[email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cc:</SPAN></B> Stephen =
Kent<BR><B><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> RE: last call for =
3280bis -=20
      escape clause</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">As a =
last call=20
      comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question whether =
RFC=20
      3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying =
parties=20
      to select what validation logic they deploy on certificate=20
      validation.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The =
background is=20
      the fact that many deployed PKIs are=20
      misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">One =
such common=20
      misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and their =
inclusion=20
      in CA certificates.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">X.509 =
path=20
      processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the =
list of EE=20
      certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many =
deployments have=20
      included pure CA certificate policies in CA certificates, =
policies that=20
      are not included in any EE certificates and as such, policy =
processing is=20
      not possible in such PKIs.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Application=20
      wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply forced =
to=20
      either fail or selectively neglect certain path processing rules. =
For a=20
      relying party such modification could be reasonable if the =
security=20
      implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">However it is not=20
      clear if an implementation allowing such local configuration =
could be=20
      regarded as standard compliant.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">There =
are more=20
      examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs would =
need=20
      similar measures to work.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The =
pki4ipsec WG=20
      recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and this =
lead to an=20
      intense debate which included core participants from the PKIX=20
      WG.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The =
result was=20
      that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as=20
      follows:<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier =
New" size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier =
New" size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier =
New" size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Users =
deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the =
capabilities of CAs available to =
them.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations =
of this specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks =
required by this specification in =
orde!<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> r =
t<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; use with =
inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates =
exist for a specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire =
system.&nbsp; Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators =
and users ought to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the various =
checks, and be clear on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt" styl!><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE></SPAN>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I'm =
basically=20
      asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape =
clause or=20
      corresponding clarification that clearly allows local =
configuration of the=20
      validation logic.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">At =
least I think=20
      it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of standards =
compliant=20
      applications as long as this is not the default=20
      functionality.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dnavy =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3Dmaroon =
size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Stefan=20
      Santesson</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
      style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#400040 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Senior Program=20
      Manager</SPAN></FONT><FONT color=3Dnavy><SPAN=20
      style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#400040 size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial">Windows=20
      Security, =
Standards</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
      <DIV>
      <DIV class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: center" =
align=3Dcenter><FONT=20
      face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
12pt">
      <HR tabIndex=3D-1 align=3Dcenter width=3D"100%" SIZE=3D2>
      </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT=20
      face=3DTahoma size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; =
FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma">=20
      [email-masked] =
[mailto:[email-masked]]=20
      <B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of =
</SPAN></B>Stephen=20
      Kent<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> den =
16 juni=20
      2006 22:42<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> =

      [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> last call for=20
      3280bis</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
12pt">Folks,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D3><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Based on the latest message from David =
Cooper, I=20
      am initiating last call on</SPAN></FONT><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> "Internet X.509 Public Key =
Infrastructure,=20
      Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)=20
      Profile"</SPAN></FONT><TT><FONT face=3D"Courier New" =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> (</SPAN></FONT></TT><A=20
      =
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.tx=
t"><FONT=20
      size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt<=
/SPAN></FONT></A><FONT=20
      size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">)</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
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      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">The last call will last for two weeks. =
In=20
      deference to the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July =
3rd is a=20
      holiday for many folks), all comments must be received by July=20
      5th.</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
      <DIV>
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      <DIV>
      <P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
      style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">Steve</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE>=
</DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: SRV Name: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt: typos, examples
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 10:54:26 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Manger, James H" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Thanks for the review James,

Comments in-line,

Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Manger, James H
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 06:50
To: [email-masked]
Subject: SRV Name: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt: typos, examples

Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt

1. Abstract, page 1, typo:
  "filed" -> "field"

<Stefan> Will be fixed

2. It would be nice if the full value of the id-on-dnsSRV object
identifier was provided in this document, without requiring a separate
lookup of RFC 3280. Add the following ASN.1 comment just above the id-on
definition in Appendix A.1 (page 8), Appendix A.2 (page 8) and section 2
"Name Definitions" (page 3):
  -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7}

<Stefan> OK

3. Include an example with an IDN so it is immediately obvious that
punycode is not used in an SRVName value.  Add the following after the
current example in section 2, page 4:

  Example:
  The "mail" service at na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net
  (an IDN, which becomes xn--nave-6pa.net when encoded as an IDNA)
  would use the following 15-character SRVName value:
    _mail.na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net
  Its 16-byte UTF-8 encoding is (in hex):
    5F 6D 61 69 6C 2E 6E 61 C3 AF 76 65 2E 6E 65 74

<Stefan> Thanks for providing the sample. Looks fine to me.

4. Appendix A.2 (page 9), glitch:
  "permanentIdentifier" -> "srvName"

<Stefan> OK I'm caught. Yes I borrowed some constructions from the PI
draft. Thought I got that fixed.

5. Why bother with the (SIZE (1..MAX)) restriction?  Delete it.

<Stefan> It seems to be the custom to use it. I don't feel enough of an
ASN.1 expert to have the correct answer. Someone else may have an
opinon. I'll be happy to remove it as long as it works.

6. SRVName is defined (in section 2) to have the form _Service.Name.
The very next section violates that definition by allowing SRVName to
hold just a service name or just a domain name.  The syntax to hold a
name is not necessarily the same syntax required to hold a matching rule
for that name.  This is a general fault with the construction of the
nameConstraints extension so it does not need to be fixed in this
specification (I am just having a rant).

<Stefan> Yes, as you state yourself. The actual name in SAN and matching
data in name constraints have different syntax rules. Simply to avoid
definition of wildcards. I think its fin as it is.

7. Appendix A, page 7:
  "augmented with 1993 the UNIVERSAL Type" ->
  "augmented with the 1993 UNIVERSAL Type"

<Stefan> OK

8. Appendix A.  Are the modules names supposed to end with "..SAN88" and
"..SAN93", or is it supposed to be "..ASN88" and "..ASN93"?

<Stefan> The current names are the names assigned by Russ,

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of [email-masked]
Sent: Friday, 23 June 2006 8:50 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt 

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Subject Alternative Name for expression of service name
	Author(s)	: S. Santesson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt
	Pages		: 11
	Date		: 2006-6-22
	
This document defines a new name form for inclusion in the otherName
filed of an X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension which allows a
certificate subject to be associated with the service name and domain
name components of a DNS Service Resource Record.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 10:28:21 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C696A7.5F1E4C4B
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	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Santosh,

=20

Yes, you are correct that the path will validate without any error in
your example.=20

It will also have an empty set of valid policies. So accepting the EE
certificate policies as valid (using that path) do require some kind of
non-conformant policy checking.

=20

I agree on your conclusion. However I have experienced implementers not
feeling sure about this principle. Especially when it comes to
configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and not just some
mode switch in the OS.

The escape clause in pki4ipsic was driven by this uncertainty.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: den 23 juni 2006 02:48
To: Stefan Santesson; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

On disagree with you on 2.  You seem to be asking for 2 and then saying
that it is not valid.

=20

A path validation profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require explicit
policy") with setting acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509
and 3280 configuration.  In that case, there will not be a policy
failure and relying party can always make additional checks.  I
encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of X.509.  If you see
any errors in Annex J, please let me know.

=20

As to Standard compliant implementation putting itself in non-compliant
mode, that is always acceptable.  In that mode it will NOT be standard
compliant; that is all.

________________________________

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 8:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Santosh,

=20

There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic solution
to the problem.

=20

1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with
EKU settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new
applications and usages.

2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if
policy constraints was set or not.

=20

In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do the job.
In the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a new
application fit into an existing infrastructure-

=20

The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow
configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation process,
or does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

=20

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

=20

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic
premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

=20

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dblue>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Yes, you are correct that the path =
will validate
without any error in your example. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It will also have an empty set of =
valid
policies. So accepting the EE certificate policies as valid (using that =
path) do
require some kind of non-conformant policy =
checking.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree on your conclusion. However =
I have
experienced implementers not feeling sure about this principle. =
Especially when
it comes to configuration options enabled by an administrative UI and =
not just
some mode switch in the OS.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The escape clause in pki4ipsic was =
driven
by this uncertainty.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Santosh Chokhani
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 23 juni 2006 =
02:48<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>On disagree with you on 2. =
&nbsp;You seem
to be asking for 2 and then saying that it is not =
valid.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>A path validation profile (assuming =
we
agree to ignore &#8220;require explicit policy&#8221;) with setting =
acceptable
policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and 3280 configuration. &nbsp;In =
that
case, there will not be a policy failure and relying party can always =
make
additional checks. &nbsp;I encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex =
J of
X.509. &nbsp;If you see any errors in Annex J, please let me =
know.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As to Standard compliant =
implementation
putting itself in non-compliant mode, that is always acceptable. =
&nbsp;In that
mode it will NOT be standard compliant; that is =
all.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Stefan Santesson
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 8:39
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are 2 distinct reasons why =
your
approach is not a generic solution to the =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo4'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with =
EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications =
and
usages.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo4'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, =
that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if =
policy
constraints was set or not.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In the perfect world, compliant =
path
processing will always do the job. In the real world, you may need to =
tweak the
rules to make a new application fit into an existing =
infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The question is still: Can a =
standards
compliant implementation allow configuration of non conformant =
modifications to
the validation process, or does that make the implementation as a whole
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Santosh Chokhani<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a
long-held view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or
business argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless =
field.
&nbsp;A relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. =
&nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &#8220;state&#8221; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard =
[JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment
correctly I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be =
added
because this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C696A7.5F1E4C4B--

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: SRV Name: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt: typos, examples
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 14:49:51 +1000
From: "Manger, James H" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt

1. Abstract, page 1, typo:
  "filed" -> "field"

2. It would be nice if the full value of the id-on-dnsSRV object identifier was provided in this document, without requiring a separate lookup of RFC 3280. Add the following ASN.1 comment just above the id-on definition in Appendix A.1 (page 8), Appendix A.2 (page 8) and section 2 "Name Definitions" (page 3):
  -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7}

3. Include an example with an IDN so it is immediately obvious that punycode is not used in an SRVName value.  Add the following after the current example in section 2, page 4:

  Example:
  The "mail" service at na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net
  (an IDN, which becomes xn--nave-6pa.net when encoded as an IDNA)
  would use the following 15-character SRVName value:
    _mail.na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net
  Its 16-byte UTF-8 encoding is (in hex):
    5F 6D 61 69 6C 2E 6E 61 C3 AF 76 65 2E 6E 65 74

4. Appendix A.2 (page 9), glitch:
  "permanentIdentifier" -> "srvName"

5. Why bother with the (SIZE (1..MAX)) restriction?  Delete it.

6. SRVName is defined (in section 2) to have the form _Service.Name.  The very next section violates that definition by allowing SRVName to hold just a service name or just a domain name.  The syntax to hold a name is not necessarily the same syntax required to hold a matching rule for that name.  This is a general fault with the construction of the nameConstraints extension so it does not need to be fixed in this specification (I am just having a rant).

7. Appendix A, page 7:
  "augmented with 1993 the UNIVERSAL Type" ->
  "augmented with the 1993 UNIVERSAL Type"

8. Appendix A.  Are the modules names supposed to end with "..SAN88" and "..SAN93", or is it supposed to be "..ASN88" and "..ASN93"?

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of [email-masked]
Sent: Friday, 23 June 2006 8:50 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt 

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Alternative Name for expression of service name
	Author(s)	: S. Santesson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt
	Pages		: 11
	Date		: 2006-6-22
	
This document defines a new name form for inclusion in the otherName
filed of an X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension which allows a
certificate subject to be associated with the service name and domain
name components of a DNS Service Resource Record.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 17:47:35 -0700
From: "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>
To: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6965F.1CC1663D
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Stefan,

=20

On disagree with you on 2.  You seem to be asking for 2 and then saying
that it is not valid.

=20

A path validation profile (assuming we agree to ignore "require explicit
policy") with setting acceptable policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509
and 3280 configuration.  In that case, there will not be a policy
failure and relying party can always make additional checks.  I
encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of X.509.  If you see
any errors in Annex J, please let me know.

=20

As to Standard compliant implementation putting itself in non-compliant
mode, that is always acceptable.  In that mode it will NOT be standard
compliant; that is all.

________________________________

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 8:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Santosh,

=20

There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic solution
to the problem.

=20

1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with
EKU settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new
applications and usages.

2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if
policy constraints was set or not.

=20

In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do the job.
In the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a new
application fit into an existing infrastructure-

=20

The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow
configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation process,
or does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

=20

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

=20

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic
premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

=20

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>On disagree with you on 2. =
&nbsp;You seem to be
asking for 2 and then saying that it is not =
valid.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>A path validation profile (assuming =
we
agree to ignore &#8220;require explicit policy&#8221;) with setting =
acceptable
policy set to anyPolicy is valid X.509 and 3280 configuration. &nbsp;In =
that case,
there will not be a policy failure and relying party can always make =
additional
checks. &nbsp;I encourage you to look at Section J.3 in Annex J of =
X.509. &nbsp;If you
see any errors in Annex J, please let me =
know.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As to Standard compliant =
implementation
putting itself in non-compliant mode, that is always acceptable. =
&nbsp;In that mode
it will NOT be standard compliant; that is =
all.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Stefan Santesson
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 8:39
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Santosh Chokhani;
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are 2 distinct reasons why =
your
approach is not a generic solution to the =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo6'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with =
EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications =
and
usages.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo6'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, =
that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if =
policy
constraints was set or not.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In the perfect world, compliant =
path
processing will always do the job. In the real world, you may need to =
tweak the
rules to make a new application fit into an existing =
infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The question is still: Can a =
standards
compliant implementation allow configuration of non conformant =
modifications to
the validation process, or does that make the implementation as a whole
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Santosh Chokhani<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a
long-held view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or =
business
argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless field. =
&nbsp;A
relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. &nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &#8220;state&#8221; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard =
[JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that would
perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp; As <st1:place
w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> properly =
notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to =
be
non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance only puts the =
relying
party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a &quot;good thing&quot; =
relatively
speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems to me that <st1:place =
w:st=3D"on"><st1:City
 w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is absolutely correct =
(assuming she
and I are interpreting your proposal properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is
redefined, this would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.&nbsp; And =
so it
should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; Very best regards -- =
Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment
correctly I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be =
added
because this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many deployed
PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6965F.1CC1663D--

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 01:39:12 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6965D.732C5B0F
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Santosh,

=20

There are 2 distinct reasons why your approach is not a generic solution
to the problem.

=20

1)       The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with
EKU settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new
applications and usages.

2)       If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if
policy constraints was set or not.

=20

In the perfect world, compliant path processing will always do the job.
In the real world, you may need to tweak the rules to make a new
application fit into an existing infrastructure-

=20

The question is still: Can a standards compliant implementation allow
configuration of non conformant modifications to the validation process,
or does that make the implementation as a whole non-conformant.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 22:59
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan,

=20

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

=20

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

=20

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic
premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

=20

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are 2 distinct reasons why =
your
approach is not a generic solution to the =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

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size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>The problem is generic and does not only apply to policy
processing. The pki4ipsec issue was e.g. motivated from problems with =
EKU
settings in existing certificates that does not satisfy new applications =
and
usages.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo3'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>If you need to test for a policy in the end certificate, =
that
policy will not be valid unless supported by the path, regardless if =
policy constraints
was set or not.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In the perfect world, compliant =
path
processing will always do the job. In the real world, you may need to =
tweak the
rules to make a new application fit into an existing =
infrastructure-<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The question is still: Can a =
standards
compliant implementation allow configuration of non conformant =
modifications to
the validation process, or does that make the implementation as a whole =
non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Santosh Chokhani<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
22:59<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a =
long-held
view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or business
argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless field. =
&nbsp;A
relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. &nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &#8220;state&#8221; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard [JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:City></st1:place> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment
correctly I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be =
added because
this would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:City></st1:place><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they =
deploy on
certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is =
assignment
of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which =
included
core participants from the PKIX WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 16:43:12 -0700
To: Tim Polk <[email-masked]>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: stringprep in 3280bis
Cc: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

Tim,
  
As far as nameprep goes, yes, AllowUnassigned is all about
"stored" v. "query" strings.  So, as you note, domain
label preparation is mostly okay.  (see below comments).

However, I do note that 7.1 says nothing about "stored"
v. "query" strings.  In this case, as one implementation
is preparing both strings in the comparison, treating
both as "stored" should be fine.

-- Kurt

At 02:52 PM 6/22/2006, Tim Polk wrote:
>>To accommodate
>>   internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming
>>   implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the
>>   ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section 4 of
>>   RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field.  Specifically,
>>   conforming implementations MUST perform the conversion operation
>>   specified in section 4 of RFC 3490 as follows:
>>
>>      * in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored
>>      string";
> (additional steps deleted)

You might want to add:
        , hence the AllowUnassigned SHALL NOT be set.

since nameprep uses this flag to indicate the string has "stored"
handling.  Likewise in subsequent bullet set in this section.

>In section 7.3, we did not specify "stored" versus "query", because it does not seem to apply.  In this section 7.3, the domain component attribute contains only a single label, so we only perform the "ToASCII" operation.

It does (via AllowUnassigned).

>>To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished
>>   name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion
>>   specified in section 4.1 of RFC 3490.
>
>As I said, the "ToASCII" operation doesn't seem to care about "stored" versus "query" so we didn't specify it.  However, the "ToASCII" operation does require specification of two additional inputs: the AllowUnassigned flag, and the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag. We dropped the ball here.  We should have specified that the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag should be set, and that AllowUassigned flag is *not* set.  (That works out to be the same as "stored" anyway, doesn't it?)

Yes.

>(1) How about the following revision to that sentence in 7.3:
>
>To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion specified in section 4.1 of RFC 3490, where the STD3ASCIIRules flag is set but AllowUnassigned flag is not set.
>(2) If I misinterpreted the specification of "ToASCII", and we do need to specify "stored" vs. "query", we could use this alternate text:
>
>To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion specified in section 4.1 of RFC 3490, where the string preparation is performed as a "stored" string.

I prefer language that explicitly says that the string is to be
regarded as "stored" and (hence) the AllowUnassigned flag is
not set (see my comment regarding 7.2 text).

-- Kurt 

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt 
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 18:50:02 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Alternative Name for expression of service name
	Author(s)	: S. Santesson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-02.txt
	Pages		: 11
	Date		: 2006-6-22
	
This document defines a new name form for inclusion in the otherName
filed of an X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension which allows a
certificate subject to be associated with the service name and domain
name components of a DNS Service Resource Record.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 23:03:58 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Guida, Richard [JJCUS]" <[email-masked]>, "Sharon Boeyen" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Stephen Kent" <[email-masked]>
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I think my initial statement was a bit misinterpreted.

=20

I suggest no changes to RFC 3280 path processing. And of course,
skipping mandatory checks would make the path processing non-conformant.

=20

However. I have noticed that it is not clear to some people weather a
conformant implementation are forced to always do conformant path
processing, or if a conformant implementation can allow administrators
to turn of certain checking.

=20

What I say is mainly two things;

1)       Misconfigured PKIs may sometimes force relying parties to do
non conformant path processing or fail altogether.

2)       A conformant implementation should be allowed to support also
non-conformant processing as long as this is not the default behavior.

=20

I think this is already allowed, but some implementers may not read it
that way and therefore I'm asking if we should add a clarification like
pki4ipsec did.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: Guida, Richard [JJCUS] [mailto:[email-masked]]=20
Sent: den 22 juni 2006 20:48
To: Sharon Boeyen; Stefan Santesson; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I think my initial statement was a =
bit misinterpreted.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I suggest no changes to RFC 3280 =
path
processing. And of course, skipping mandatory checks would make the path
processing non-conformant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However. I have noticed that it is =
not
clear to some people weather a conformant implementation are forced to =
always do
conformant path processing, or if a conformant implementation can allow
administrators to turn of certain checking.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>What I say is mainly two =
things;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>Misconfigured PKIs may sometimes force relying parties to do =
non
conformant path processing or fail =
altogether.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<font size=3D1 =
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:navy'>A conformant implementation should be allowed to support =
also
non-conformant processing as long as this is not the default =
behavior.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I think this is already allowed, =
but some
implementers may not read it that way and therefore I&#8217;m asking if =
we
should add a clarification like pki4ipsec =
did.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Guida, Richard
[JJCUS] [mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 22 juni 2006 =
20:48<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; Stefan
Santesson; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:place></st1:City>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:place></st1:City> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment correctly
I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added =
because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:place></st1:City><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many deployed
PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an =
implementation
allowing such local configuration could be regarded as standard =
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69647.C3E2A6F5--

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 17:52:56 -0400
To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
From: Tim Polk <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: stringprep in 3280bis
Sender: [email-masked]

Kurt,

To be fair, the I-D does address stored strings in a couple of places, 
although we may have missed a reference.  Please review the quotes below, 
along with a couple of alternatives for one update, to see if we have it 
right...

Section 7.2 of this I-D includes the following text:

>To accommodate
>    internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming
>    implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the
>    ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section 4 of
>    RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field.  Specifically,
>    conforming implementations MUST perform the conversion operation
>    specified in section 4 of RFC 3490 as follows:
>
>       * in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored
>       string";
  (additional steps deleted)

Sections 7.5 includes a reference to the text in 7.2.  From 7.5:

>    Where the host-part (the domain of the addr-spec) contains an
>    internationalized name, the domain name MUST be converted from an IDN
>    to the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section
>    7.2.
>
>    Two email addresses are considered to match if:
>
>       1) the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
>       2) the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
>       ASCII comparison.

I am probably missing some nuance, but this would seem to be sufficient for 
sections 7.2 and 7.5.

In section 7.3, we did not specify "stored" versus "query", because it does 
not seem to apply.  In this section 7.3, the domain component attribute 
contains only a single label, so we only perform the "ToASCII" operation.

>To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished
>    name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion
>    specified in section 4.1 of RFC 3490.

As I said, the "ToASCII" operation doesn't seem to care about "stored" 
versus "query" so we didn't specify it.  However, the "ToASCII" operation 
does require specification of two additional inputs: the AllowUnassigned 
flag, and the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag. We dropped the ball here.  We should 
have specified that the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag should be set, and that 
AllowUassigned flag is *not* set.  (That works out to be the same as 
"stored" anyway, doesn't it?)

(1) How about the following revision to that sentence in 7.3:

To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished name, the 
implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion specified in 
section 4.1 of RFC 3490, where the STD3ASCIIRules flag is set but 
AllowUnassigned flag is not set.

(2) If I misinterpreted the specification of "ToASCII", and we do need to 
specify "stored" vs. "query", we could use this alternate text:

To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished name, the 
implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion specified in 
section 4.1 of RFC 3490, where the string preparation is performed as a 
"stored" string.

Am I correct that 7.2 and 7.5 are okay?  What do you think of the 
alternatives for 7.3?

Thanks,

Tim

At 11:39 PM 6/21/2006 -0700, Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>For various values, this I-D discusses how strings are to be
>prepared using various profiles of the StringPrep algorithm.
>However, the I-D fails to discuss whether the strings should
>be prepared as "stored" or "query" strings (see Section 4
>of RFC 3490).   The I-D should be revised so as to be clear
>which strings are to be treated as "stored" strings and which
>are to be treated as "query" strings.
>
>Off the cuff, I suspect the right thing to do is:
>   1) requiring each prepared string in a certificate/CRL be
>     treated as "stored", and
>   2) prepared strings to be compared against prepared strings
>   in a certificate/CRL to be treated as either "query" or "stored".
>This assures that each comparison between prepared strings
>involves at least one "stored" string.
>
>-- Kurt
>
>At 01:42 PM 6/16/2006, Stephen Kent wrote:
> >Folks,
> >
> >Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call 
> on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate 
> Revocation List (CRL) Profile" 
> (<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)
> >
> >The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. 
> Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many 
> folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.
> >
> >Steve

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 13:58:32 -0700
From: "Santosh Chokhani" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6963F.1D4C93BD
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	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Stefan,

=20

I agree with sentiments voiced by Steve, Rich, and Sharon.

=20

I have a simple solution to your concern from the relying party
viewpoint.  This observation is made with a long-held view of mine (and
no one had provided a convincing logical or business argument) that the
require explicit policy setting is a useless field.  A relying party can
always set acceptable policies to none.  In that scenario, (require
explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path validation will succeed.
Now, the user can examine the end certificate policy.

=20

You and I have had this discussion in another context.  The basic
premise is that if some field in the last certificate only is of
interest and the "state" in the path validation process does not impact
it, that need not be path of path validation engine.

=20

Thus, you can judiciously use the 3280 Engine and obtain the result you
seek.

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Guida, Richard [JJCUS]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 2:48 PM
To: Sharon Boeyen; 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

=20

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops
a relying party from writing software that would perform processing
extensions only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes,
that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to
be non-compliant if it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the
relying party at risk, not others - so that is a "good thing" relatively
speaking.  But in the final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a circumstance
of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated as such.  Very best
regards -- Rich

=20

=20

=20

Richard A. Guida=20
Director, Information Security=20

Johnson & Johnson=20
Room GS8217=20
410 George Street=20
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901=20
Phone:  732 524 3785=20

	-----Original Message-----
	From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
	Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
	To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
	Cc: Stephen Kent
	Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

	Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly
believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.=20

	=20

	My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would
enable a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs
found in CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is
that a correct understanding?=20

	=20

	If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation
is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can
mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.

	=20

	Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.

	=20

	Cheers,

	Sharon

		-----Original Message-----
		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
		Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
		To: [email-masked]
		Cc: Stephen Kent
		Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

		As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to
raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause
clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they
deploy on certificate validation.

		=20

		The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are
misconfigured.2

		One such common misconfiguration is assignment of
certificate policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.

		X.509 path processing requires policies in CA
certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are
valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE
certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such
PKIs.

		=20

		Application wanting to use certificate policies in such
PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.

		However it is not clear if an implementation allowing
such local configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

		=20

		There are more examples where deploying applications in
misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.

		=20

		The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in
their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
participants from the PKIX WG.

		=20

		The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an
escape clause as follows:

		=20

		4.1.  X.509 Certificates
		=20
		   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have
often had little
		   control over the capabilities of CAs available to
them.
		   Implementations of this specification may include
configuration knobs
		   to disable checks required by this specification in
orde!
		 r t
		 o permit
		   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.
However, all checks on
		   certificates exist for a specific reason involving
the security of
		   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be
enabled by default.
		   Administrators and users ought to understand the
security purpose for
		   the various checks, and be clear on what security
will be lost by
		   disabling the check.

		=20

		=20

		I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation
needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation logic.

		At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such
configuration of standards compliant applications as long as this is not
the default functionality.

		=20

		=20

		Stefan Santesson

		Senior Program Manager

		Windows Security, Standards

	=09
________________________________

		From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
		Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
		To: [email-masked]
		Subject: last call for 3280bis

		=20

		Folks,

		=20

		Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am
initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure,
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

		=20

		The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to
the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for
many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

		=20

		Steve

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<body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dblue>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I agree with sentiments voiced by =
Steve,
Rich, and Sharon.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I have a simple solution to your =
concern
from the relying party viewpoint.&nbsp; This observation is made with a
long-held view of mine (and no one had provided a convincing logical or
business argument) that the require explicit policy setting is a useless =
field.
&nbsp;A relying party can always set acceptable policies to none. =
&nbsp;In that
scenario, (require explicit policy) flag not withstanding, path =
validation will
succeed. &nbsp;Now, the user can examine the end certificate =
policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>You and I have had this discussion =
in
another context. &nbsp;The basic premise is that if some field in the =
last
certificate only is of interest and the &#8220;state&#8221; in the path
validation process does not impact it, that need not be path of path =
validation
engine.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thus, you can judiciously use the =
3280
Engine and obtain the result you seek.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Guida, Richard =
[JJCUS]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 2:48
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; =
'Stefan
Santesson'; [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan - perhaps I am missing =
something,
but there is nothing that stops a relying party from writing software =
that
would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only on CA certs as you =
propose.&nbsp;
As <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:place></st1:City>
properly notes, that would not be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying =
party can
choose to be non-compliant if it wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance =
only
puts the relying party at risk, not others - so that is&nbsp;a =
&quot;good
thing&quot; relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the final analysis, seems =
to me
that <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place =
w:st=3D"on">Sharon</st1:place></st1:City> is
absolutely correct (assuming she and I are interpreting your proposal
properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, this would remain a =
circumstance of
non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; =
Very best
regards -- Rich</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Richard A. Guida</span></font></b> <br>
<b><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
font-weight:bold'>Director, Information Security</span></font></b> =
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><font size=3D5 color=3Dred face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
18.0pt;color:red;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Johnson &amp; =
Johnson</span></font></i></b>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Room
GS8217</span></font> <br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>410 <st1:address
w:st=3D"on"><st1:Street w:st=3D"on">George Street</st1:Street><font =
size=3D3
 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>
 <br>
 </span></font><st1:City w:st=3D"on">New Brunswick</st1:City>, =
<st1:State w:st=3D"on">New
  Jersey</st1:State>&nbsp; <st1:PostalCode =
w:st=3D"on">08901</st1:PostalCode></st1:address></span></font>
<br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Phone:&nbsp;
732 524 3785</span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]]<b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Sharon Boeyen<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, June 22, =
2006 1:57
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Stefan Santesson';
[email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Stefan, if I understand your =
comment correctly
I strongly believe such an escape clause cannot possibly be added =
because this
would render 3280bis non-compliant with X.509. =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>My understanding of your comment is =
that
the escape clause would enable a path validation engine to process the
certificate policy OIDs found in CA certificates but ignore those found =
in EE
certificates. Is that a correct understanding? =
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>If it is a correct understanding, =
then any
such implementation is non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of =
X.509 and
as such can mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional =
elements but
cannot reverse the mandatory processing from =
X.509.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Apologies if I've misunderstood =
your
question.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Cheers,</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>=

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><font =
size=3D2
  color=3Dblue face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
  color:blue'>Sharon</span></font></st1:place></st1:City><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DTahoma><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> =
[email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b><span =
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On
Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, June 21, =
2006
5:23 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: last call =
for 3280bis
- escape clause</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this
conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which
included core participants from the PKIX =
WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in orde!<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> r =
t<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> o =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span styl! e=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre></span>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis =
path
validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding clarification =
that
clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to
clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as =
long as
this is not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabIndex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
&quot;Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate Revocation =
List
(CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier =
New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> (</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From: "Guida, Richard [JJCUS]" <[email-masked]>
To: Sharon Boeyen <[email-masked]>, "'Stefan Santesson'" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 14:48:05 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

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Content-Type: text/plain

Stefan - perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops a
relying party from writing software that would perform processing extensions
only on CA certs as you propose.  As Sharon properly notes, that would not
be RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to be non-compliant if
it wishes.  And such non-compliance only puts the relying party at risk, not
others - so that is a "good thing" relatively speaking.  But in the final
analysis, seems to me that Sharon is absolutely correct (assuming she and I
are interpreting your proposal properly) - unless X.509 is redefined, this
would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.  And so it should be treated
as such.  Very best regards -- Rich

Richard A. Guida 
Director, Information Security 

Johnson & Johnson 
Room GS8217 
410 George Street 
New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901 
Phone:  732 524 3785 

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On
Behalf Of Sharon Boeyen
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM
To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such an
escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis
non-compliant with X.509. 
 
My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable a
path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA
certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct
understanding? 
 
If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is
non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate
certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but cannot reverse
the mandatory processing from X.509.
 
Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.
 
Cheers,
Sharon

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question
whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying
parties to select what validation logic they deploy on certificate
validation.

The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2

One such common misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and
their inclusion in CA certificates.

X.509 path processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the
list of EE certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many
deployments have included pure CA certificate policies in CA certificates,
policies that are not included in any EE certificates and as such, policy
processing is not possible in such PKIs.

Application wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply
forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path processing rules.
For a relying party such modification could be reasonable if the security
implications has been well though through.

However it is not clear if an implementation allowing such local
configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

There are more examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs
would need similar measures to work.

The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and
this lead to an intense debate which included core participants from the
PKIX WG.

The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as
follows:

4.1.  X.509 Certificates
 
   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little
   control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.
   Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs
   to disable checks required by this specification in order t

 o permit
   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.  However, all checks on
   certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of
   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.
   Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for
   the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by
   disabling the check.

I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape
clause or corresponding clarification that clearly allows local
configuration of the validation logic.

At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of
standards compliant applications as long as this is not the default
functionality.

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
To: [email-masked]
Subject: last call for 3280bis

Folks,

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call on
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile" (
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>
http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. Independence
Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many folks), all comments
must be received by July 5th.

Steve

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<BODY lang=EN-US vLink=blue link=blue>
<DIV><SPAN class=803343518-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Stefan 
- perhaps I am missing something, but there is nothing that stops a relying 
party from writing software that would perform processing extensions&nbsp;only 
on CA certs as you propose.&nbsp; As Sharon properly notes, that would not be 
RFC3280 compliant - but a relying party can choose to be non-compliant if it 
wishes.&nbsp; And such non-compliance only puts the relying party at risk, not 
others - so that is&nbsp;a "good thing" relatively speaking.&nbsp; But in the 
final analysis, seems to me that Sharon is absolutely correct (assuming she and 
I are interpreting your proposal properly)&nbsp;- unless X.509 is redefined, 
this would remain a circumstance of non-compliance.&nbsp; And so it should be 
treated as&nbsp;such.&nbsp; Very best regards -- Rich</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=803343518-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=803343518-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV><BR>
<P><B><FONT face=Arial size=2>Richard A. Guida</FONT></B> <BR><B><FONT 
face=Arial size=2>Director, Information Security</FONT></B> </P>
<P><B><I><FONT face="Times New Roman" color=#ff0000 size=5>Johnson &amp; 
Johnson</FONT></I></B><I></I> <BR><FONT face=Arial size=2>Room GS8217</FONT> 
<BR><FONT face=Arial size=2>410 George Street</FONT> <BR><FONT face=Arial 
size=2>New Brunswick, New Jersey&nbsp; 08901</FONT> <BR><FONT face=Arial 
size=2>Phone:&nbsp; 732 524 3785</FONT> </P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader dir=ltr align=left><FONT face=Tahoma 
  size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> [email-masked] 
  [mailto:[email-masked]]<B>On Behalf Of </B>Sharon 
  Boeyen<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:57 PM<BR><B>To:</B> 'Stefan 
  Santesson'; [email-masked]<BR><B>Cc:</B> Stephen Kent<BR><B>Subject:</B> 
  RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2>Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such 
  an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis 
  non-compliant with X.509. </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>My 
  understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable a path 
  validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA 
  certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct 
  understanding? </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>If 
  it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is non-conformant 
  to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate certain optional 
  elements or exclude optional elements but cannot reverse the mandatory 
  processing from X.509.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2>Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2>Cheers,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
  size=2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
  <BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
    <DIV></DIV>
    <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader lang=en-us dir=ltr align=left><FONT 
    face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> 
    [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] <B>On 
    Behalf Of </B>Stefan Santesson<BR><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 
    PM<BR><B>To:</B> [email-masked]<BR><B>Cc:</B> Stephen 
    Kent<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: last call for 3280bis - escape 
    clause<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
    <DIV class=Section1>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">As a last call 
    comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question whether RFC 
    3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying parties to 
    select what validation logic they deploy on certificate 
    validation.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The background is 
    the fact that many deployed PKIs are 
    misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">One such common 
    misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion 
    in CA certificates.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">X.509 path 
    processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the list of EE 
    certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many deployments have 
    included pure CA certificate policies in CA certificates, policies that are 
    not included in any EE certificates and as such, policy processing is not 
    possible in such PKIs.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Application wanting 
    to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or 
    selectively neglect certain path processing rules. For a relying party such 
    modification could be reasonable if the security implications has been well 
    though through.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">However it is not 
    clear if an implementation allowing such local configuration could be 
    regarded as standard compliant.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">There are more 
    examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs would need 
    similar measures to work.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The pki4ipsec WG 
    recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an 
    intense debate which included core participants from the PKIX 
    WG.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The result was that 
    the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as 
    follows:<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">4.1.&nbsp; X.509 Certificates<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by this specification in orde!
 r t
 o permit<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks on<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN styl!
 e="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the check.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I'm basically 
    asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape clause or 
    corresponding clarification that clearly allows local configuration of the 
    validation logic.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">At least I think it 
    is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant 
    applications as long as this is not the default 
    functionality.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=Arial color=maroon size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan 
    Santesson</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><FONT color=navy><SPAN 
    style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=#400040 size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Senior Program 
    Manager</SPAN></FONT><FONT color=navy><SPAN 
    style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <P class=MsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=Arial color=#400040 size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Windows 
    Security, Standards</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <DIV class=MsoNormal style="TEXT-ALIGN: center" align=center><FONT 
    face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
    <HR tabIndex=-1 align=center width="100%" SIZE=2>
    </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><B><FONT face=Tahoma size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT 
    face=Tahoma size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma"> 
    [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] <B><SPAN 
    style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Stephen Kent<BR><B><SPAN 
    style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> den 16 juni 2006 
    22:42<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> 
    [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> 
    last call for 3280bis</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Folks,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am 
    initiating last call on</SPAN></FONT><FONT size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, 
    Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
    Profile"</SPAN></FONT><TT><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> (</SPAN></FONT></TT><A 
    href="http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt"><FONT 
    size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt</SPAN></FONT></A><FONT 
    size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">)</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">The last call will last for two weeks. In deference 
    to the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for 
    many folks), all comments must be received by July 
    5th.</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
    <DIV>
    <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
    style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Steve</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6962C.6413C4C6--

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 14:32:20 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: Seth Hitchings <[email-masked]>
CC: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

Seth Hitchings wrote:

>Should the CMS reference in section 11.1 be updated to RFC 3852?
>  
>
Seth,

Yes.  I believe that the [CMS] reference should be updated from 3369 to 
3852.  Also, the [UTF8] reference should be updated from 2279 to 3629 
and the [IKE] reference should be updated from 2409 to 4306.

Updating the [UTF8] and [IKE] should only affect the References section.

Updating the [CMS] reference will also require changing the ASN.1 in 
section 8 so that ContentInfo is imported from the 
CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 module rather than the 
CryptographicMessageSyntax, but I don't think that should cause any 
problems.

Dave

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 19:31:21 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: Sharon Boeyen <[email-masked]>
Cc: "'Stefan Santesson'" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Subject: Re: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Sender: [email-masked]

I guess I'd agree with Sharon's conclusion but for slightly different
reasons. If people need such a different profile of x.509 or 3280bis
then a different RFC is required IMO - given that 3280 exists it would
be wrong for 3280bis to include such a change since you'd potentially
punish 3280 implementers for being compliant.

Stephen.

Sharon Boeyen wrote:
> Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such 
> an escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 
> 3280bis non-compliant with X.509.
>  
> My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable 
> a path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in 
> CA certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a 
> correct understanding?
>  
> If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is 
> non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can 
> mandate certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but 
> cannot reverse the mandatory processing from X.509.
>  
> Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.
>  
> Cheers,
> Sharon
> 
>     -----Original Message-----
>     *From:* [email-masked]
>     [mailto:[email-masked]] *On Behalf Of *Stefan Santesson
>     *Sent:* Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
>     *To:* [email-masked]
>     *Cc:* Stephen Kent
>     *Subject:* RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
> 
>     As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the
>     question whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause clearly
>     allowing relying parties to select what validation logic they deploy
>     on certificate validation.
> 
>      
> 
>     The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2
> 
>     One such common misconfiguration is assignment of certificate
>     policies and their inclusion in CA certificates.
> 
>     X.509 path processing requires policies in CA certificates to
>     reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are valid for a
>     path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate
>     policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any
>     EE certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in
>     such PKIs.
> 
>      
> 
>     Application wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are
>     simply forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path
>     processing rules. For a relying party such modification could be
>     reasonable if the security implications has been well though through.
> 
>     However it is not clear if an implementation allowing such local
>     configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.
> 
>      
> 
>     There are more examples where deploying applications in
>     misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to work.
> 
>      
> 
>     The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in their PKI
>     profile and this lead to an intense debate which included core
>     participants from the PKIX WG.
> 
>      
> 
>     The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause
>     as follows:
> 
>      
> 
>     4.1.  X.509 Certificates
> 
>      
> 
>        Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little
> 
>        control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.
> 
>        Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs
> 
>        to disable checks required by this specification in order t
>      o permit
> 
>        use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.  However, all checks on
> 
>        certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of
> 
>        the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.
> 
>        Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for
> 
>        the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by
> 
>        disabling the check.
> 
>      
> 
>      
> 
>     I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar
>     escape clause or corresponding clarification that clearly allows
>     local configuration of the validation logic.
> 
>     At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration
>     of standards compliant applications as long as this is not the
>     default functionality.
> 
>      
> 
>      
> 
>     **Stefan Santesson**
> 
>     Senior Program Manager
> 
>     **Windows Security, Standards**
> 
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
>     *From:* [email-masked]
>     [mailto:[email-masked]] *On Behalf Of *Stephen Kent
>     *Sent:* den 16 juni 2006 22:42
>     *To:* [email-masked]
>     *Subject:* last call for 3280bis
> 
>      
> 
>     Folks,
> 
>      
> 
>     Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last
>     call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and
>     Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
>     (http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)
> 
>      
> 
>     The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
>     Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many
>     folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.
> 
>      
> 
>     Steve
> 

From: Sharon Boeyen <[email-masked]>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 13:56:51 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69624.D29D3652
Content-Type: text/plain

Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such an
escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis
non-compliant with X.509. 
 
My understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable a
path validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA
certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct
understanding? 
 
If it is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is
non-conformant to X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate
certain optional elements or exclude optional elements but cannot reverse
the mandatory processing from X.509.
 
Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.
 
Cheers,
Sharon

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: Stephen Kent
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause

As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question
whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying
parties to select what validation logic they deploy on certificate
validation.

The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2

One such common misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and
their inclusion in CA certificates.

X.509 path processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the
list of EE certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many
deployments have included pure CA certificate policies in CA certificates,
policies that are not included in any EE certificates and as such, policy
processing is not possible in such PKIs.

Application wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply
forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path processing rules.
For a relying party such modification could be reasonable if the security
implications has been well though through.

However it is not clear if an implementation allowing such local
configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

There are more examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs
would need similar measures to work.

The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and
this lead to an intense debate which included core participants from the
PKIX WG.

The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as
follows:

4.1.  X.509 Certificates
 
   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little
   control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.
   Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs
   to disable checks required by this specification in order to permit
   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.  However, all checks on
   certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of
   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.
   Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for
   the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by
   disabling the check.

I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape
clause or corresponding clarification that clearly allows local
configuration of the validation logic.

At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of
standards compliant applications as long as this is not the default
functionality.

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
To: [email-masked]
Subject: last call for 3280bis

Folks,

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call on
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile" (
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>
http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. Independence
Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many folks), all comments
must be received by July 5th.

Steve

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<BODY lang=EN-US vLink=blue link=blue>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Stefan, if I understand your comment correctly I strongly believe such an 
escape clause cannot possibly be added because this would render 3280bis 
non-compliant with X.509. </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>My 
understanding of your comment is that the escape clause would enable a path 
validation engine to process the certificate policy OIDs found in CA 
certificates but ignore those found in EE certificates. Is that a correct 
understanding? </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>If it 
is a correct understanding, then any such implementation is non-conformant to 
X.509. 3280 is a profile of X.509 and as such can mandate certain optional 
elements or exclude optional elements but cannot reverse the mandatory 
processing from X.509.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Apologies if I've misunderstood your question.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Cheers,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=698515317-22062006><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Sharon</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV></DIV>
  <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader lang=en-us dir=ltr align=left><FONT 
  face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> 
  [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] <B>On 
  Behalf Of </B>Stefan Santesson<BR><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, June 21, 2006 5:23 
  PM<BR><B>To:</B> [email-masked]<BR><B>Cc:</B> Stephen 
  Kent<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: last call for 3280bis - escape 
  clause<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
  <DIV class=Section1>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">As a last call 
  comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis 
  should include an escape clause clearly allowing relying parties to select 
  what validation logic they deploy on certificate 
  validation.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The background is the 
  fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">One such common 
  misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in 
  CA certificates.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">X.509 path processing 
  requires policies in CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate 
  policies that are valid for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA 
  certificate policies in CA certificates, policies that are not included in any 
  EE certificates and as such, policy processing is not possible in such 
  PKIs.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Application wanting 
  to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or 
  selectively neglect certain path processing rules. For a relying party such 
  modification could be reasonable if the security implications has been well 
  though through.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">However it is not 
  clear if an implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded 
  as standard compliant.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">There are more 
  examples where deploying applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar 
  measures to work.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The pki4ipsec WG 
  recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile and this lead to an 
  intense debate which included core participants from the PKIX 
  WG.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The result was that 
  the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as 
  follows:<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">4.1.&nbsp; X.509 Certificates<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by this specification in order t
 o permit<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks on<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE><PRE><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN style
 ="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the check.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></PRE>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I'm basically asking 
  if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding 
  clarification that clearly allows local configuration of the validation 
  logic.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">At least I think it 
  is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of standards compliant 
  applications as long as this is not the default 
  functionality.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=navy size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=Arial color=maroon size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Stefan 
  Santesson</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><FONT color=navy><SPAN 
  style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face=Arial color=#400040 size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Senior Program 
  Manager</SPAN></FONT><FONT color=navy><SPAN 
  style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <P class=MsoNormal><STRONG><B><FONT face=Arial color=#400040 size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Windows Security, 
  Standards</SPAN></FONT></B></STRONG><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <DIV class=MsoNormal style="TEXT-ALIGN: center" align=center><FONT 
  face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
  <HR tabIndex=-1 align=center width="100%" SIZE=2>
  </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><B><FONT face=Tahoma size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma">From:</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT 
  face=Tahoma size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma"> 
  [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] <B><SPAN 
  style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">On Behalf Of </SPAN></B>Stephen Kent<BR><B><SPAN 
  style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> den 16 juni 2006 22:42<BR><B><SPAN 
  style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> [email-masked]<BR><B><SPAN 
  style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> last call for 
  3280bis</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Folks,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am 
  initiating last call on</SPAN></FONT><FONT size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, 
  Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
  Profile"</SPAN></FONT><TT><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> (</SPAN></FONT></TT><A 
  href="http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt"><FONT 
  size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt</SPAN></FONT></A><FONT 
  size=2><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">)</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&nbsp;</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to 
  the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many 
  folks), all comments must be received by July 
  5th.</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV>
  <DIV>
  <P class=MsoNormal><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=2><SPAN 
  style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Steve</SPAN></FONT><o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 10:30:33 -0400
From: "Seth Hitchings" <[email-masked]>
To: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>, "pkix" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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Should the CMS reference in section 11.1 be updated to RFC 3852? 

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of David A. Cooper
Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 3:38 PM
To: pkix
Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt

All,

I have just submitted draft 26 of SCVP for posting.  The draft should be
available soon, but in the meantime, I have posted a diff file highlighting
the differences between drafts 24 and 26 (the only difference between drafts
24 and 25 was the correction of a typographical error in section 3.6).  The
diff file is available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/wdiff_draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-24_to_26.
html.

Drafts 24 and 26 differ in the following places:

1) Section 3: corrected cross-reference ("3.10" replaced by "3.11").

2) Section 3.2.4.2.3 (Name Validation Algorithm):  Matching rules for use
with id-kp-serverAuth are now specified in the document rather than
referring to the matching rules in RFC 2818 [HTTP-TLS].  (RFC 2818 is an
Informational RFC and so SCVP could not include a normative reference to
that document).

3) Section 3.6: "requestorName" replaced with "responderName".  (This was
the typographical error that was corrected in draft 25.)

4) Section 4: A new sentence was added to clarify that when a protected
response is required, the SCVP server must use SignedData or
AuthenticatedData even if the response is being sent over a protected
transport (e.g., TLS).

5) Section 11.1 (Normative References):  The reference to RFC 2818 was
deleted.

None of these changes to the document result in any changes to the protocol.

Dave

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - references
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 13:52:22 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: "Stephen Kent" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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	charset="us-ascii"
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In general we need a work through of the reference section to get the
references up to date.

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
To: [email-masked]
Subject: last call for 3280bis

=20

Folks,

=20

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call
on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

=20

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many
folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

=20

Steve

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>In general we need a work through =
of the
reference section to get the references up to =
date.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

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Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 23:39:58 -0700
To: [email-masked]
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <[email-masked]>
Subject: stringprep in 3280bis
Sender: [email-masked]

For various values, this I-D discusses how strings are to be
prepared using various profiles of the StringPrep algorithm.
However, the I-D fails to discuss whether the strings should
be prepared as "stored" or "query" strings (see Section 4
of RFC 3490).   The I-D should be revised so as to be clear
which strings are to be treated as "stored" strings and which
are to be treated as "query" strings.

Off the cuff, I suspect the right thing to do is:
  1) requiring each prepared string in a certificate/CRL be
    treated as "stored", and
  2) prepared strings to be compared against prepared strings
  in a certificate/CRL to be treated as either "query" or "stored".
This assures that each comparison between prepared strings
involves at least one "stored" string.

-- Kurt

At 01:42 PM 6/16/2006, Stephen Kent wrote:
>Folks,
>
>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" (<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)
> 
>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.
>
>Steve

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: last call for 3280bis - escape clause
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 22:22:53 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Stephen Kent" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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As a last call comment on RFC 3280bis I would like to raise the question
whether RFC 3280bis should include an escape clause clearly allowing
relying parties to select what validation logic they deploy on
certificate validation.

=20

The background is the fact that many deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2

One such common misconfiguration is assignment of certificate policies
and their inclusion in CA certificates.

X.509 path processing requires policies in CA certificates to reflect
the list of EE certificate policies that are valid for a path. Yet many
deployments have included pure CA certificate policies in CA
certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates and
as such, policy processing is not possible in such PKIs.

=20

Application wanting to use certificate policies in such PKI are simply
forced to either fail or selectively neglect certain path processing
rules. For a relying party such modification could be reasonable if the
security implications has been well though through.

However it is not clear if an implementation allowing such local
configuration could be regarded as standard compliant.

=20

There are more examples where deploying applications in misconfigured
PKIs would need similar measures to work.

=20

The pki4ipsec WG recently came to this conclusion in their PKI profile
and this lead to an intense debate which included core participants from
the PKIX WG.

=20

The result was that the pki4ipsec profile included an escape clause as
follows:

=20

4.1.  X.509 Certificates
=20
   Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little
   control over the capabilities of CAs available to them.
   Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs
   to disable checks required by this specification in order to permit
   use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs.  However, all checks on
   certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of
   the entire system.  Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default.
   Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for
   the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by
   disabling the check.

=20

=20

I'm basically asking if RFC 3280bis path validation needs a similar
escape clause or corresponding clarification that clearly allows local
configuration of the validation logic.

At least I think it is necessary to clearly allow such configuration of
standards compliant applications as long as this is not the default
functionality.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: den 16 juni 2006 22:42
To: [email-masked]
Subject: last call for 3280bis

=20

Folks,

=20

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last call
on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
(http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt> )

=20

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many
folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

=20

Steve

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As a last call comment on RFC =
3280bis I
would like to raise the question whether RFC 3280bis should include an =
escape
clause clearly allowing relying parties to select what validation logic =
they
deploy on certificate validation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The background is the fact that =
many
deployed PKIs are misconfigured.2<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One such common misconfiguration is
assignment of certificate policies and their inclusion in CA =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>X.509 path processing requires =
policies in
CA certificates to reflect the list of EE certificate policies that are =
valid
for a path. Yet many deployments have included pure CA certificate =
policies in
CA certificates, policies that are not included in any EE certificates =
and as
such, policy processing is not possible in such =
PKIs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Application wanting to use =
certificate
policies in such PKI are simply forced to either fail or selectively =
neglect
certain path processing rules. For a relying party such modification =
could be
reasonable if the security implications has been well though =
through.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>However it is not clear if an
implementation allowing such local configuration could be regarded as =
standard
compliant.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>There are more examples where =
deploying
applications in misconfigured PKIs would need similar measures to =
work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The pki4ipsec WG recently came to =
this conclusion
in their PKI profile and this lead to an intense debate which included =
core participants
from the PKIX WG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The result was that the pki4ipsec =
profile
included an escape clause as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>4.1.&nbsp; X.509 =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></pre><pre><fon=
t
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Users deploying IKE and IPsec =
with certificates have often had =
little<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; control over the capabilities of =
CAs available to them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Implementations of this =
specification may include configuration =
knobs<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; to disable checks required by =
this specification in order to =
permit<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; use with inflexible and/or =
noncompliant CAs.&nbsp; However, all checks =
on<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; certificates exist for a =
specific reason involving the security =
of<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the entire system.&nbsp; =
Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by =
default.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators and users ought =
to understand the security purpose =
for<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the various checks, and be clear =
on what security will be lost =
by<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre><pre><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; disabling the =
check.<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I&#8217;m basically asking if RFC =
3280bis
path validation needs a similar escape clause or corresponding =
clarification
that clearly allows local configuration of the validation =
logic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>At least I think it is necessary to =
clearly
allow such configuration of standards compliant applications as long as =
this is
not the default functionality.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D3 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 16 juni 2006 =
22:42<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> last call for =
3280bis</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating =
last
call on</span></font><font size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;</span></font><tt><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'> =
(</span></font></tt><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"><font
size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pki=
x-rfc3280bis-03.txt</span></font></a><font
size=3D2><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S.
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many =
folks),
all comments must be received by July 5th.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>Steve</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69578.DB4D2429--

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Turner, Sean P." <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 11:10:28 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Sender: [email-masked]

spt

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2006 16:31:02 -0700
To: Michael Str�der <[email-masked]>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
Cc: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

At 01:44 AM 6/20/2006, Michael Str�der wrote:
>Reference to RFC 2253 should be updated since it
>was obsoleted by RFC 4514 recently.

In the same vein...

The document's reference to RFC 2247 should be replaced with a
reference RFC 4419.  RFC 4419 replaces that portion of RFC 2247
referenced.

The document's reference to draft-ietf-ldapbis-strprep-07.txt
should be updated to RFC 4518.
The document's reference to RFC 2255 should be replaced with
RFC 4516.

THe document's reference to RFC 2587 should be replaced with
RFC 4523.
The document's reference to RFC 1778 should be removed (not used).

The document's reference to RFC 2252 should be replaced with
RFC 4512, which now specifies the <numericoid> syntax.

The document's reference to RFC 2279 should be replaced with
a reference to RFC 3629.

Regarding the included ASN.1 modules, it might be appropriate
to add a copyright comment, e.g.:
        -- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This version of  
        -- this ASN.1 module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself    
        -- for full legal notices.

>Ciao, Michael.
>
>[email-masked] wrote:
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.
>> 
>>       Title           : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
>>       Author(s)       : D. Cooper, et al.
>>       Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
>>       Pages           : 141
>>       Date            : 2006-5-24

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: PKXIX draft agenda
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2006 13:22:55 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Stephen Kent" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69464.4267ACF2
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

All,

=20

Here is the draft PKIX agenda for the 66th IETF.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

=20

---------------------------------------------

=20

PKIX WG (pkix-wg)

http://ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html

=20

=20

MONDAY, July 10, 2006 1520-1720 (Room 519b)

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

=20

CHAIR: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>, Stefan Santesson
<[email-masked]>

=20

AGENDA:

=20

1. WG Status and Direction

=20

1.1 Document Status Review (5 min.)

      Stefan Santesson (WG co-chair)

=20

      Some WG documents are with the Ads, some are in RFC editors queue=20

      and a few are still within the WG development process. (10 min.)

=20

2. PKIX WG Specifications=20

=20

  2.1 Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) (10 min.)

      David Cooper (NIST)

        http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-25.txt

=20

      This document is in AD evaluation state with some final issues
still under discussion

=20

  2.2 3280bis (15 min.)

      David Cooper (NIST)

=20
http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt

=20

      A new draft 03 was recently posted and WG last call has been
initiated.

=20

  2.3 Algorithm IDs for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in PKIX (10 min.)

     Daniel Brown (Certicom)

=20
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-02.txt

=20

     Some issues concerning algorithm identifiers are yet to be
determined

=20

  2.5 Subject Identification Method (SIM) [Agneda item not decided yet]
(5 min.)

      Tim Polk (NIST)

        http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sim-07.txt

=20

      Past IETF last Call. A new draft is requested by IESG.

=20

  2.6 Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA (5 min.)

      Tim Polk (NIST)

=20
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.tx
t

=20

     A new -00 draft has just been posted.

=20

=20

3. Related Specifications & Liaison Presentations

=20

      Time allowing, liaison presentations will be accommodated to
ensure the

      PKIX WG is aware of related specifications currently progressing
as

      individual drafts.

=20

  3.1 Including the AIA extension in attribute certificates (10 min)

      David Chadwick (University of Kent)

=20

      A presentation about including the AIA extension in attribute
certificates,=20

      and the requirement to find the superior AA of the AC issuer, as
well as the=20

      signing certificate of the issuer of the AC

=20

=20

4. Joint PKIX/SIDR Meeting

   http://ietf.org/html.charters/sidr-charter.html

=20

  4.1 Address Space & As Number PKI (60 min.)

      Stephen Kent (BBN)

=20

     This presentation will review the current plans and status for
creating a PKI

     that reflects the allocation of resources through Regional Internet
Registries.

     The motivation for creation this PKI is to enable better security
for Internet

     routing (BGP).

=20

=20

=20

=20

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>All,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Here is the draft PKIX agenda for =
the 66<sup>th</sup>
IETF.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier =
New"'>---------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></fo=
nt></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>PKIX WG =
(pkix-wg)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html">http://ietf.org/=
html.charters/pkix-charter.html</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>MONDAY, July 10, 2006 1520-1720 (Room =
519b)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier =
New"'>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<o:p></o:p></=
span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>CHAIR: Stephen Kent &lt;[email-masked]&gt;, =
Stefan
Santesson &lt;<font color=3Dnavy><span =
style=3D'color:navy'>stefans</span></font>@<font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'>microsoft</span></font>.<font =
color=3Dnavy><span
style=3D'color:navy'>com</span></font>&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>AGENDA:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>1. WG Status and =
Direction<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>1.1 Document Status Review (5 =
min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Stefan =
Santesson (WG
co-chair)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Some WG =
documents are
with the Ads, some are in RFC editors queue =
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and a few are =
still
within the WG development process. </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>(10 =
min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>2. PKIX WG =
Specifications <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;2.1 Simple Certificate Validation
Protocol (SCVP) (10 min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David Cooper =
(NIST)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; <a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-25.txt"
title=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-25.txt">htt=
p://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-25.txt</a><o:p></o:p></=
span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This document =
is in
AD evaluation state with some final issues still under =
discussion<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp; 2.2 3280bis (15 =
min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David Cooper =
(NIST)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; <a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
"
title=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.tx=
t">http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt</a><=
o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A new draft 03 =
was
recently posted and WG last call has been =
initiated.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp; 2.3 Algorithm IDs for Elliptic Curve
Cryptography in PKIX (10 min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Daniel Brown =
(Certicom)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-02=
.txt"
title=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-0=
2.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-pkalgs-02.=
txt</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Some issues =
concerning algorithm
identifiers are yet to be determined<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp; 2.5 Subject Identification Method =
(SIM)
[Agneda item not decided yet] (5 min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Tim Polk =
(NIST)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sim-07.txt"
title=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sim-07.txt">http=
://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sim-07.txt</a><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Past IETF last =
Call.
A new draft is requested by IESG.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp; 2.6 Additional Algorithms and =
Identifiers for
DSA and ECDSA (5 min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Tim Polk =
(NIST)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecds=
a-00.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ec=
dsa-00.txt</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A new -00 draft =
has
just been posted.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>3. Related Specifications &amp; Liaison =
Presentations<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Time allowing,
liaison presentations will be accommodated to ensure =
the<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; PKIX WG is =
aware of
related specifications currently progressing =
as<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; individual =
drafts.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp; 3.1 Including the AIA extension in =
attribute
certificates (10 min)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David Chadwick =
(<st1:place
w:st=3D"on"><st1:PlaceType w:st=3D"on">University</st1:PlaceType> of =
<st1:PlaceName
 =
w:st=3D"on">Kent</st1:PlaceName></st1:place>)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p=

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A presentation =
about
including the AIA extension in attribute certificates, =
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and the =
requirement
to find the superior AA of the AC issuer, as well as the =
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; signing =
certificate
of the issuer of the AC<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>4. Joint PKIX/SIDR =
Meeting<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp; <a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/html.charters/sidr-charter.html">http://ietf.org/=
html.charters/sidr-charter.html</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;4.1 Address Space &amp; As Number =
PKI
(60 min.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Stephen Kent =
(BBN)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This =
presentation will
review the current plans and status for creating a =
PKI<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;that reflects the
allocation of resources through Regional Internet =
Registries.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The motivation for =
creation
this PKI is to enable better security for =
Internet<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;routing =
(BGP).<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Courier New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C69464.4267ACF2--

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2006 10:44:27 +0200
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

Reference to RFC 2253 should be updated since it
was obsoleted by RFC 4514 recently.

Ciao, Michael.

[email-masked] wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
> 	Author(s)	: D. Cooper, et al.
> 	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt
> 	Pages		: 141
> 	Date		: 2006-5-24

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Turner, Sean P." <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt 
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 19:10:58 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Sender: [email-masked]

A couple of comments:

General: What is the relationship of this and the ECC PKALGS ID? Is the text
that is common going to be removed? Is the other ID dead (it has expired but
it's not clear that it won't be resurrected)? Is another draft being
prepared for the Key Agreement Schemes? 

Keys/Parameters: The document only addresses the
signatureAlgorithm/signatureVale/signature fields and points to RFC3279 for
the ECDSA Public Key Encodings...but it seems like there ought to be an
explicit indication of the algorithm the key can be used with in the
subjectPublicKeyInfo field along with its parameters? They do this with
DSA/RSA why not with ECDSA?

Specific
Sec 3 1st para last sentence: r field/fields
Sec 3 4th para last sentence: r should/SHOULD
Sec 3.1 1st para 2nd sentence r SHA2/SHA-2
Sec 3.2 bullets 1, 2, 3: r may/MAY
Sec 3.2.1 1st para: r SHA 512/SHA512

spt
-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of [email-masked]
Sent: Monday, June 19, 2006 3:50 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt 

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working
Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 
                          Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and
ECDSA  
	Author(s)	: Q. Dang, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt
	Pages		: 
	Date		: 2006-6-19
	
        This document supplements RFC 3279. It 
        specifies algorithm identifiers, and ASN.1 
        encoding rules for the Digital Signature 
        Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital 
        Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) digital signatures 
        when using SHA-224, SHA-256, 384 or SHA-512 as 
        hashing algorithm. This specification applies 
        to the Internet X.509 Public Key 
        Infrastructure (PKI) when digital signatures 
        are used to sign certificates and certificate 
        revocation list (CRLs).  

        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 
        "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", 
        "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
        document are to be interpreted as described in 
        [RFC 2119]. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt

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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt 
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 16:49:07 -0400
From: "Seth Hitchings" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_03AF_01C693C0.47A81700
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Section 3.1 (DSA Signature Algorithm) lists both id-dsa-with-sha224 and
id-dsa-with-sha256 as:

joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1

They're correctly identified (I think) in the ASN.1 module as 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively.

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of [email-masked]
Sent: Monday, June 19, 2006 3:50 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt 

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working
Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 
                          Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and
ECDSA  
	Author(s)	: Q. Dang, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt
	Pages		: 
	Date		: 2006-6-19
	
        This document supplements RFC 3279. It 
        specifies algorithm identifiers, and ASN.1 
        encoding rules for the Digital Signature 
        Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital 
        Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) digital signatures 
        when using SHA-224, SHA-256, 384 or SHA-512 as 
        hashing algorithm. This specification applies 
        to the Internet X.509 Public Key 
        Infrastructure (PKI) when digital signatures 
        are used to sign certificates and certificate 
        revocation list (CRLs).  

        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 
        "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", 
        "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
        document are to be interpreted as described in 
        [RFC 2119]. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt

To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to
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To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt 
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 15:50:02 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 
                          Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA  
	Author(s)	: Q. Dang, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt
	Pages		: 
	Date		: 2006-6-19
	
        This document supplements RFC 3279. It 
        specifies algorithm identifiers, and ASN.1 
        encoding rules for the Digital Signature 
        Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital 
        Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) digital signatures 
        when using SHA-224, SHA-256, 384 or SHA-512 as 
        hashing algorithm. This specification applies 
        to the Internet X.509 Public Key 
        Infrastructure (PKI) when digital signatures 
        are used to sign certificates and certificate 
        revocation list (CRLs).  

        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 
        "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", 
        "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
        document are to be interpreted as described in 
        [RFC 2119]. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-00.txt

To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to 
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NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
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To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt 
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 15:50:01 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt
	Pages		: 84
	Date		: 2006-6-19
	
SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
   certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
   validation (e.g. making sure that none of the certificates in the
   path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
   which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
   of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
   policies.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt

To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to 
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Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 02:27:46 -0400
To: [email-masked]
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: slight whoops
Sender: [email-masked]

As you may have noticed, Stefan and I independently sent out last 
call notices for 3820bis, with slightly different closing dates.  We 
have agreed to go with my date, so July 5th is the close of last call 
for 3280bis.

Steve

Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2006 16:42:28 -0400
To: [email-masked]
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: last call for 3280bis
Sender: [email-masked]

--============_-1061631940==_ma============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"

Folks,

Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating last 
call on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" 
(<http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt)

The last call will last for two weeks. In deference to the U.S. 
Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd is a holiday for many 
folks), all comments must be received by July 5th.

Steve
--============_-1061631940==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>last call for 3280bis</title></head><body>
<div>Folks,</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Based on the latest message from David Cooper, I am initiating
last call on<font size="-1"> &quot;Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile"</font><tt> (</tt><a
href=
"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt"><font
 size="-1"
>http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt</font
></a><font size="-1">)</font></div>
<div><font size="-1">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size="-1">The last call will last for two weeks. In
deference to the U.S. Independence Dya holiday (which means July 3rd
is a holiday for many folks), all comments must be received by July
5th.</font></div>
<div><font size="-1"><br></font></div>
<div><font size="-1">Steve</font></div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-1061631940==_ma============--

Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2006 15:38:04 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-26.txt
Sender: [email-masked]

All,

I have just submitted draft 26 of SCVP for posting.  The draft should be 
available soon, but in the meantime, I have posted a diff file 
highlighting the differences between drafts 24 and 26 (the only 
difference between drafts 24 and 25 was the correction of a 
typographical error in section 3.6).  The diff file is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/wdiff_draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-24_to_26.html.

Drafts 24 and 26 differ in the following places:

1) Section 3: corrected cross-reference ("3.10" replaced by "3.11").

2) Section 3.2.4.2.3 (Name Validation Algorithm):  Matching rules for 
use with id-kp-serverAuth are now specified in the document rather than 
referring to the matching rules in RFC 2818 [HTTP-TLS].  (RFC 2818 is an 
Informational RFC and so SCVP could not include a normative reference to 
that document).

3) Section 3.6: "requestorName" replaced with "responderName".  (This 
was the typographical error that was corrected in draft 25.)

4) Section 4: A new sentence was added to clarify that when a protected 
response is required, the SCVP server must use SignedData or 
AuthenticatedData even if the response is being sent over a protected 
transport (e.g., TLS).

5) Section 11.1 (Normative References):  The reference to RFC 2818 was 
deleted.

None of these changes to the document result in any changes to the protocol.

Dave

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: WG Last Call: RFC3280bis
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2006 18:39:52 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6916B.E03064F2
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Folks,

=20

This message initiates working group last call for "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile"

This document is currently available at:
http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt. =20

=20

The last call will be two weeks.  That is, Last Call for this document
closes on or after July 3rd, 2006.

=20

Since I'm co-editor, Steve Kent will determine WG consensus.

=20

Thanks,

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6916B.E03064F2
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
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xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
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<body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<pre><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This message initiates working group last =
call for &quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and =
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) =
Profile&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></font></pre>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>This document is =
currently
available at: <a
href=3D"http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt=
">http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-03.txt</a>.&=
nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>The last call will =
be two
weeks.&nbsp; That is, Last Call for this document closes on or after =
July 3rd,
2006.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>Since I&#8217;m =
co-editor,
Steve Kent will determine WG consensus.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New"><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

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Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2006 13:08:30 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
CC: pkix <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [Fwd: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-25.txt]
Sender: [email-masked]

This was a typographical error.  The text should have referred to 
section 3.11 (SCVP Request Authentication), which defines the 
id-kp-scvpClient OID, but the cross-reference did not get updated when a 
new subsection was added to section 3.

yannick quenechdu wrote:

>Hi,
>
>I would wish a clarification about section 3 :
>
>"If the extended key usage extension is present, it MUST contain either
>the SCVP client OID (see Section 3.10) or another OID acceptable to the
>SCVP server."
>
>I do not see the relation with section 3.10. It is necessary to use the
>field RequestorText to indicate a OID for SCVP client ?
>  
>

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: RE: Request for agenda items for next IETF in Montreal
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2006 12:47:15 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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I would appreciate if editors of each wg document could send me a note
about whether any of the editors will be at the PKIX meeting and how
much time they need to make a status report.

=20

Thanks

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: den 2 juni 2006 23:29
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Request for agenda items for next IETF in Montreal

=20

At next IETF in Montreal we are going to have two PKIX sessions.

=20

One PKIX only session, in the traditional form, and one joint session
with the SIDR WG (Secure Inter-Domain Routing)

At the joint PKIX/SIDR meeting, Steve Kent will give a 1 hour
presentation on a PKI proposal.

=20

I will however only manage the agenda for the PKIX only session.

=20

Please let me know if you want to request a time slot for this meeting.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would appreciate if editors of =
each wg
document could send me a note about whether any of the editors will be =
at the
PKIX meeting and how much time they need to make a status =
report.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Thanks<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
[email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 2 juni 2006 =
23:29<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> [email-masked]<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> Request for =
agenda items
for next IETF in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place =
w:st=3D"on">Montreal</st1:place></st1:City></span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>At next IETF in <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Montreal</st1:City></st1:place>
we are going to have two PKIX sessions.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>One PKIX only session, in the traditional form, and =
one
joint session with the SIDR WG (</span></font>Secure Inter-Domain =
Routing<font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>)<o:p></o:p></span></font></=
p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>At the joint PKIX/SIDR meeting, Steve Kent will give =
a 1
hour presentation on a PKI proposal.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>I will however only manage the agenda for the PKIX =
only session.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>Please let me know if you want to request a time slot =
for
this meeting.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

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To: IETF-Announce <[email-masked]>
From: The IESG <[email-masked]>
Subject: Last Call: 'Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments' to  Informational RFC (draft-ietf-pkix-lightweight-ocsp-profile) 
Reply-to: [email-masked]
CC: <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2006 10:13:18 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) WG 
to consider the following document:

- 'Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments '
   <draft-ietf-pkix-lightweight-ocsp-profile-05.txt> as an Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
[email-masked] or [email-masked] mailing lists by 2006-06-29.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-lightweight-ocsp-profile-05.txt

Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: Request for agenda items for next IETF in Montreal
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 22:29:02 +0100
From: "Stefan Santesson" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C6868B.922D5A85
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

At next IETF in Montreal we are going to have two PKIX sessions.

=20

One PKIX only session, in the traditional form, and one joint session
with the SIDR WG (Secure Inter-Domain Routing)

At the joint PKIX/SIDR meeting, Steve Kent will give a 1 hour
presentation on a PKI proposal.

=20

I will however only manage the agenda for the PKIX only session.

=20

Please let me know if you want to request a time slot for this meeting.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>At next IETF in <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City =
w:st=3D"on">Montreal</st1:City></st1:place>
we are going to have two PKIX sessions.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>One PKIX only session, in the traditional form, and =
one
joint session with the SIDR WG (</span></font>Secure Inter-Domain =
Routing<font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>)<o:p></o:p></span></font></=
p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>At the joint PKIX/SIDR meeting, Steve Kent will give =
a 1
hour presentation on a PKI proposal.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>I will however only manage the agenda for the PKIX =
only session.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>Please let me know if you want to request a time slot =
for
this meeting.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon'>Stefan =
Santesson</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><strong><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font></b></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

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