Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 15:27:56 +0100

At 12:42 15.02.00 -0500, Chris Savage wrote:
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: P.J. Ponder [mailto:[email-masked]]
> >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 11:15 AM
> >To: [email-masked]
> >Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments
> >
> >
> >In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the
> >wiretapping document, I think the document as originally
> >posted is concise
> >and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions
> >raised.
> >
> >There were some comments about the definition of
> >'wire-tapping', and some
> >other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the
> >draft.  These
> >comments may deserve further discussion.
> >
> >Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it
> >stands to
> >set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the
> >IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping.  I don't see any
> >glaring errors
> >or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have
> >reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'.
> >
> >We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of
> >substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense
> >and cleary
> >states a position.
>
>As the (AFAIK) only proponent of a significant number of word changes, let
>me say that I agree.
>
>As I said earlier, the point of my proposed changes was to clarify the
>draft's evident intent, not to make actual, substantive changes.  The only
>possible exception was that, having defined "wiretapping" for purposes of
>the document to relate to communications on the 'net, an example that
>asserted that certain telco practices would "be" wiretapping seemed
>inconsistent; that discussion received, I think, my heaviest suggested
>editorial pen.  But even that was intended to clarify and tighten up the
>discussion, not to change its basic thrust in any way.
>
>Time to declare victory and go home?

I'd hope so.
I know the editors have your input in their queue; a new draft will 
probably be forthcoming reasonably soon, with the intent of shipping it to 
the IESG for processing and RFC publication (possibly with an IETF-wide 
Last Call).

After that, we should be done.

                  Harald

--
Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway
[email-masked]

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---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:57:02 -0500

The draft is a good general document, in my view, but it should be judged 
in light of how it will be applied. For example, if evaluated as a limited 
technical document expressing a general policy, I think it serves that 
purpose adequately. If evaluated as a clear, complete and unambiguous 
statement that plugs all loopholes that government lawyers may want to find 
in it by way of pointing to industry and user support for some kind of 
intrusion, experience teaches us that any crevice will be so exploited.

If the draft needs only to serve the former purpose, I think it is 
sufficient, with one modification: the wiretapping definition should 
include intercepts whether they are targeted or untargeted, whether 
processed in realtime or stored for potential subsequent processing.

If the draft is exploited by a government entity to declare industry and 
user acceptance of some further intrusion, it has ample crevices to 
accomodate that, unintended as that usage might be by the overwhelming 
consensus expressed at the meeting and in this list.

I assume we should judge the draft by the former criteria, and protest 
loudly if the latter exploitation comes forth.

--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 01:13:05 +0100

At 09:57 16.02.00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote:
>statement that plugs all loopholes that government lawyers may want to 
>find in it by way of pointing to industry and user support for some kind 
>of intrusion, experience teaches us that any crevice will be so exploited.

Anyone who thinks you can get a loophole-free document that is also 
understandable either has not worked much with standards or laws, or worked 
too long with them. I think the former interpretation is the only sensible one.

>processed in realtime or stored for potential subsequent processing.

I don't believe we can do that without declaring traffic statistics as 
wiretaps. Or spending an extremely long time arguing about the borderline 
cases.

                 Harald

                        Harald