Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:04:06 -0000

> >there is only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures.
> > 
> ... the cure is better procedures to prevent them getting unnecessarilly
in the death row.

Chefren, show us how, and tell us who the incorruptibles are who will
monitor these standards.  

not forgetting that an entire police force of a city numbering millions
couldnt control itself.

> Also very simple standards like "after conviction no electric chair within
xxx day's" can help.

how many days is xxx then? Shall I bother to trail the history books for
people proven innocent years after their execution?

Face some simple facts: authorities are not immune to corruption.
Authorities are the most difficult entity to police.  Law is not infallible.
Then perhaps we can get back to the purpose of the mailing list - ie should
the IETF blah blah blah.

Phil

_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
[email-masked]
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:16:50 +1100

I think one simple answer can be explored.
WE monitor the "authorities". The Auuthorities should be there to serve US.
How - by providing a reliable evidence trail in the technology WE use.
Do WE have this capability today?  Not even close!

Regards,
Lyal
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of
> [email-masked]
> Sent: Wednesday, 2 February 2000 20:04
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people
>
>

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 08:53:28 -0500

>Do WE have this capability today?  Not even close!

And this evidence trail --- it would be harder to subvert than current Los 
Angeles police evidence trails in which thousands of convictions are likely 
to be thrown out or challenged for police perjury, and other misconduct? 
There, police have lied under oath when testifying about chain of evidence, 
about actions of defendants, about shootings followed by police throwing 
down the throw-down gun. There have been thousands of wiretaps on thousands 
of phones from a single improperly approved judicial warrant, etc.

[It is noteworthy to describe how the LA Rampart police criminality was 
discovered. It was not via self monitoring of the police by the police. It 
was by a policeman, who had been inadvertantly arrested for separate crimes 
(using his policeman status to steal crack and cocaine and resell it thru 
prostitutes and providing protection for them) who offered to finger other 
police crimes for a reduced sentence.]

Why is it so hard to understand that the fears one has of crime in the 
general population are equalled if not exceeded by justifiable and 
reasonable fears about crime in the government, law enforcement, and 
surveillance, where there is less accountability and greater secrecy -- and 
guns/power to arrest and imprison?

Why is it so hard to understand that technical standards do not constrain 
the behavior of sovereign governments?

Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental 
entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, 
place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves?

To trust such unprecedented additions to the concentration of power and 
authority in governments defies our understanding of history and human 
nature. One must ignore both to have even a reasonable hope that the good 
done by "crime control" will exceed the harm done by concentrating this 
secretly-used power in government, and stressing government to manage 
accumulated powers that are beyond its wisdom, morality (?), and temptations.

Governments have murdered 170 million of their own subjects this century, 
excluding civil wars and international wars. There is no grouping of 
persons or organizations, to which the surveillance is proposed to be 
deployed, who can match the record of governments for outright murder. 
("Death by Government").

It is not that the people in government are more evil than other people; 
rather it's that concentrations of power (including power to arrest and 
imprison and a legal monopoly on violence), combined with secrecy and 
general self-policing, inevitably result in abuse. The history of avoiding 
that is based not on protocols, but on limiting accumulations and 
concentrations of power. Where that fails, we find the major horrors of the 
twentieth century, far beyond any damage any non-government terrorist 
assemblage has ever committed.

Those who think some standard or protocol by IETF can keep them on the 
straight and narrow have thus far failed to provide more than unsupported 
assertion as to that belief.

Those who think IETF participating in building standards or protocols will 
constrain governments to a higher quality, more moral and limited 
surveillance behavior have thus far failed to provide a shred of evidence 
to demonstrate how such effort will constrain governments.

Those who think such standards and protocols as an "auditable tap" can 
constrain a goverment who chooses from time to time not to be so 
constrained, have yet to provide even a science-fiction level description 
of how an "auditable tap" can tie the the hands of that miscreant government.

Lastly, no one has pointed to any law (CALEA and its FCC August ruling) 
that provides basis in US law that requires IETF to do anything; the August 
FCC ruling is under legal challenge in court now. And no one has described 
the basis on which one nation's laws must direct IETF while another 
nation's laws would be ignored by IETF.

That is why "IETF should NOT and will NOT participate in the creation or 
modification of protocols or standards to facilitate wiretapping...."

And chefren, before you fall back on the mindless rubric that "it must be 
done because democracies require it", please simply turn back the clock 
sixty years, look a few miles southeast from where you now comfortably sit, 
and ponder what that democracy "required".

That logical process is:
1. Is the entity that requires the action a democracy?
2. If yes, do the action and do not resist.

History has taught us that each person must evaluate the action and its 
effects, not just the entity that issues the orders. I would have thought 
that lesson would be more widespread in Holland, at least.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:12:12 +1100

Evidence trails are only as good as the technology that implements them, and
the society that reviews them.

Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all vehicle speed
(and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the speedo to a
review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed
limit?

With evidence trails, the activities of the Los Angeles police should have
come to light much earlier, theoretically improving the privacy for all the
others who where subsequently "privacy infringed".

Regards,
Lyal

> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Ed
> Stone
> Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 0:53
> To: [email-masked]

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 03 Feb 2000 06:41:49 -0500

> review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed

I would be tempted to find another means to travel.  This hypothetical
record of speeds traveled and speed limits seen would leak information
about exactly where I've been.  Why would I want to hand a list of
such information to police even if it sometimes catches dangerous
drivers?

> others who where subsequently "privacy infringed".

The problem here is that you're not proposing to impose any evidence
trails on police.  You're proposing to impose them on the general
citizenry.  That would not have helped the problem in LA; it would
have just made the LAPD's job easier.

It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law.  No
*technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police
who are disobeying the law.

-- 
James Carlson, System Architect                     <[email-masked]>
IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue   71.246W   Vox:  +1 781 372 8132
Lexington MA  02421-7996 / USA           42.423N   Fax:  +1 781 372 8090
"PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp

---

From: Matthew Saroff <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 07:40:07 -0600

On May 13, 11:42, James Carlson wrote:
> Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people
	There is a proposal to do this in Britain, with the data being fed to
an onboard governor to control auto speed.

-- 
Matthew Saroff
Do not reply directly to this message.  Reply to
[email-masked]

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 09:08:29 -0500

"Thumbs Down on Net Wiretaps
by Declan McCullagh

3:00 a.m. 3.Feb.2000 PST
WASHINGTON -- It took four months, a
grim debate, and thousands of mailing list
messages, but the group that sets
Internet standards has decided not to
support wiretapping.

The executive committees of the Internet
Engineering Task Force dismissed the idea
with characteristic understatement,
saying they would not "consider
requirements for wiretapping" in
protocols. ...."

source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34055,00.html

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:09:43 +1100

My point was, and as accepted below, a degree of compulsory auditability
(i.e set in law) dissuades you from undertaking activity outside the
prescribed limits.

The "LA police" issue is exactly that - a group of individuals acting
outside prescribed limits. They know what the are, and chose to ignore them.
If they were compulsorily audited, then they could have legally wiretapped,
but been detected as soon as non-legal wiretapping occured, protecting the
privacy of a large number of individuals.

If list participants distrust them LE much, then let's make sure we have a
process to make the accountable.  Since "we citizens" are unlikely to pay
for a "police the police force" consisting of thousands of privacy auditors,
why not have technology provide the basic grunt work of collecting and
collating audit material.

The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to ourselves.

An example of a minimum could be making all network interfaces devices
record when and how often they are put into promiscuous mode.

Regards,
Lyal
> James Carlson
> Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 22:42
> To: [email-masked]

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 22:42:24 +0100

> place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves?

Why is it so hard to understand there is now known 
alternative for democracy?

+++chefren

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 03 Feb 2000 16:58:54 -0500

> (i.e set in law) dissuades you from undertaking activity outside the

That's somewhat true, but still beside the point.  We could have LE
monitoring equipment duct-taped to our foreheads.  I'm sure that would
dissaude all sorts of crime and evil-doing.  I don't know whether it
would fly in Oz, but I assure you, it would not here.

> collating audit material.

Accountability is a political issue, not a technical issue.

> The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to ourselves.

Untrue.  The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do
NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without
LEA backdoors when we care about our data.  That doesn't sound like
bleating to me.  On the contrary, the plaintive wails from those who
would acquiesce to the random and unsubstantiated demands to tap
everything in sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep.

> record when and how often they are put into promiscuous mode.

Many do, but that does not help a whit.  How do I view logs of the
network interface events that occur at my ISP?  How about his upstream
provider?

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:03:50 +1100

[snip]
> everything in sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep.

Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each
individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data.

Lyal

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:59:56 +0100

> who are disobeying the law.

Nonsense.

If technical and to the point recommendations of the IETF 
require a unique chipcard to start a car it's pretty 
difficult to start the car without a chipcard.

All wiretap equipment should have auditability in it as 
should have routers and everything involved in the privacy 
of others.

+++chefren

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:03:13 +0100

> an onboard governor to control auto speed.

Strange views...

It's not an offence to break speed limits to be able to 
punish people.

It is to keep injuries/deaths low, to keep environment 
clean.

So if a system is proposed that makes the cars drive 
automatically exactly the right speed for a given traject 
that's OK and prevents anyone getting fines for speed 
limits.

The techies here tend to see lot's of things upside down...

+++chefren

---

From: Paul Ferguson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 07:15:17 -0500

>that's OK and prevents anyone getting fines for speed

*plonk*

And with that ridiculous comment, you are now in my
permanent twit filter list. You should also probably
be added to the net.kooks list....

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:17:27 +0100

On 3 Feb 00, at 16:58, James Carlson wrote:

> LEA backdoors when we care about our data.

And not about our community?

> That doesn't sound like bleating to me. On the contrary,
> the plaintive wails from those who would acquiesce to the
> random and unsubstantiated demands to tap everything in
> sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. 

Who demands to tap everything in sight?

The about 10+ people who aren't against tapping here are 
all for tightly integrated strong provisions against misuse.

+++chefren

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 04 Feb 2000 07:37:32 -0500

> > who are disobeying the law.

Certainly not.  What's needed are legal and political solutions.
Technical solutions cannot and will not by themselves force police (or
anyone else for that matter) to respect anyone's rights.

> difficult to start the car without a chipcard.

That's silly.  If such a car were built, then the folks who need to
start a car without being detected would MODIFY the car so that it
will start that way -- a couple of wires would do it -- or simply use
an old car that doesn't have the encumbrance.

"Pretty difficult" here means only that the people who are
inconvenienced are those who obey the law.  Those who do not are not
bothered a bit.

> should have routers and everything involved in the privacy 

That's still false.  Auditability does not solve the privacy problem.
In fact, it makes it worse.  Only those who are obeying the law
surrender their privacy to the auditing mechanism.

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 04 Feb 2000 07:47:54 -0500

> individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data.

Assuming, of course, that the police need to recover evidence on
someone's computer, yes.  That's the usual way search warrants are
handled and is highly unlikely to change.

For what it's worth, this isn't the bogeyman, and yours is not a
particularly strong argument.  Suppose LE did have a tappable version
of all known and knowable IP protocols.  They use these to detect one
of those newfangled thoughtcrimes in progress right here in Network
City.  Then what?  Well, of course, they turn the evidence over to a
prosecutor who then obtains warrants to break into each individual
computer to make sure there's nothing else hiding in there.  They'd be
negligent if they did anything less.

It is not the case, as you seem to be asserting, that allowing LE
unfettered access to the contents of IP traffic will somehow obviate
their perceived need to steal^H^H^H^H^Hgather evidence as they do
today.  In fact, since they would have enhanced means to detect crimes
that they fail to detect today, I would certainly expect that the
number of break-ins and seized computers would greatly increase under
this hypothetical police state.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 14:35:49 +0100

> anyone else for that matter) to respect anyone's rights.

Such legal and political solutions are "forbid free use of 
strong encryption", "make tapping equipment fully 
auditable".

The latter would for sure be helped by some good IETF 
standards.

> an old car that doesn't have the encumbrance.

Modern cars don't start without the cpu running properly.
 
> inconvenienced are those who obey the law.  Those who do not are not

I think this is beond reality. The newest modern cars in 
Europe are very difficult to steal because of techical 
tricks that cannot be circumvented with a few wires because 
they are tightly integrated in the design.

Precisely what I think tapping needs. Tapboxes with lot's 
of technical tricks that prevent Law Enforcement or others 
misusing them.

> surrender their privacy to the auditing mechanism.

I invite you to try to drive away in my car after I left it 
for one minute without locking it.

It will lock itself after that time and close the doors. 

To drive away you need to open it physically by a remote 
controller with rolling key generator, that generator 
automatically unlocks the computer inside and a physical 
key to start the motor. Only the latter can probably be 
overruled with some wires.

Encryption/authentication technology can be put in place to 
prevent misuse of taps and I'm pretty sure it works in a 
very high degree because I SEE it here in the Netherlands.

+++chefren

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 04 Feb 2000 08:50:48 -0500

> And not about our community?

I'm afraid I fail to see the threat against the community at large
posed by free access to strong encryption.

(Quite off topic, but the funny thing about it is that several
right-leaning folks on this list have stated without sufficient
evidence that we lefties would like the government to control this.
On the contrary!  Speaking as one of those pinkos, I think government
should keep its grubby fingers off my data.)

> Who demands to tap everything in sight?

Um, well, let's start with the LEs that rather forcefully request
tapping interfaces on all telecommunications equipment.  To that, you
can add the sycophant manufacturers and developers who are pushing to
standardize such a mistake and integrate the bug into IETF protocols.

> all for tightly integrated strong provisions against misuse.

I think you've misunderstood something.  We admit that we don't know
how to make complex security systems completely secure.  We know for a
fact that adding another interface to an already questionable security
infrastructure makes the entire system more complex and less reliable.

Given all of that, how do you propose the addition of intentional
security holes that only "properly authorized" LE can use and that
don't also violate the integrity of the system as a whole?

I find the argument that misuse will be prevented by technical means
to be wrong on the face of it and completely disingenuous.  It's a
fraud.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 15:29:26 +0100

> posed by free access to strong encryption.

People can organize cartels? And the non-business version 
in politics?

Or plainly organize crime so it can get the scale of 
Colombia or Russia.

..
 
> tapping interfaces on all telecommunications equipment.

That has nothing to do with sleepnetfishing, they demand 
access if necessary. If the provisions aren't made in 
telecom equipment the access won't be possible if necessary.

  [Here in The Netherlands there are laws that prevent the
  fire brigade finds blocks in their way  if there is
  fire.] 

..
 
> infrastructure makes the entire system more complex and less reliable.

I agree with that. But if society demands tappability, what 
do you want, a hodgepodge of proprietary standards or a 
well designed standard system that can be studied.
 
> don't also violate the integrity of the system as a whole?

It might well be that tappability will ad security holes 
but so are almost all requirements.

> to be wrong on the face of it and completely disingenuous.  It's a

It isn't. Tapping of GSM and ISDN in The Netherlands is 
done according to the lines I described here some times and 
I can assure you it's pretty impossible to misuse it.

You need special equipment, you need special software, you 
need keys, you need to be on a special place, there are at 
least three independently administering parties that are 
involved.

+++chefren

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 04 Feb 2000 09:40:14 -0500

> strong encryption", "make tapping equipment fully 

That appears to be a non sequitur.  Just how does the lack of strong
encryption or the addition of auditing force anyone to respect
anyone's rights?

You seem to be missing the point.

> Modern cars don't start without the cpu running properly.

Pre-modern cars are readily available.  Would you like to prohibit the
possession of 1971 Buick LeSabres on national security grounds?  There
certainly are some humorous conclusions to this line of "reasoning."

> of technical tricks that prevent Law Enforcement or others 

You've never designed security systems, have you?  The more technical
tricks you add, the *LESS* secure the system is.  The systems we have
now cannot be completely analyzed from a security standpoint.  Adding
more complexity will make the problem (and the failures) far worse.

We're an engineering group.  Our goals are engineering goals.  It's
most certainly not a goal to produce security that doesn't work.

> overruled with some wires.

I'm not a skilled thief, and I never claimed to be.  Such a system,
though, is not secure against those skilled in the art.  It simply
deters amateurs.  Someone who is good at this very likely does not
need the key generator.  Instead, he takes it to a garage,
disassembles the car and replaces the computer with one more to his
liking.

This is roughly the situation with tapping.  Suitable application of
force will bypass flimsy protections.

> very high degree because I SEE it here in the Netherlands.

And your proof would be what?  Anecdotal evidence?

---

From: "Ge' Weijers" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:44:41 -0700

> individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data.

This measure is more expensive, and far more riskier, so it will only
be used where ordinary policework won't do the trick. Widespread abuse
is far less likely.

Ge'

-- 
-
Ge' Weijers                                Voice: (614)326 4600
Progressive Systems, Inc.                    FAX: (614)326 4601
2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:44:03 +1100

I think the point of the previous misses the thread of the discussion.

While it it true that a warrant would be issued to examine computer contents
IF evidence were gained elsewhere (including by police-work or tapping), in
the absence of adequate tapping facilities, LE WILL, secretly and
indiscriminately, gain secret access to large numbers of computers.
You can't imagine they'd be silly enough to not get a copy of BO source
code, pay someone to tweak it, and then embed it into a dozen of so common
peices of shareware or software tools/accessories distributed with every
operating system. For $500k, they'd have us all by the short and curlies.

This creates the analogy of the "LAPD tapping abuse", which reaches into
millions of computers, anywhere in the world, not just in the individual LE
officer's jurisdiction.

To put it bluntly, there won't be reliable means of detecting such "Break
and Enter" and "Break & Bug" software or hardware tools in operation.

Some months ago I made two assertions on this list that a) so far, no
untapped encryption protocols existed (they mostly depend on external
factors for security), and b) no "secure enough" consumer PC-like operating
systems existed to preclude simple B&E to computers.  The recent CERT
announced web vulnerability confirms the latter, and no-one disputed the
former.

And since more than 99.5% of internet users are less that security literate,
or computers-literate to manage their own security, this situation will
remain while ever "WE" take no steps.

Unless we look at these issues long and hard, we are wasting out time with
this, and all similar lists.

Regards,
Lyal

> Sent: Friday, 4 February 2000 23:48
> To: [email-masked]

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:54:22 +1100

[snip]

> be used where ordinary policework won't do the trick. Widespread abuse

I don't think it would be any riskier, and comparatively cheap - probably
cheaper than mass tapping.
The plethora of undetected Back-Orifice style trojans successfully operating
on the Internet is testament to the low-risk, low cost, high success attacks
that could be launched.

Getting these trojans into machines is not a difficult or expensive task.
The most expensive option may be to simply buy a software comapny, and put
the code into a few items of code that is distributed as shareware, or as
accessory tools to an OS distribution.
The Real music player and WebTV incidents are examples of how long it takes
millions of users to detect something is not kosher in their device.

Lyal

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:36:44 +0100

> this, and all similar lists.

I don't know.

What I do know is that withing a few years PC's will be 
out. They are cumbersome and the programmability is their 
weakness.

Internetterminals with minimal "OS" and an XHTML compatible 
browser in FlashROM will be in.

All functionality will be in the applications that run on 
central Hotmail like servers.

Of course people like us will still have personal computers 
and workstations but the big majority (95% or more of the 
people) will be behind more or less unprogrammable 
networkterminals. Java-Sandbox will be the maximum local 
freedom for normal users. Strong encryption will probably 
only be possible with help of an chipcard-slot and a highly 
standardized chipcard (unique personal ID on it...).

Since all communication is provided and the service 
provider is one of the communication partners decryption 
for law enforcement will be no problem at all(?).

Maybe we make far too much trouble about this?

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:33:21 -0500

>alternative for democracy?

If democracy were a certification of reasonable respect for human rights, 
Holland would not have had to put up its 18 minute defense against a regime 
to its south east 60 years ago, a regime which was, uh, democratically 
elected by a large and vigorous majority.

Others found a cure for that democracy.

Those who are unaware of history are condemned to support wiretapping, it 
seems.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 04:06:14 +0100

On 4 Feb 00, at 20:33, Ed Stone wrote:

> Those who are unaware of history are condemned to
> support wiretapping, it seems. 

You are very fixed on history.

If history was a =guarantee= for the future everybody would 
be rich and famous. (0) And we wouldn't have anything new.

Things change. Democracies have decided that individuals 
can not be allowed to hide their communication in an 
absolute way for law enforcement.

+++chefren

(0) Yes, stupid thought.