Subject: RE: [RPSEC] Interoperation between solutions

From: "Dennis Beard" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 15:02:37 -0500

How do we define requirements if the threat work is not done?  Why the
discussion on requirements at this point?  Perhaps I am missing the point or
did we get ahead of ourselves.

Regards,

Dennis Beard

-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Kent [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 2:09 PM
To: Iljitsch van Beijnum
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [RPSEC] Interoperation between solutions

At 7:35 PM +0100 11/12/02, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
>We may end up in a situation where part of the internet uses S-BGP and 
>another part uses soBGP. We need something to make the two work 
>together. Proposed requirement:
>
>	An interdomain routing protocol security solution must have
>	provisions to allow the use of proxy validation servers between
>	areas of the network where the solution is used, and other areas
>	of the network where other solutions are in use. It must be
>	possible to determine the real origin of the routing
>	information that has passed the proxy server, but validation of
>	this information must be based on the proxy server's credentials
>	and a possible implicit or explicit indication of the security
>	level of the original information, as determined and validated
>	by the proxy server. Information passing a proxy server shall
>	not be given a higher security level than that warranted by the
>	proxy server's credentials, even if the proxy server indicates
>	the original information has a higher security level. The
>	security level of individual proxy servers must be configurable.
>

I think this suggestion is getting way ahead of what this WG is supposed to
do. It has the flavor of "I know what the answer is and I want to make 
sure we craft requirements that accommodate my idea of the right 
answer."

This WG is supposed to develop security requirements for routing 
protocols.  We have had a lot of discussion of S-BGP as an example, 
but it's adoption and deployment is far from certain and ought not be 
the focus of most of our discussions. soBGP is very, very new. I know 
of no published papers analyzing it from any perspective: security, 
performance, etc., unlike S-BGP.  So unless you believe that the 
corporate affiliation of its authors automatically ensures its 
adoption (hardly an IETF way of doing business), it is even less 
certain to be adopted or deployed.

This sort of requirements gerrymandering is very inappropriate.

Steve
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