Subject: Re: [RPSEC] Re: draft-convery-bgpattack-00

From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2002 16:03:37 -0700

Steve,
Do you have a pointer to this study?

-danny

> This last observation is not borne out by experience.  DARPA-funded 
> research reported in 2002 observed that about 1% of all advertised 
> routes are in error at any time.  Given current routing table sizes, 
> this amounts to about 1,000 routes.  Thus some number of ISPs do make 
> mistakes and their neighbors do propagate these errors to the rest of 
> the Internet. Mechanisms that detect and reject advertisements that 
> are in error do seem to be needed for BGP.

_______________________________________________
RPSEC mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec

---

From: Iljitsch van Beijnum <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 00:26:42 +0100 (CET)

> Do you have a pointer to this study?

I think that would be this one:
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/ratul/bgp/index.html

Note that only a small part of this is due to user error.

I learned this the hard way. A while ago, when replacing a prefix list
with an identical one under a different name I triggered maximum
prefixes for a peer even though there was no time there wasn't a valid
filter in place.

---

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 18:41:11 -0500

>  > are in error do seem to be needed for BGP.

A paper was published by these folks in SIGCOMM 2002:

Understanding BGP Misconfiguration. Ratul Mahajan, David Wetherall 
and Tom Anderson(University of Washington)