Subject: [RPSEC] Comments on Section 1, Introduction

From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2003 22:32:37 -0400 (Eastern Daylight Time)

I would suggest we replace this section:

   denial of service, flooding attacks and others. The document does not
   consider threats that result from bad implementations that are
   related to specific routing.  The security requirements derived from
   this threat analysis are intended to be used as guidance to those who
   are designing routing protocols.

with:

While its well known that bad, incomplete, or poor implementations of
routing protocols may, in themselves, lead to routing problems or
failures, or may increase the risk of a network being attacked
successfully, these issues are not considered here. This document only
considers attacks against robust, well considered implementations of
routing protocols, as outlined in [OSPF], [IS-IS], [RIP], and [BGP].

(provide references for the above)

The security requirements derived from this analysis are intended to
be used as guidance to those who are designing and modifying routing
protocols. They may also be used by routing protocol implementors to
increase the robustness of their impmementations.

--

I'm not certain we reached any concensus on list.

:-)

Russ

__________________________________
[email-masked] CCIE <>< Grace Alone

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