Subject: Re: [RPSEC] issue: operator use

From: Sandy Murphy <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 12:22:19 -0500 (EST)

> The problem we're running in
> to here is that we have to decide is engineering traffic is actually an
> attack or not.

I see it a bit differently.  The problem to me is that allowing this
behavior as legitimate makes it real darn difficult to prevent people
from adding AS's other than their own to an AS_PATH for evil
purposes.  Not impossible but much more complicated.

Engineering your own traffic is reasonable - engineering someone
else's traffic can be a problem.

--Sandy

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From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 12:37:56 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)

>> The problem we're running in to here is that we have to decide is 
>> engineering traffic is actually an attack or not.
>
> from adding AS's other than their own to an AS_PATH for evil purposes. 
> Not impossible but much more complicated.
>
> Engineering your own traffic is reasonable - engineering someone else's 
> traffic can be a problem.

Of course, your inbound traffic is someone else's outbound traffic, and 
your outbound traffic is someone else's inbound traffic, so it's not even 
that simple...

:-)

Russ

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[email-masked] CCIE <>< Grace Alone

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From: Doug Montgomery <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 14:15:21 -0500

I think soon we will need to partition existing BGP mechanisms *and* common
practices into those that we think  are necessary / desirable to secure
and those that can secured in a reasonable way.

I can envision a long period of partial / incremental deployment (possibly
forever) in which one might still use things that don't make the second cut.
Seems like it might become a local pref kind of thing, reflecting how concerned
you are about various attributes being verifiable vs not.  Depending upon your
local policy you might weight completely verifiable but otherwise lower
pref, higher than some other path that can't be completely verified.

Anyway, the meta thought was not everything that is common practice today
has to be secured.  Those that don't make the cut won't necessarily die,
they will just be less assured.  How they continue to be used will probably
evolve over time.

dougm