Subject: Re: [RPSEC] Basis of Requirements?

From: Sandy Murphy <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2005 16:34:22 -0400 (EDT)

>If the bad guys won't be able to make routing anomolies happen, but 
>they can still happen, then these must happen because of the good 
>guys, how do we tell them apart? :).

Your statement says "if A can't happen and B is happening, how do
we tell them apart?" which doesn't parse, because there's no "them"
to tell apart, you see.

The idea is trying to remove the ability for the bad guys to inject
deliberate routing anomalies into the system as much as possible.
Then plan on learning to live with the anomalies that occur locally
and "naturally", with the expectation that these are random and
uncoordinated.  Of course, if the local "natural" anomalies become
deliberate, and especially if they become coordinated (dependent
rather than independent), then you need to think about changes -
to the protocols, to operations, whatever.

--Sandy

_______________________________________________
RPSEC mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec

---

From: Tony Li <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2005 15:20:53 -0700

Sandy,

> deliberate routing anomalies into the system as much as possible.

No, that's definitely NOT the goal.  In particular, the "as much as  
possible" part is way over the top.  We need a solution that raises  
the bar on the control plane, to be sure, but the costs and  
complexity of the solution must be in keeping with the amount of  
deterrence actually achieved relative to the status quo and in  
keeping with the fact that we are not addressing the forwarding plane.

To be much more blunt: both SBGP and SoBGP are way over the top.   
Arguing about which is better is pointless, as the deployable reality  
is that something simpler than either is all that is warranted, IMHO.

Regards,
Tony

p.s. I vote 'no'.  ;-)  Requirements that lead to undeployable  
solutions are pointless.