Subject: [rrg] [ILNP] Firewalls and good practices

From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 16:37:43 +0200

In
<http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/research/researchnotes/documents/RN_05_22.pdf>,
you can read "The use of Identifiers enables firewalls to have access
control rules that are based on identity, rather than address or
location. This might permit a corporate IT security manager to give
the CEO's laptop more privileges than a network-capable ID badge
reader, for example." 

This claim is not reproduced in the current set of I-D and rightly so:
because ILNP has no protection of the Identifier (such as ORCHID), it
is easy to lie about your Identifier.

So, what are the good practices for firewalls with ILNP? The current
set of I-D does not mention it (may be it is too early). I would say
that, since you can get *some* authentication of the Locator (BCP 38,
returnability with protocols like TCP), filtering on the Locator may
be a sensible idea while filtering on the Identifier is a very bad
one.

This would be consistent with the current practice. With Apache, when
you write 'Allow from 2001:660:3003::/48', you say "Allow every
machine which happens to be connected in this network". You authorize
a localisation, not an identity.

Do you think it would be a good addition in Security Considerations
for future documents?