Subject: [Rserpool] Applicability draft

From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 18:12:54 -0400

It's nice work, and I have a few comments:

1) This may be the discussion that never dies, but I
think in section 1 it may be best to say that rserpool
provides highly-available network sessions, rather than
highly-available services.  The latter implies that 
rserpool moves service state around.  As such, rather than
stating "The goal is to provide server based redundancy"
it might be better to say that the goal is to provide a tool
to help build redundant servers.

2) In the security section it says that TLS or IPSec will be
used to secure the connection.  IPSec will not work unless
IP addresses are transferred during failover (in which case
you wouldn't need rserpool), because of the use of addresses
as selectors in the SADB.   For TLS to be able to work you 
would need to have server certs on every server in the pool,
which is straightforward, but you'd also need a mechanism
to securely transfer session security state (negotiated
shared secret, cryptographic attributes. etc.).

Melinda

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From: Michael Tuexen <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 00:28:40 +0200

Melinda,
see my comments below.
Best regards
Michael

> to help build redundant servers.
You are right on this point.
> shared secret, cryptographic attributes. etc.).
You assume that the IPSec security association or the TLS session
is maintained during failover. This is not required.
In TLS, for example, during fail-over you can set up a new SCTP
connection (assuming an SCTP based service) and a new TLS session.
The SCTP connection state is NOT transfered and there is no requirement
to do this for the TLS session. So you do NOT have to have a security
state transfer mechanism.
> Melinda
[email-masked]

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From: Michael Tuexen <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 00:28:40 +0200

Melinda,
see my comments below.
Best regards
Michael

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From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 18:37:32 -0400

At 12:28 AM 6/25/02 +0200, Michael Tuexen wrote:
>So you do NOT have to have a security state transfer mechanism.

Thanks for clarifying that.  Perhaps it would be clearer in
if that were made explicit in the text?

Thanks,

Melinda

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From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 18:37:32 -0400

Thanks,

Melinda