Subject: Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: (with COMMENT)

From: "Stephen Farrell" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 05:10:42 -0700

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I would have liked to know a bit more about how these schemes
behave if some of the servers or say a ToR device in the DC are
considered as attackers e.g. having been compromised, but you
only mention attacks from outside the DC. I assume the answer is
to not accept servers as BGP speakers, but I'm not sure how you
do that reliably. And I also don't know whether or not ToR
devices are successfully attacked often.