Subject: Draft minutes

From: [email-masked] (Sam Hartman)
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:06:48 -0400 (EDT)

Please send in comments or corrections by next Tuesday.  I will send
in for proceedings shortly after that point.

IETF SASL WG meeting Minutes
==========================

Tuesday 15 July 2003
3:45pm
chairs:    Sam Hartman <[email-masked]> Kurt Zeilenga <[email-masked]>
scribe: Luke Howard <[email-masked]>

2222bis
=======

- Alexei noted that he has published a subsequent revision of
  2222bis; minor editorial issues remain
- Clarification of empty authorization identities 
- Alexei will do a final revision of the document in the first
  week of August after which it can go to last call

saslprep
========

- Sam noted that current belief is that this will meet the needs
  of the Kerberos community
- The saslprep document is to be revised to include informational
  mapping tables but is otherwise ready for last call.  New revision
  is expected shortly after the meeting and the last call will follow
  shortly after it is announced.

DIGEST-MD5
==========

- DIGEST-MD5: Alexei noted that since the last revision he has
  made the following changes:
- Clarifications regarding character sets and authorization vs authentication 
  identities
- reference to saslprep the last revision has been
  updated
- Clarified RC4 cipher state is not reset between
  packets
- merged AES cipher document with this one
- no changes to solve the AES CBC mod attack:
  requested text be contributed once a solution is
  found. 
- The working group decided that AES for digest-md5 will use random IVs
  rather than counter mode.  Counter mode is harder to implement
  correctly.
- Questions from Sam regarding mandatory to implement
  ciphers: what should it be (if one is not already
  required)?
- Sam believes there will be interest in making   RC4  mandatory
  to implement   because it is implemented now;
  there is no security reason to not do so that he 
  was aware of
- Kurt noted a question as to whether security layers
  were mandatory to implement; not wearing his chair
  hat he suggested that at least integrity should be
  mandatory, Alexei noted that many mail clients do
  authentication only
- Chris Newman suggested that layers should not be
  mandatory because we already have TLS; suggest that
  vendors may remove support for DIGEST-MD5 entirely
  due to engineering cost of implementing layers
- Kurt suggested SHOULD implement integrity and that
  security considerations should note that you are
  subject to MITM without TLS or layers
- Noted that CRAM-MD5 is subject to the "evil server" 
  attach which DIGEST-MD5 is not because there is a
  client nonce; also DIGEST-MD5 being compatible with 
  HTTP digest has advantages. ie. there are sufficient
  advantages over CRAM-MD5 in spite of the lack of 
  layers being mandatory to implement
- Sam asked for consensus for deprecating both DES and
  triple DES. There were no objections, nor to taking
  them out of the document. Sam suggested that we note
  in the Security Considerations or Changes Since
  section as to why these were deprecated (preference
  for latter section)

GSSAPI
======

- Sam noted draft was "eaten by the secretariat"
- Plan is to move forward on it -- 00 to appear "soon"

CRAM-MD5
========

- A version with saslprep references is available

SASL Applicability Statement
============================

- Keith Burdis agreed to submit an SASL applicability statement as an
  individual submission.  His document will include comparisons of the
  various sasl mechanisms and their security properties. Sam agreed to
  propose an outline for the document.  The working group will discuss
  rechartering to include this document after the first revision.