Subject: [savi] New version of SEND-SAVI draft

From: Alberto García <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2009 10:47:44 +0200

Hi,

We have uploaded a new version of the SEND SAVI draft.

The main changes from version -00 are the following:

-        Now deployment is perimetrical (with trusted and untrusted ports).
Therefore, only border SEND SAVI devices have to check for the validity of a
binding.

-        The mechanism is described as a state machine

-        Bindings are created by making a SEND SAVI devices issue secured
NUD NSOL messages with their own addresses.

-        SEND Anchors, Certification Path Solicitations/Advertisements. are
considered

-        A mechanism is provided to protect against DoS attacks by blocking
for some time ports from which validation was unsuccessful.

Regards,

Alberto

      Title           : SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation

      Author(s)       : M. Bagnulo, A. Garcia-Martinez

      Filename        : draft-ietf-savi-send-01.txt

      Pages           : 19

      Date            : 2009-10-23

This memo describes SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address

validation using the SEND protocol.  The proposed mechanism is

intended to complement ingress filtering techniques to provide a

higher granularity on the control of the source addresses used.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:

 <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-savi-send-01.txt>
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-savi-send-01.txt