Subject: RE: [Sipping] Working Group Last Call -- draft-ietf-sipping-nai-r eqs

From: "Mark Watson" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 15:34:19 +0100

> > OK, I will check this. The definition of a Trust Domain (in general)
> > does not need to define Spec(T). 
> 
> I mean something much simpler. I mean that your document does 
> not define 
> what "Spec(T)" means. It needs to define it, like it defines 
> trust domain.
> 

The meaning of the term Spec(T) is defined as part of the definition of a
Trust Domain:

"A node can be a member of a Trust Domain, T, only if the node is know to be
compliant to a certain set of specifications, Spec(T), which characterize
the handling of Network Asserted Identity within the Trust Domain, T."

I could try re-wording this to make it clear that this is intended to define
the term Spec(T) - do you have any suggestions ?

...Mark

---

From: Jonathan Rosenberg <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 07 Jun 2002 11:50:12 -0400

Mark Watson wrote:
> The meaning of the term Spec(T) is defined as part of the definition of
> a Trust Domain: 
> 
> "A node can be a member of a Trust Domain, T, only if the node is know
> to be compliant to a certain set of specifications, Spec(T), which
> characterize the handling of Network Asserted Identity within the Trust
> Domain, T."
> 
> I could try re-wording this to make it clear that this is intended to
> define the term Spec(T) - do you have any suggestions ?

There should be a defintiion for it in section 2, since IMHO, the notion 
of a spec(T) is quite central to the entire architecture.

How about:

2.X Spec(T)

An aspect of the definition of a trust domain is that all the elements 
in that domain are compliant to a set of configurations and 
specifications generally referrred to as Spec(T). Spec(T) is not a 
specification in the sense of a written document; rather, its an agreed 
upon set of information that all elements are aware of. Proper 
processing of the asserted identities requires that the elements know 
what is actually being asserted, how it was determined, and what the 
privacy policies are. All of that information is characterized by Spec(T).

-Jonathan R.

-- 
Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D.            72 Eagle Rock Avenue
Chief Scientist                         First Floor
dynamicsoft                             East Hanover, NJ 07936
[email-masked]                 FAX: (973) 952-5050
http://www.jdrosen.net                  PH:  (973) 952-5000
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---

From: Michael Hammer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 07 Jun 2002 17:56:18 -0400

Based on this definition and my previous comment regarding the 
diagram.  Does spec(T) also require that there be a secure connection 
between the two elements?

I understood the dotted line meant all parties were in the same trust domain.
Being in the same trust domain means that all parties share the same spec(T).
Sharing the same spec(T) means that A, B, and C can mutually trust each other.

The previous response said no.  What am I missing?

Mike

At 11:50 AM 6/7/2002 -0400, Jonathan Rosenberg wrote:

>>>I mean something much simpler. I mean that your document does not define 
>>>what "Spec(T)" means. It needs to define it, like it defines trust domain.
>>
>An aspect of the definition of a trust domain is that all the elements in 
>that domain are compliant to a set of configurations and specifications 
>generally referrred to as Spec(T). Spec(T) is not a specification in the 
>sense of a written document; rather, its an agreed upon set of information 
>that all elements are aware of. Proper processing of the asserted 
>identities requires that the elements know what is actually being 
>asserted, how it was determined, and what the privacy policies are. All of 
>that information is characterized by Spec(T).
>
>
>
>-Jonathan R.
>
>
>
>--

---

From: Jonathan Rosenberg <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 09 Jun 2002 01:37:28 -0400

> The previous response said no.  What am I missing?

Sharing spec(T) does not mean A,B, and C can mutually trust each other. 
In the diagram, A cannot trust C. Even though it knows C conforms to 
Spec(T), it doesn't have a secure connection to C, and therefore, can't 
be sure that the thing its talking to is C, and so doesn't know for sure 
that it follows spec(T).

-Jonathan R.

---

From: Michael Hammer <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2002 12:19:46 -0400

At 01:37 AM 6/9/2002 -0400, Jonathan Rosenberg wrote:

>Sharing spec(T) does not mean A,B, and C can mutually trust each other. In 
>the diagram, A cannot trust C. Even though it knows C conforms to Spec(T), 
>it doesn't have a secure connection to C, and therefore, can't be sure 
>that the thing its talking to is C, and so doesn't know for sure that it 
>follows spec(T).
>
>-Jonathan R.

So, I guess I need to read a couple things into the picture:

1)  Spec(T) conformance cannot define behavior at B such that transitive 
trust between A and C could be established.

2) There is an assumption that C cannot authenticate itself and sign a 
message that is passed through B over the secure connections to A.  (In 
other words, that would be represented by an additional secure connection 
line from A to C.

Mike