Subject: [Sipping] Re: e2m, m2m security drafts

From: Kumiko Ono <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 18:44:40 +0900

Hi Mark,

Thanks for your comments. Inline-

<[email-masked]> wrote:
>1. Section 5.1 of 
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ono-sipping-end2middle-security-
>00.txt 
>shows an example of an encrypted SDP in an INVITE but the key to this 
>encrypted SDP is selectively shared with some proxies so they can view the 
>encrypted data.  There is undoubtedly some information in the SDP that a 
>proxy needs to view and some that it does not need to view, such as the 
>end-to-end keying material.  Can we accommodate this requirement in the 
>current proposals?  That is, could we keep the keying material encrypted 
>end-to-end while allowing a proxy to view other parts of the SDP message?

Yes, definitely. 
Section 3.1 of the requirement draft says that 
"The solution MUST work even with  SIP end-to-end encryption for 
confidentiality service enabled".

To clarify this requirement, I would say:
- It MUST work even with end-to-end encryption of some data.
  That is, encrypted data can be shared with the end user and selected 
proxies.
- It MUST NOT violate end-to-end encryption when the encrypted data does 
not need to be shared with any proxies.
  
>2. Have you considered writing a core specification like RFC 1847 and allow 
>for one or more profiles such as S/MIME (today) and PGP MIME (in the 
>future)?  I understand that S/MIME is the designated SIP solution, but it 
>might be wise to allow for future extensions.

Hmm... in the future, such extensions might be needed.
However, I have not considered that yet.
I think there are still more work to use S/MIME practically in SIP.

Thanks a lot,

Kumiko

--
Kumiko Ono
NTT Network Service Systems Labs.
Tel +81 422 59 4508/Fax +81 422 60 4012

_______________________________________________
Sipping mailing list  https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping
This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP
Use [email-masked] for questions on current sip
Use [email-masked] for new developments of core SIP