Subject: RE: [Sipping] SIP support for hold and ringback for operator / 91 1 services

From: "Rosen, Brian" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 14:59:04 -0500

> In principal, I would think that someone (NENA??) could hand 
> out certs 
> that do, in fact, certify that a user is an operator in an emergency 
> service center. If a call I make completes to an user that has a cert 
> declaring them as an emergency operation, my UA wouldn't allow me to 
> terminate the call.
> 
I looked into this when the privacy folks wanted to make sure that
emergency calls in fact reached an emergency service provider.

I was told this would take a treaty.

Basically, the nations won't recognize any specific agency as the
root CA.  I keep hoping we can get ITU to do it as part of the
delegation of sos.arpa.  I really do want a cryptographic way to
authenticate stuff in my sos.arpa DNS tree, and I really do want to
authenticate a PSAP.

It guaranteed to be a problem if any organization that looks vaguely
US in origin was doing it.  NENA could be the CA for the U.S. of course,
but to work really well, you want its key to be signed by the international
CA.

Brian

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From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 17:18:45 EST

> but to work really well, you want its key to be signed by the international

Well, the answer to all this is quite simple - just recognize that emergency 
calling, connection holding, ringback, etc. are national matters and do not 
have to cross boundaries (except maybe where adjacent countries set up specific 
agreements, including CAs if necessary). Anything more than that seems to be 
beyond our ability to deal with.

Mike Pierce

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From: "Rosen, Brian" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 17:43:18 -0500

We don't do national variants in the IETF.  It does matter.
If you can spoof, you can create your own imitation sos.arpa tree,
with your own us.sos.arpa, with your own public key.  No one will be
the wiser.  

We can broadly disseminate the us.sos.arpa public key within the U.S.,
but in general, it's not possible to securely disseminate every nation's
sos.arpa public key.  Having a root CA to certify them would make a
basically insecure system a secure system.

Brian

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 5:19 PM
To: [email-masked]; [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Sipping] SIP support for hold and ringback for operator / 91 1
services

Well, the answer to all this is quite simple - just recognize that emergency
calling, connection holding, ringback, etc. are national matters and do not
have to cross boundaries (except maybe where adjacent countries set up
specific agreements, including CAs if necessary). Anything more than that
seems to be beyond our ability to deal with. 

Mike Pierce

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 18:21:51 EST

In a message dated 2/17/2004 5:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> We don't do national variants in the IETF.

I didn't suggest doing a national variant. I said "recognize that emergency 
calling, connection holding, ringback, etc. are national matters". Then, all 
that the IETF needs to do is make sure it has generic protocols and security 
procedures in place so each country can define ways to use them so that people in 
that country can call emergency centers in that country according to the 
rules and laws applicable in that country.

Mike Pierce