Subject: RE: [Speermint] Updated Draft: SPEERMINT Peering Architecture

From: "Lee, Yiu" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2006 08:35:53 -0400

Brian,

I agree that most people will accept unknown calls to discover something
new. However, we have to admit that some people in this world abuse our
curiosity. I think the last thing we want to have is building a system
that allows spammers to spam sip sessions like the way they spam emails.
Since many people in this list (including myself) compare sip peering to
email system, we need to define some way to protect ourselves. Asserted
identity is a very good approach. I can at least complain to my service
provider when I received a spam call and my service provider will be
able to trace down the caller from the asserted identity. To prevent
from receiving 10000 "unknown" calls per day, I will probably only
accept calls routed from my service provider rather than accepting any
call routed from public/unknown proxies directly to me. I will rely on
my service provider to accept calls only with valid asserted identity. I
expect that my service provider will probably sign some bi-lateral
agreement with other peering service providers to enforce policies for
asserted identity. Of course, this is only my choice. Other people can
decide to open up their proxies and accept calls from anywhere. For
Domain C, I think at minimum C cares if A's Id is asserted by Domain B.
So, if C wants to trace back A for any reason, he will have a way.

Regards,
Yiu

-----Original Message-----
From: Brian Rosen [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 7:46 AM
To: 'Otmar Lendl'; 'Patrick Melampy'
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: [Speermint] Updated Draft: SPEERMINT Peering Architecture

Oh, I really expect to see most connections through carriers for quite a
while.  I do wonder if "trust" is something transit networks can
actually help with.

I believe in identity, and identity has to be asserted by someone.  One
reasonable source of trusted identity is the originating carrier.  That
is an enduring value; if a carrier does little more than provide a
reliable identity, that will help avoid SPIT.

However, it seems hard to me for a transit network to provide a trust
chain stronger than a direct connections.  Maybe this is wrapped up in
what you call "trusted communications".  What is the assertion that B is
making about A that C cares about?

One of the things that we have to face is that most of us WILL accept a
call from someone we don't know.  We balance the risk of being annoyed
or offended against the risk of discovering something new that we like.
A business, as an example, doesn't want to miss a call from a new
customer, so it always accepts calls directed to its general sales line
from anyone.  

We have to deal with identity, which is one of the trust characteristics
an originator provides to a terminator.  What else are we trusting?

Brian

-----Original Message-----
From: Otmar Lendl [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 2:15 AM
To: Patrick Melampy
Cc: 'Brian Rosen'; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Speermint] Updated Draft: SPEERMINT Peering Architecture

On 2006/05/31 03:05, Patrick Melampy <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 
> B's value (which you seem to completely be disregarding) isn't solely 
> that he can forward SIP messages directly to C -- more importantly, C 
> trust's B that B will only forward TRUSTED communication to C. Thus 
> the chain of identity asserted, trusted communication, can only work 
> when untrusted networks and proxies are either excluded, or clearly 
> identified as untrusted.

Correct.

> Speaking of enterprises...I bet very few will connect their IP PBX to 
> the public internet.

You've got to distinuish "public internet" on layer 3 from open SIP
proxy on the Internet. Right now, some of the enum.at registrars are
happily selling VoIP-based PBX installations to enterprises which peer
with each other automatically based on User-ENUM and open SIP URIs.

>                  I suspect they will connect these types of systems 
> only
to
> proxies and sources of inbound communications requests that they
trust.

That's one of the examples of my "federation" draft. E.g. take the MPAA
as a typical industry association: If they run a X.509 certification
authority (incl. revocation lists) which signs the TLS certs of the PBXs
of member organizations then all the telephone systems of Hollywood can
peer with each other over the open Internet in a secure fashion.

Whatever Speermint comes up with: such a scenario must IMHO be
supported.

> This group needs to be focused on developing schemes for "connecting"
these
> proxies into trusted chains. I believe that an advertisement mechanism
> (subscribe/notify) can meet this requirement.

As mentioned before, (subscribe/notify) is very nice for manually
configured relationsships. I don't see how you implement the guild
example from above with that concept. 

Please elaborate.

/ol
--
< Otmar Lendl ([email-masked]) | nic.at Systems Engineer >

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From: Duane <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2006 10:04:10 -0400

> I agree that most people will accept unknown calls to discover something

How's this different from the current system where CID spoofing in the 
US is so prevalent that companies are actually making a business out of 
it. I think the future has the ability to reduce, not increase this in 
the same way people now apply spam filtering to their emails. Although 
the FCC's DNC list is a nice big stick just the same.

-- 

Best regards,
  Duane