Subject: [Speermint] RE: TLS for peering (attack vector draft request)

From: "Livingood, Jason" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2006 10:42:06 -0400

> Let me summarize the point you just made: "It isn't secure on 
> the PSTN, therefore we needn't do it either."  That's hardly 
> a requirement developed against the analysis of a threat.
> 
> I believe that most people would want both the signaling and 
> media secured (if they knew the difference between the two), 
> but if they had to have one they would opt for secure media.
> 
> And if you are worried about toll fraud, the "last mile" 
> access link should be a significant worry.  There is no point 
> in burdening the peering points with over-the-top security 
> when the system can be easily gamed at the end points.

I'd like to suggest that someone or some group of people start work on a
draft that documents possible VoIP peering attack vectors so we know all
of the possible angles of attack to consider.  That could help inform
some of the discussion here.  Don't say we didn't ask for one...  :-)

FWIW, I continue to believe that some of the attack/abuse-prevention
techniques and learnings from messaging could be applied here in some
sense.  So if anyone from MAAWG (Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group) or
something like that wants to help out, please do so. 

Regards
Jason

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From: Andrew Newton <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 07 Jul 2006 11:23:18 -0400

> something like that wants to help out, please do so. 

Having been a participant of MAAWG, co-chair of MARID, and otherwise 
wasting too much time in the anti-spam arena, the one big takeaway I got 
from all of it was Dave Crocker's saying:

   "If anybody tells you they have the answer to spam, they are lying."

If you want to prevent abuse, you need reputation systems.  They come in 
many forms from private address ACLs to DNS blacklists to managed 
services (which for this context, is known as a peering federation or 
exchange).  And as you can imagine, one size does not fit all.

This is why I keep asking the question about the scope of the work for 
this working group: are we addressing the problems of wide open peering, 
or are we addressing the problems of more restrictive peering 
arrangements?  The two do not have the same problems and requirements.

If this group is to address wide open peering, then the right answer 
might be to produce something on which reputation services could hang 
their hat... and hope and pray that some entity out there gets 
recognized as a trusted reputation player.

If this group is to address peering arrangements where some form of 
reputation system is already in use, I see little value in demanding 
they switch it to certificate-based TLS... if for no other reason than 
it is much, much harder to develop a reasonable reputation service than 
the bits on the wire to enable them.

-andy

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From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2006 09:42:49 -0700

> something like that wants to help out, please do so. 

	Excellent suggestion. Have folks looked at any of the BGP
	attack tree documents? It'd be nice (tm) to have
	something like that for our case(s).

	--dmm

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From: "Reinaldo Penno" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2006 18:41:34 -0400

I agree. This long security discussion will greatly benefit from a
security draft in Speermint as suggested by the chairs. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Meyer [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 9:43 AM
> To: Livingood, Jason
> Cc: Khan, Sohel Q [CTO]; [email-masked]; Uzelac, Adam
> Subject: Re: [Speermint] RE: TLS for peering (attack vector draft
request)