Subject: [TLS] Issue 15: Mandate protection against CBC mode timing attack

From: Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2007 07:52:22 -0700

http://www3.tools.ietf.org/wg/tls/trac/ticket/15

NIST's comments suggest that the defense suggested in 6.2.3.2
should be  mandatory. My argument is that hardware systems may
operate in fixed time or otherwise be safe and so we shouldn't
mandate any particular defense.

Proposed resolution: leave as-is.

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From: "Ben Laurie" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2007 10:23:09 -0700

> mandate any particular defense.

Perhaps we should mandate it for implementations that are vulnerable?

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From: Bodo Moeller <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2007 21:59:02 +0200

> Perhaps we should mandate it for implementations that are vulnerable?

That's exactly what the current I-D does: "MUST ensure that record
processing time is essentially the same whether or not the padding is
correct", and "[i]n general, the best way to do this is ...".

>> Proposed resolution: leave as-is.

Bodo