Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt

From: Yaron Sheffer <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2016 22:36:54 +0200

The draft describes using an opaque ticket (similar to a session 
resumption ticket) to pin the identity of a TLS server. The new version 
addresses several comments on this list, in particular regarding the 
message syntax, and requesting a comparison with TACK - thanks Dave and 
Daniel.

Thanks,
     Yaron

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for 
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
Date: 	Sat, 06 Feb 2016 12:25:54 -0800
From: 	[email-masked]
To: 	Yaron Sheffer <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Yaron Sheffer and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket
Revision:	01
Title:		TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
Document date:	2016-02-06
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		16
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01

Abstract:
    Fake public-key certificates are an ongoing problem for users of TLS.
    Several solutions have been proposed, but none is currently in wide
    use.  This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque tickets,
    similar to those being used for TLS session resumption, as a way to
    pin the server's identity.  That is, to ensure the client that it is
    connecting to the right server even in the presence of corrupt
    certificate authorities and fake certificates.  The main advantage of
    this solution is that no manual management actions are required.

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

---

From: Benjamin Kaduk <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 13:31:42 -0600

On 02/06/2016 02:36 PM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> resumption ticket) to pin the identity of a TLS server. The new
> version addresses several comments on this list, in particular
> regarding the message syntax, and requesting a comparison with TACK -
> thanks Dave and Daniel.

I only skimmed, but a couple things stood out:

"bricking" is kind of an informal term

I usually think of "identity" as being some concrete thing that can be
named, so that when it says "identity pinning", I expected there to be
some name or similar concrete identifier.  It seems to me that what is
going on is really that this is a scheme to ensure that subsequent
communications are talking to the same entity by proof-of-possession of
a token/key exchanged on the first communication, but that token does
not contain any particular nameable entity.  It seems that rewording the
entire document in such a fashion would be pretty tedious and result in
somewhat more stilted language, though, so I'm hesitant to recommend
that course of action.

-Ben