Subject: [v6ops] ICMP/ICMPv6 network ingress filtering (Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt)

From: Fernando Gont <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 14:44:15 -0300

Folks,

Based on the recent discussion we have had about ICMP-based DoS attacks,
we have posted an I-D which describes and suggests that network ingress
filtering be applied on ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 error messages (based on the
addresses of the embedded payload).

The I-D is available at:
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt>

Any feedback will be very appreciated.

Thanks!

Best regards,
Fernando

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 10:37:47 -0700
From: [email-masked]
To: Will(Shucheng) Liu <[email-masked]>, Jeroen Massar
<[email-masked]>, Ray Hunter <[email-masked]>, Fernando Gont
<[email-masked]>, Ray Hunter <[email-masked]>, Jeroen Massar
<[email-masked]>, Fernando Gont <[email-masked]>, Shucheng LIU
(Will) <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Fernando Gont and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering
Revision:	00
Title:		Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Attacks which employ Forged
ICMP/ ICMPv6 Error Messages
Document date:	2014-08-28
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		9
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering/
Htmlized:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00

Abstract:
   Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMP/
   ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild.
   The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source
   address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses
   of the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMP/ICMPv6 payload be forged.
   This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward
   method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that
   use forged addresses in the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMP/ICMPv6
   payload.  This advice is in line with the recommendations in BCP38.

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