Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt

From: Hugo Krawczyk <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 00:27:55 -0400

Dear CFRG and chairs,

Draft draft-krawczyk-opaque-01 introduces the OPAQUE scheme, an asymmetric
(or augmented) password-authenticated key exchange with unique security and
functional features. The draft describes OPAQUE's general design and ways
to integrate it with several KE schemes, including TLS 1.3.  I would like
this work to be considered and discussed as a CFRG WG document.

In parallel, we submitted draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00 to the TLS WG with a
much more detailed (though initial) specification for integrating OPAQUE
into TLS 1.3.

Hugo

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 7:00 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
To: Hugo Krawczyk <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Hugo Krawczyk and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque
Revision:       01
Title:          The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol
Document date:  2018-12-28
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          20
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01

Abstract:
   This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
   password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
   authentication in a client-server setting without any reliance on
   PKI.  OPAQUE is the first PKI-free aPAKE to accommodate secret salt
   and therefore it is the first to be secure against pre-computation
   attacks upon server compromise.  In contrast, prior aPAKE protocols
   did not use salt and if they did, the salt was transmitted in the
   clear from server to user allowing for the building of targeted
   pre-computed dictionaries.  OPAQUE security has been proven by
   Jarecki et al.  (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and universally
   composable formal model of aPAKE security.  In addition, the protocol
   provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the password from
   the server even during password registration.

   Strong security, good performance and an array of additional features
   make OPAQUE a natural candidate for practical use and for adoption as
   a standard.  To this end, this draft presents several optimized
   instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of integrating OPAQUE with TLS.

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