Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dmarc-psd-10.txt

From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 09:10:37 -0800

Circling back to this:

On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:56 PM Dave Crocker <[email-masked]> wrote:

> On 1/29/2021 12:15 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 7:51 AM Dave Crocker <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>>    DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
>>    Conformance) is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating
>>    organization can express domain-level policies and preferences for
>>    message validation, disposition, and reporting, that a mail-receiving
>>    organization can use to improve mail handling.  The design of DMARC
>>    presumes that domain names represent either nodes in the tree below
>>    which registrations occur, or nodes where registrations have
>>
>> DMARC does not have 'registrations'.
>>
>
> It's referring to domain name registrations, not DMARC registrations.
>
> Also the occur/occured contrast has no obvious meaning to me.  Really, I
>> have no idea what's intended by it.
>>
> "exist"?
> "take place"?
> "are made"?
> "are done"?
>
> The issue wasn't synonyms but semantics.  'registrations occurred' has no
> obvious DMARC meaning.
>
> unless, perhaps, the meaning is 'domain names exist', but that still
> doesn't explain the contrast being drawn.
>
I'm struggling to understand the concern here.  I think we all know what it
means to register a domain, and that the namespace is arranged as a tree,
and that trees are made up of nodes, and that some nodes are above the cut
where registrations take place while the rest are below.  What other
meaning might someone in this space infer from this text?

Maybe this is better, just for the sake of having something else to look at?

   DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
   Conformance) is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating
   organization can express domain-level policies and preferences for
   message validation, disposition, and reporting, that a mail-receiving
   organization can use to improve mail handling.  The design of DMARC
   presumes that domain names represent nodes in the DNS tree that are either
   reserved as points below which new domain name registrations are made, or are
   the results of those registrations; it does not permit a node to
have both of these
   properties simultaneously.  Since its deployment in 2015, use of
   DMARC has shown a clear need for the ability to express policy for
   these domains as well.

Apart from that, I'm at a loss to understand what's confusing.  I'm not
convinced that "registrations" in the context of domain names is unclear to
a reader familiar with this space.

-MSK

---

From: Barry Leiba <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 18:01:52 -0500

I agree that the abstract is unclear.  This makes no sense to me:

   domain names represent either nodes in the tree below
   which registrations occur, or nodes where registrations have
   occurred; it does not permit a domain name to have both of these
   properties simultaneously.

I don't understand the distinction that it's trying to make between
the two possibilities.
I also don't see the antecedent to "these domains" in the final
sentence of that paragraph.

Beyond that:
> I'm at a loss to understand what's confusing.  I'm not convinced that "registrations" in the
> context of domain names is unclear to a reader familiar with this space.

I am absolutely convinced that it is.  Think of people in M3AAWG, for
whom this is very relevant.  Many of them don't know much about
registries, registrars, and such, and in general, the average reader
won't understand the difference, from a "registration" standpoint,
between facebook.com (which is registered) and "www.facebook.com"
(which is not).  To the average reader, "facebook.com" is registered
under com, and "www.facebook.com" is registered under facebook.  And
the ones who don't think that will likely not understand why we can't
just talk about second-level domains and be done with it.

All that needs to be explained in the Introduction, not the Abstract.
But the Abstract has to explain enough for a reader to understand why
she might or might not be interested in getting the document and
reading it.  So it's going to be tough to word it carefully and to
keep it concise.  But we have to.

Stressing a point:
We very clearly do NOT want to explain this stuff in the Abstract.  In
fact, we don't have to explain much at all in the Abstract.  What we
have to do is make sure that the Abstract doesn't say stuff that's
*wrong* or confusing.  So let's try to find some fifth-grade language
that can suffice, and then make sure the Introduction has the right
words to make it clear to people who know how to do email, but who
don't already understand the issues involved here.

Barry

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 20:12:22 -0800

On 2/18/2021 9:10 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> Circling back to this:
>
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:56 PM Dave Crocker <[email-masked] 
> <mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
>
>>     On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 7:51 AM Dave Crocker <[email-masked]
>>     <mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
>>
>>     ...
> I'm struggling to understand the concern here.  I think we all know 
> what it means to register a domain, and that the namespace is arranged 
> as a tree,

With the intent of building upon Barry's note:

<pedanty> Specification writing requires clarity of who the reader is 
and empathy with the experience they will have reading the document.  
</pedantry>

In that context "we all know" is automatically a red flag for requiring 
overly insider expertise.

However in this case, I think the problem is worse.

Simply put, I believe the text does not say what it means to 
distinguish, even for an expert reader.  So, yes, we all know what you 
say we know.

But in fact that's not the point of the text.  It's trying to make some 
other point,  I assume it's about a type of boundary status, but it 
doesn't say that, nevermind saying it clearly and with enough technical 
and semantic detail to distinguish it.

The text you offer:

>     the results of those registrations; it does not permit a node to have both of these
moves closer to the mark, I think, but still doesn't get there.

EVERY node can have sub-nodes registered.  So it isn't clear what 
'reserved' means.

Worse is that:

    reserved as points below which new domain name registrations are made, or are
    the results of those registrations; it does not permit a node to have both of these
    properties simultaneously.

doesn't make sense to me.  I suspect an average technical reader will be 
at least as confused as I am.

d/

-- 

Dave Crocker
[email-masked]
408.329.0791

Volunteer, Silicon Valley Chapter
American Red Cross
[email-masked]

---

From: Douglas Foster <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 09:01:20 -0500

This wording attempts to address the objections by giving
"registration" a specific context.    I also rewrote some of it for
readability.

- -

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
Conformance) is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating
organization can policies and preferences for validation and
disposition of messages which purport to come from owned domains,
as well as requesting feedback reporting about those message
validation and disposition actions.  These features allow the domain
owner to detect and inhibit domain name abuse.

DMARC is designed for use by domain owners.  Consequently it has no
applicability for domains that have no owner because the domain has
never been registered with an Internet Naming Authority.  Those
authorities have an interest in detecting and inhibiting abuse of the
name registration process, and message recipients have an interest
in preventing deception by entities using unregistered organization
domain names.

Domains at which Internet Naming Authorities perform registration are
referred to as Public  Suffix Domains (PSDs).  This document describes
an extension to DMARC to enable DMARC functionality for PSDs.

 This document also seeks to address implementations that consider a
 domain on a public Suffix list to be ineligible for DMARC
 enforcement.

On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 11:12 PM Dave Crocker <[email-masked]> wrote:

>> I'm struggling to understand the concern here.  I think we all know what
> it means to register a domain, and that the namespace is arranged as a
> tree,
>
>
> <pedanty> Specification writing requires clarity of who the reader is and
> empathy with the experience they will have reading the document.
> </pedantry>
>
> Simply put, I believe the text does not say what it means to distinguish,
> even for an expert reader.  So, yes, we all know what you say we know.
>
> other point,  I assume it's about a type of boundary status, but it doesn't
> say that, nevermind saying it clearly and with enough technical and
> semantic detail to distinguish it.
>
> The text you offer:
>
> Dave [email-masked]
> 408.329.0791
>
> American Red [email-masked]
>
> _______________________________________________
> dmarc mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
>

---

From: "Chudow, Eric B CIV NSA DSAW (USA)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 2021 16:49:24 +0000

I think it's getting better, but I wouldn't call them Internet Naming Authorities. Should we just call them higher-level entities? Also, while the biggest help that PSD DMARC would make is for non-existent organizational domains, it can also help with other domains that haven't expressed a DMARC policy, so the abstract shouldn't only discuss unregistered domains.

How about this:
--
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance) is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating organization can express policy preferences for validation and disposition of messages which purport to come from owned domains, as well as requesting feedback reporting about those message validation and disposition actions. These features allow the Domain Owner to detect and inhibit domain name abuse.

DMARC is designed for use by individual Domain Owners or organizational Domain Owners for their domains and sub-domains. Consequently, DMARC preferences by higher-level entities that have Organizational Domains below them in the DNS hierarchy cannot be specified for sub-domains in their purview. Those higher-level entities have an interest in detecting and inhibiting domain name abuse for domain names within their section of the DNS tree, and message recipients have an interest in preventing deception by entities using those domain names as well. Since its deployment in 2015, use of DMARC has shown a clear need for the ability to express policy preferences for these domains.

Domains at which higher-level entities accept registrations by multiple organizations or other separate entities are referred to as Public Suffix Domains (PSDs).  This document describes an extension to DMARC to enable DMARC functionality for PSDs. It also addresses implementations that consider a domain on a Public Suffix List to be ineligible for DMARC enforcement.

This document also describes an extension to DMARC to specify separate, often stricter, policy preferences for non-existent sub-domains.
--

Thanks,
-Eric

___________________________________
Eric Chudow
DoD Cybersecurity Mitigations
410-854-5735, [email-masked]

From: Douglas Foster <[email-masked]> 
Sent: Saturday, February 20, 2021 9:01 AM
To: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Cc: Murray S. Kucherawy <[email-masked]>; IETF DMARC WG <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dmarc-psd-10.txt

This wording attempts to address the objections by giving
"registration" a specific context.    I also rewrote some of it for readability.

- -

---

From: Steven M Jones <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 2021 15:05:30 -0800

On 2/21/21 08:49, Chudow, Eric B CIV NSA DSAW (USA) wrote:
> I think it's getting better, but I wouldn't call them Internet Naming Authorities. Should we just call them higher-level entities?

There are proper names for these actors - there's no need to be even
more vague ...

> Also, while the biggest help that PSD DMARC would make is for non-existent organizational domains, it can also help with other domains that haven't expressed a DMARC policy, so the abstract shouldn't only discuss unregistered domains.

Except for the few cases where the registrar for a given TLD mandates
DMARC participation and/or certain policies, there should be no language
that sounds like /imposing/ DMARC on domains where the domain
owner/operator has not elected to do so. Loose language here will not be
received well.

--S.

---

From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 2021 23:08:37 -0800

> just talk about second-level domains and be done with it.

Actually that's a community that I would expect to know exactly what all
those terms mean and how they are all related.

I think the use of "registered" seems to be the source of some of this
confusion.  To work with the example you gave here, I agree that "
facebook.com" is registered (under "com"), but disagree that "
www.facebook.com" is registered at all; "facebook.com" was delegated to
some company that now "owns" that piece of the namespace tree and can
create whatever it wants under there without any external arrangement.  To
my mind, "register" involves a specific transaction, sometimes involving
money, with whoever gates access to make those delegations.

> don't already understand the issues involved here.

How's this?:

   organization can use to improve mail handling.

   Within the Domain Name System (DNS) on the public Internet, which is

   organized as a tree, some nodes of that tree are reserved for use by

   registrars, who delegate sub-trees to other operators on request.
DMARC currently
   permits expression of policy only for such sub-trees.  There is a
marked desire to

   be able to express policy for the reserved nodes as well.  This document

   describes an experimental extension to DMARC to add that capability.

If we like that as a replacement Abstract, I'll carry on and propose a
revision to the Introduction.

-MSK

---

From: Barry Leiba <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 09:32:19 -0500

> Actually that's a community that I would expect to know exactly what all those terms mean and
> how they are all related.

There clearly are some in that community who do.  But there are many
there who don't.  This stuff is more esoteric than those of us who are
in the middle of it often realize.

> I think the use of "registered" seems to be the source of some of this confusion.

Yes, exactly.

> To work with the example you gave here, I agree that "facebook.com" is registered (under "com"), but
> disagree that "www.facebook.com" is registered at all;

Right, of course it's not.  I didn't say that it is: I said that
people who don't fully understand this stuff *think* it is, and that's
the part that the text isn't making clear.

> To my mind, "register" involves a specific transaction, sometimes involving money, with whoever gates
> access to make those delegations.

And that's what we need to explain better in the Introduction.

>    registrars, who delegate sub-trees to other operators on request.  DMARC currently
>    permits expression of policy only for such sub-trees.  There is a marked desire to
> If we like that as a replacement Abstract, I'll carry on and propose a revision to the Introduction.

I don't think that really explains it properly either -- I think with
the above text, it's less confusing, but also not correct, or at least
not really indicative of what the document is proposing.

I don't have time today, but give me a couple of days to work on the
Abstract and the Introduction/Example, and I'll propose some specific
text that we can try out.

Barry

---

From: Ken O'Driscoll <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 14:36:00 +0000

I would go even further and not even talk about the trees and nodes. Also, echoing elsewhere in this thread, making it really clear that this is not a case of DMARC is coming for your TLD. So, I’d propose something super basic like this for the second paragraph:

Domain name suffixes (for example .com, .eu, and .co.uk) are controlled by registries, who either directly or through accredited registrars, facilitate the registration and management of domain names below these suffixes. DMARC currently permits expression of policy only for domain names and not for domain suffixes. Since its deployment in 2015, specialist use cases have been identified where it may be desirable for a suffix to express a DMARC policy. This document describes an experimental extension to DMARC to add that capability.

Ken.

From: dmarc <[email-masked]> On Behalf Of Murray S. Kucherawy
Sent: Monday 22 February 2021 07:09
To: Barry Leiba <[email-masked]>
Cc: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>; IETF DMARC WG <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dmarc-psd-10.txt

On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 3:02 PM Barry Leiba <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
I agree that the abstract is unclear.  This makes no sense to me:

I am absolutely convinced that it is.  Think of people in M3AAWG, for
whom this is very relevant.  Many of them don't know much about
registries, registrars, and such, and in general, the average reader
won't understand the difference, from a "registration" standpoint,
between facebook.com<http://facebook.com> (which is registered) and "www.facebook.com<http://www.facebook.com>"
(which is not).  To the average reader, "facebook.com<http://facebook.com>" is registered
under com, and "www.facebook.com<http://www.facebook.com>" is registered under facebook.  And
the ones who don't think that will likely not understand why we can't
just talk about second-level domains and be done with it.

Actually that's a community that I would expect to know exactly what all those terms mean and how they are all related.

I think the use of "registered" seems to be the source of some of this confusion.  To work with the example you gave here, I agree that "facebook.com<http://facebook.com>" is registered (under "com"), but disagree that "www.facebook.com<http://www.facebook.com>" is registered at all; "facebook.com<http://facebook.com>" was delegated to some company that now "owns" that piece of the namespace tree and can create whatever it wants under there without any external arrangement.  To my mind, "register" involves a specific transaction, sometimes involving money, with whoever gates access to make those delegations.

Stressing a point:

How's this?:

-MSK

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 07:21:06 -0800

>>> how they are all related.

yes. But it's worse than that.  The current language is not 
automatically clear even for folk with good knowledge about DNS 
administration.

As is being noted, I too think a great deal of the problem is 
over-reliance on the word register.

It is being used as if it explains a basic difference in administrative 
roles.  It doesn't.  Not even close.

> Right, of course it's not.

I disagree.  Strongly.  The fact that one registration is internal and 
another is through a third-party, semi-regulated service does not make a 
difference, for the use of that word.

I work with an organization that has an IT department that is just as 
formal typical ICANN-authorized registries.  To get a sub-domain is a 
Very Big Deal.  Don't think for a moment that it is fundamentally 
different than interacting with the TLD registeries.

> I didn't say that it is: I said that

How much do you pay to register to vote?

However the rest of the above statement is correct.  A transaction to 
record gain access to a resource or to reserve access to it.

Registration is a process of signing up.  That's all.  And it says 
nothing about the role or relationship of the entity the registration is 
with.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
[email-masked]
408.329.0791

---

From: Douglas Foster <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:49:13 -0500

So what is the best nomenclature for referring to the "ICANN-authorized
registries"?   Dave's phrase or something else?

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 08:14:25 -0800

On 2/22/2021 7:49 AM, Douglas Foster wrote:
> So what is the best nomenclature for referring to the 
> "ICANN-authorized registries"?   Dave's phrase or something else?

Strictly speaking co.uk is not ICAN-authorized.  It's authorized by 
mechanisms internal to the UK.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
[email-masked]
408.329.0791

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 08:13:18 -0800 (PST)

> different than interacting with the TLD registeries.

Wow, I didn't know you had started working for Oracle! Welcome aboard! ;-)

Seriously, this is the rule, not the exception, with large organizations,
especially those that assign significant value to their domain reputations.
There are all kinds of hoops you have to jump through before you'll be able to
get a sub-domain, or for that matter a different name with the company name
embedded in it. And after it's registered, there are ongoing maintenance
requirements.

Registering a domain with, say, GoDaddy is a triviality by comparison.

The SSL certificate situation adds even more complexity, but fortunately
that's not relevant here.

> nothing about the role or relationship of the entity the registration is

Yep.

				Ned

---

From: Douglas Foster <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 11:54:14 -0500

That does not answer the question.  We can only clarify the registration
question by clarifying what entity's registration mechanism is in scope.

Do we simply say that this document applies to registrations occurring
immediately below an entry on the PSL?

---

From: Ken O'Driscoll <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:00:13 +0000

> mechanisms internal to the UK.

None of the ccTLDs registry operators would call or consider themselves "ICANN-authorized". The original authorisation to use the namespace is very separate to ICANN having any general authority over them. Further, it’s likely to be confused with the more common term "ICANN-accredited", which refers to a sub-set of domain registrars, not registries.

I think a better and more inclusive term would be "Internet Domain Registry".

Ken.

---

From: Alessandro Vesely <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 13:37:23 +0100

On Mon 22/Feb/2021 15:36:00 +0100 Ken O'Driscoll wrote:
> I would go even further and not even talk about the trees and nodes. Also, 
> echoing elsewhere in this thread, making it really clear that this is not a 
> case of /DMARC is coming for your TLD/. So, I’d propose something super basic 
> like this for the second paragraph:
> 
>     Domain name suffixes (for example .com, .eu, and .co.uk) are controlled by 
>     registries, who either directly or through accredited registrars, facilitate 
>     the registration and management of domain names below these suffixes. DMARC 
>     currently permits expression of policy only for domain names and not for domain 
>     suffixes. Since its deployment in 2015, specialist use cases have been 
>     identified where it may be desirable for a suffix to express a DMARC policy. 
>     This document describes an experimental extension to DMARC to add that capability.

Clear and concise.  Just s/only for domain names/only for registered domain names/.

Best
Ale
--

---

From: Barry Leiba <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 00:10:13 -0500

OK, here's my proposal; please let me know what you think:

— Abstract —

OLD

   Domains at which registrations can occur are referred to as Public
   Suffix Domains (PSDs).  This document describes an extension to DMARC
   to enable DMARC functionality for PSDs.

NEW

   DMARC uses a Public Suffix List (PSL) to determine what part of a
   domain name is the Public Suffix Domain (PSD), below which
   organizational domain names are created.  DMARC allows organizational
   domains to specify policies that apply to their subdomains, but it
   does not give that flexibility to PSDs.

   This document describes an extension to DMARC to fully enable DMARC
   functionality for PSDs.  This document also addresses implementations
   that consider a domain on a public Suffix list to be ineligible for
   DMARC enforcement.

— Section 1 —

OLD
   DMARC as specified presumes that domain names present in a PSL are
   not organizational domains and thus not subject to DMARC processing;
   domains are either organizational domains, sub-domains of
   organizational domains, or listed on a PSL.  For domains listed in a
   PSL, i.e., TLDs and domains that exist between TLDs and organization
   level domains, policy can only be published for the exact domain.  No
   method is available for these domains to express policy or receive
   feedback reporting for sub-domains.  This missing method allows for
   the abuse of non-existent organizational-level domains and prevents
   identification of domain abuse in email.

NEW
   DMARC as specified presumes that domain names present in a Public
   Suffix List (PSL) — Public Suffix Domains (PSDs) — are not
   organizational domains and are thus not subject to DMARC processing.
   In DMARC, domains fall into one of three categories: organizational
   domains, sub-domains of organizational domains, or PSDs.  For PSDs,
   policy can only be published for the exact domain: no mechanism is
   available for PSDs to express policy or receive feedback reporting
   for sub-domains.  The lack of such a mechanism allows for the abuse
   of non-existent organizational-level domains and hampers
   identification of domain abuse in email.

— Section 1.1 —

OLD
   As an example, imagine a country code TLD (ccTLD) which has public
   subdomains for government and commercial use (".gov.example" and
   ".com.example").  A PSL whose maintainer is aware of this country's
   domain structurewould include entries for both of these in the PSL,
   indicating that they are PSDs below which registrations can occur.
   Suppose further that there exists a domain "tax.gov.example",
   registered within ".gov.example", that is responsible for taxation in
   this imagined country.

NEW
   As an example, imagine a Top-Level Domain (TLD), ".example", that has
   public subdomains for government and commercial use (".gov.example"
   and ".com.example").  A PSL whose maintainer is aware of this TLD’s
   domain structure would include entries for both of these in the PSL,
   indicating that they are PSDs below which organizational domains can
   be registered.  Suppose further that there exists a legitimate domain
   called "tax.gov.example", registered within ".gov.example".

OLD
   This DMARC record provides policy and a reporting destination for
   mail sent from @gov.example.  However, due to DMARC's current method
   of discovering and applying policy at the organizational domain
   level, the non-existent organizational domain of @t4x.gov.example
   does not and cannot fall under a DMARC policy.

NEW
   This DMARC record provides policy and a reporting destination for
   mail sent from @gov.example.  Similarly, "tax.gov.example" will have
   a DMARC record that specifies policy for mail sent from addresses
   @tax.gov.example.  However, due to DMARC's current method of
   discovering and applying policy at the organizational domain
   level, the non-existent organizational domain of @t4x.gov.example
   does not and cannot fall under a DMARC policy.

-- 
Barry

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 06:13:24 -0800

If everyone liked using the PSL and making it integral to DMARC, then 
that would be fine.  But they don't; so it isn't.

The suggested revisions to Barry's suggested revisions, below, primarily 
serve to reference the PSD construct without needing to reference the 
PSL.  And, of course, there are various other suggested wording tweaks...

>     that consider a domain on a public Suffix list to be ineligible for

The major intention is removal of reference to /how/ it does the hierarchy distinction.  In case it ever uses a different mechanism that people like better...

EVEN NEWER
    Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
    Conformance (DMARC) permits a mail-originating
    organization to express domain-level policies and preferences for
    message validation, disposition, and reporting, which a mail-receiving
    organization can use to improve mail handling.

    DMARC distinguishes the portion of a name that is a
       Public Suffix Domain (PSD), below which
    organizational domain names are created.  The basic DMARC capability allows organizational
    domains to specify policies that apply to their subdomains, but it
    does not give that capability to PSDs. This document describes an extension to DMARC to
       fully enable DMARC
    functionality for PSDs.

    Some implementations of DMARC consider a PSD to be ineligible for
    DMARC enforcement.  This specification addresses that case.

>     identification of domain abuse in email.

EVEN NEWER

NEW
    In the basic DMARC model, PSDs are not
    organizational domains and are thus not subject to DMARC processing.
    In DMARC, domains fall into one of three categories: organizational
    domains, sub-domains of organizational domains, or PSDs.  A PSD
    can only publish DMARC policy for itself, and not for any sub-domains under it.
       In some cases, this limitation allows for the abuse
    of non-existent organizational-level domains and hampers
    identification of domain abuse in email.

>     called "tax.gov.example", registered within ".gov.example".

EVEN NEWER
    As an example, imagine a Top-Level Domain (TLD), ".example", that has
    public subdomains for government and commercial use (".gov.example"
    and ".com.example").  The maintainer of a list of such a PSD structure
    would include entries for both of these sub-domains, thereby
    indicating that they are PSDs, below which organizational domains can
    be registered.  Suppose further that there exists a legitimate domain
    called "tax.gov.example", registered within ".gov.example".

>     does not and cannot fall under a DMARC policy.

darn.  couldn't find anything to suggest changing for this one...

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
[email-masked]
408.329.0791

---

From: "Kurt Andersen (b)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 08:41:54 -0800

This is getting much better - thanks for all the wordsmithing. I have one
nuance to add...

>     organization can use to improve mail handling.

Especially in the case of the PSD policies, one should not expect that the
controlling organization would necessarily be "a mail-originating
organization". Generally the idea is to *disavow* being such :-)

Suggested alternate text:

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
permits a domain-controlling
organization to express domain-level policies and preferences for message
validation, disposition, and reporting,
which a mail-receiving organization can use to improve mail handling.

--Kurt

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 09:13:08 -0800

On 2/25/2021 8:41 AM, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
> Especially in the case of the PSD policies, one should not expect that 
> the controlling organization would necessarily be "a mail-originating 
> Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance 
> (DMARC) permits a domain-controlling
> message validation, disposition, and reporting,

+1

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
[email-masked]
408.329.0791

---

From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 13:34:50 -0800

These all work for me.  Thanks for the contributions.

Scott, please work your magic with a revision so the chairs can request
publication and we can get this on its way.

-MSK

---

From: Tim Wicinski <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 16:52:58 -0500

I was just working on merging Barry's comments with Dave's and Kurt's.

I attached what should be correct.  I would like someone to just double
check my work.

tim

---

From: Barry Leiba <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 17:01:57 -0500

It looks right to me.  Thanks, Tim.

Barry

---

From: Tim Wicinski <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 17:22:19 -0500

Thanks Barry

I sent a pull request along to Scott with the changes.

I also generated an rfcdiff which I include for completeness sake.

thanks
tim