Subject: [dns-privacy] User Perspective

From: Brian Haberman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 14:23:53 -0400

This thread is for discussion of the user perspective of DNS privacy
between the recursive resolver and authoritative servers.

    - Focus on *what* is needed.
    - Avoid *how* to achieve it.
    - Consider both ends of DNS the exchange.
    - Scenarios will frame the discussion.

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From: "Paul Hoffman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 10:58:40 -0700

The user scenarios that I can think of are:

1) Users want DNS transaction privacy if possible
2) Users need absolute DNS privacy
3) Users want DNS transaction authentication if possible
4) Users need absolute DNS authentication

#1 is basically opportunistic encryption: the resolver keeps going even 
if the server can't be authenticated. A MITM can see the transaction, 
but a passive observer cannot. Widespread use of #1 would reduce the 
ability to snoop on resolver traffic.

I cannot think of a real use case for #2. That is, I cannot imagine a 
way for a user to usefully signal to a resolver "you must have 
authenticated transaction privacy with all authoritative servers; if any 
of the servers cannot do that, don't continue and return an error to 
me".

#3 does not help prevent any attacks I can think of.

#4 is a new use case that has been discussed recently to give assurance 
of results in unsigned zones, and assurance of child NS and glue records 
in signed zones. This use case is not about privacy.

--Paul Hoffman

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From: manu tman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 16:27:25 -0700

1) User may be willing to send PII (such as ECS) to authority if the
transaction is encrypted.
2) user may be willing to be signaled that the response is “validated” if
the authoritative answer was obtained over an authenticated link for
unsigned zones ( similar to 4. from Paul)

Manu

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