Subject: [dns-privacy] Recursive Resolver Operator Perspective

From: Brian Haberman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 14:24:16 -0400

This thread is for discussion of the recursive resolver operator
perspective of DNS privacy between the recursive resolver and
authoritative servers.

    - Focus on *what* is needed.
    - Avoid *how* to achieve it.
    - Consider both ends of DNS the exchange.
    - Scenarios will frame the discussion.

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From: "Paul Hoffman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:37:14 -0700

Some resolver operators care about their customers' general privacy. In 
such a case, they would want to prevent passive snooping of 
communications between the resolver and authoritative servers. 
Preventing passive snooping would require encryption, but does not 
require authentication.

Some resolver operators have recently spoken of a new use case: giving 
assurance of results in unsigned zones, and assurance of child NS and 
glue records in signed zones. This use case is not about privacy.

--Paul Hoffman

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From: Paul Wouters <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 18:07:50 -0700

> On Jul 25, 2018, at 12:37, Paul Hoffman <[email-masked]> wrote:

> Some resolver operators have recently spoken of a new use case: giving assurance of results in unsigned zones, and assurance of child NS and glue records in signed zones. This use case is not about privacy.

That should not be considered a valid use case for privacy or otherwise.

No one should trust data delivered over the internet without origin security, regardless of which protocol we are talking about.

Paul, who strongly dislikes dns is the last protocol left on the internet where some people argue the protocol needed no protection.

---

From: "Paul Hoffman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 18:36:23 -0700

On 25 Jul 2018, at 18:07, Paul Wouters wrote:

>> Some resolver operators have recently spoken of a new use case: 
>> giving assurance of results in unsigned zones, and assurance of child 
>> NS and glue records in signed zones. This use case is not about 
>> privacy.
>
> No one should trust data delivered over the internet without origin 
> security, regardless of which protocol we are talking about.

This use case has origin security. That is, the authoritative server 
must be fully authenticated. It is similar to web content over TLS.

--Paul