Subject: [Emu] Potential re-establishment of the EMU working group, version 2

From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:25:48 +0200

Here’s a second spin of the potential WG charter. I will talk to the ADs and see what we can do with this… would also appreciate any further comments or expressions of support or objection from you all :-)

Jari

————

EAP Maintenance Update (emu)
       or
EAP Method Maintenance Update (emmu)
------------------------------------

Chairs:
    TBD

Security Area Directors:
    Eric Rescorla <[email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>>
    Kathleen Moriarty <[email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>>

Security Area Advisor:
    TBD

Mailing Lists:
    General Discussion: [email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>
    To Subscribe:       https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu>
    Archive:            http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/ <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/>

Description of Working Group:

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network
   access authentication framework used, for instance, in 802.11 and VPN
   networks and mobile networks. EAP itself is a simple
   protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.

   Over 50 different EAP methods exist, including several methods
   developed in the IETF, and support for EAP exists in a broad set
   of different devices. Previous larger EAP-related efforts at the
   IETF included rewriting the base EAP protocol documentation and
   the development of several standards track EAP methods.

   EAP methods are generally based on existing other security
   technologies, such as TLS, SIM cards, and various algorithms.
   Some of these technologies continue to evolve. And the
   understanding of security threats in today's Internet evolves as
   well, which has driven some of the evolution in these underlying
   technologies. At the same time, some new use cases for EAP have
   been identified, such as broader use of EAP in mobile network
   authentication.

   This working group has been chartered to provide updates to some
   commonly used EAP method. Specifically, the working group shall
   produce documents to:

   - Provide a guidance or update to enable the use of TLS 1.3 in the
     context of EAP TLS (RFC 5216). Update the security
     considerations relating to EAP TLS, to document the implications
     of using new vs. old TLS version, any recently gained new
     knowledge on vulnerabilities, and the possible implications of
     pervasive survellaince or other new concerns.

   - Update the EAP-AKA' specification (RFC 5448) to ensure that its
     capability to provide a cryptographic binding to network context
     stays in sync with what updates may come to the referenced 3GPP
     specifications through the use of EAP in 5G.

     Also, the group should document any recently gained new 
     knowledge on vulnerabilities or the possible implications of 
     pervasive surveillance or other new concerns.

   - Define session identifiers for fast re-authentication for
     EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, and EAP-AKA’. The lack of this definition
     is a recently discovered bug in the original RFCs.

   - Develop an extension to EAP-AKA' such that Perfect Forward Secrecy
     can be provided. There may also be privacy improvements that
     have become feasible with the introduction of recent identity
     privacy improvements in 3GPP networks.

   - Gather experience regarding the use of large certificate and
     certificate chain sizes in the context of EAP-TLS (all versions),
     as some implementations and access networks may limit the 
     number of EAP packet exchanges that can be handled.
     Document operational recommendations or other mitigation
     strategies to avoid issues.

   In all of the above, it is a requirement that none of the updates
   break backwards compatibility with existing specifications or
   implementations. The current RFCs shall not be obsoleted but
   rather updated with either new information or instructions on
   what is needed, for instance, to employ a new TLS version.

   The working group is expected to stay in close collaboration with
   the EAP deployment community, the TLS working group (for EAP-TLS
   work), and the 3GPP security architecture group (for EAP-AKA'
   work).

Milestones:

   TBD

---

From: Alan DeKok <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 09:45:35 -0500

> On Jan 18, 2018, at 9:25 AM, Jari Arkko <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 

  That looks good to me.  I think it covers all of the open topics of conversation.

  Alan DeKok.