Subject: [Emu] WG Last Call for Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-17)

From: Joseph Salowey <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 16:25:41 -0700

This is the working group last-call (WGLC) for draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13.
Please review the draft, focus on the changes since the last WGLC and
submit your comments to the list by July 8, 2021.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-17

A diff from the previous WGLC version (-15):
https://www.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-17&url2=draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-15

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-17

Thanks,

Joe

---

From: Oleg Pekar <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:11:09 +0300

I still see unclearness in Section "2.2. Identity Verification", I'm trying
to look from the implementer's perspective.

1) "Since EAP-TLS deployments may use more than one EAP
   server, each with a different certificate, EAP peer implementations
   SHOULD allow for the configuration of a unique trusted root (CA
   certificate) to authenticate the server certificate and one or more
   server names to match against the SubjectAltName (SAN) extension in
   the server certificate.  To simplify name matching, an EAP-TLS
   deployment can assign a name to represent an authorized EAP server
   and EAP Server certificates can include this name in the list of SANs
   for each certificate that represents an EAP-TLS server."

--- question: Should the server name match *any* of SAN extensions in the
server certificate? If so - then suggest to say this explicitly.

2) "If server
   name matching is not used, then peers may end up trusting servers for
   EAP authentication that are not intended to be EAP servers for the
   network."

--- question: It looks like a warning, right? Suggest to make it more
explicit. Something like "If server name matching is not used, then it
essentially decreases the level of security of peer's authentication since
the peer may end up trusting servers for EAP authentication that are not
intended to be EAP servers for the network."

Regards,
Oleg

On Mon, Jun 28, 2021 at 2:26 AM Joseph Salowey <[email-masked]> wrote:

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