Subject: [Gen-art] GEN-ART telechat review of draft-farrell-perpass-attack-05

From: Scott Brim <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:55:58 -0500

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
< http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-farrell-perpass-attack-05
Reviewer: Scott Brim
Review Date: 2014-02-01
IETF LC End Date: 2013-12-31
IESG Telechat date: 2014-02-06

Summary: This draft is ready for publication as a BCP.

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:

Two comments:

First, there are good arguments for publication as Informational , but
since it incrementally adds to BCP 72, it should be incorporated
there, so BCP is slightly better.

Second, the only significant difference from -04 was the removal of
"and be prepared to justify their decisions". There was a lot of
discussion that led to this, and some concern that the statement on
architectural considerations is not strongly enough worded without it.
However, see the previous paragraph (both paragraphs are below).  I
believe that these two paragraphs, taken together, do what is desired.

   Those developing IETF specifications need to be able to describe how
   they have considered PM, and, if the attack is relevant to the work
   to be published, be able to justify related design decisions.  This
   does not mean a new "pervasive monitoring considerations" section is
   needed in IETF documentation.  It means that, if asked, there needs
   to be a good answer to the question "is pervasive monitoring relevant
   to this work and if so how has it been considered?"

   In particular, architectural decisions, including which existing
   technology is re-used, may significantly impact the vulnerability of
   a protocol to PM.  Those developing IETF specifications therefore
   need to consider mitigating PM when making these architectural
   decisions.  Getting adequate, early review of architectural decisions
   including whether appropriate mitigation of PM can be made is
   important.  Revisiting these architectural decisions late in the
   process is very costly.

Scott

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From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 09:22:08 -0800

> there, so BCP is slightly better.

It does?

It does not say it does.

So that linkage is something the reviewer is creating.

At the least, a claim that it does "add to" BCP 72 invites further 
debate about the nature and implications of the update.

Again, making this a BCP confuses the nature of the document with those 
that give substantive operational guidance.

This document does exactly what it should:  It defines the topic and it 
says the IETF considers the topic important.  It calls for practices, 
but doesn't -- and shouldn't -- define them.

The job of providing substantive details about IETF practices associated 
with the topic will come later.

d/
-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 12:38:59 -0500

Thanks Scott.
In the interest of being clear about my position, I support publication
of 04 but do not support publication of 05.

I think all the discussion that is useful has happened and all that
remains is the consensus call from the sponsoring AD.

---

From: Abdussalam Baryun <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2014 02:02:51 +0100

> of 04 but do not support publication of 05.

I don't know why you object 05.

> remains is the consensus call from the sponsoring AD.

The AD should read all comments from the community of practical
statements and AD to follow/sponsor reasonable statements/discussions or
policies, not sponsoring best future plan as best current practice ( it may
be initial plan for BCP).

IMHO, the AD powers are not to be used against reasonable engineering
discussions/requests only if that AD has done sound reasonable
engineering replies.

AB