Subject: Re: [GROW] New Version Notification for draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00.txt

From: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 13:19:27 +0000

This is a new individual draft submission in SIDROPS.
Thought there may be interest to look at it and comment here (in GROW) as well.

This work was motivated following a recent NANOG discussion about AS hijacking: 
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-June/207797.html

Sriram
________________________________________
From: Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) <[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2020 8:44 AM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Fw: New Version Notification for draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00.txt

Comments on the draft are welcome.
Chairs have kindly allocated time to present this at IETF 108 SIDROPS meeting.

Sriram
________________________________________
From: [email-masked] <[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 7:52 PM
To: Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed); Montgomery, Douglas C. (Fed)
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00.txt

A new version of I-D, draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Kotikalapudi Sriram and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection
Revision:       00
Title:          AS Hijack Detection and Mitigation
Document date:  2020-07-13
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          5
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00.txt 
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-00 

Abstract:
   This document proposes a method for detection and mitigation of AS
   hijacking.  In this mechanism, an AS operator registers a new object
   in the RPKI called 'ROAs Exist for All Prefixes (REAP)'.  REAP is
   digitally signed using the AS holder's certificate.  By registering
   REAP, the AS operator is declaring that they have Route Origin
   Authorization (ROA) coverage for all prefixes originated by their AS.
   A receiving AS will mark a route as Invalid if the prefix is not
   covered by any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) and the route origin AS
   has signed a REAP.  Here Invalid means that the route is determined
   to be an AS hijack.