Subject: [Idr] change in draft-ietf-idr-bgp-vuln-00.txt

From: Yakov Rekhter <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 06:26:34 -0700

Folks,

Sandy Murphy, the author of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-vuln-00.txt, proposed
the following change to her document, Replace 
  
  Spoofing a RST in this situation requires an attacker to guess a sequence 
  number that is in the proper half of the sending window,

with

  Spoofing a RST in this situation requires an attacker to guess a sequence 
  number that need only be within the receive window [9],

and add a [9] reference to the Paul Watson talk about the TCP RST
study he did.

The proposed change is intended to make the issue with TCP RST more
clear and accurate.

If there are any objections to the proposed change, please
send them to the list by May 18, 2004.

Yakov.

_______________________________________________
Idr mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr

---

From: Curtis Villamizar <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 12:14:45 -0400

In message <[email-masked]>, Yakov Rekhter writes
> send them to the list by May 18, 2004.

Yakov,

Very good change.  It makes the statement much more clear and reminds
us that the probability is based on the number space divided by the
window size (minus the size of the attacker's payload).  If DoS is the
goal then all that is needed is a single byte to cause a cease.  If
insertion of bogus data is the attacker's goal a packet boundary must
be matched and the insertion must match a packet boundary or a cease
will be caused and the bogus insertion lost.  Might be worth
mentioning that too (optional).

Curtis

ps - ah that's easy to fix just make the window real small like a
couple of bytes... [just kidding of course :) ]

---

From: Curtis Villamizar <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 12:14:45 -0400

Yakov,

Curtis